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Thee7reL:GI'OVe 
During the past forty years, Oregon voters have appr.oved only two 
tax proposals; both taxes on cigarettes. The subject of this study is 
the campaign carried out by proponents of H.B. 3064 to pass the most recent 
Oregon tax referendum measure. Central to the questions asked in the 
investigation of the 1972 cigarette tax campaign was why the outcome of 
this proposal was successful. The thesis hypothesizes that the critical 
variable was the involvement of major socio-economic interest groups in 
formulating and disseminating persuasive campaign messages. 
The rationale for entering ,into such a study was the shortage of 
information on campaigns which focus not only on the effects of the "new 
p~litics?t on the electorate, but t,.Jhich fill in details of significance 
to the historical setting within which the campaign takes place •. Further, 
there is an apparent shortage of information on state-wide referendum 
campaigns which describe the campaign setting, the structure of the decis­
ion-making organization directing the campaign effort, and the voters 
reaction to campaign strategies. 
For these reasons two research methods were utilized for the des­
criptive case study: a field investigation and a two-part opinion survey. 
The former traced the historical-political situation in Oregon, action 
taken by the 1971 legislative assembly to correct the state budgetary 
dilemma, the mobilization of public and private individuals following the 
successful referral drive to place the cigarette tax on the ballot, and 
campaign strategies carried out during the 40 day period prior to the 
special election. 
By reviewing all available news reports and interviewing those 
persons active in the campaign, the field investigation revealed that the 
state was indeed threatened by budgetary crisis and that the proposed tax 
was the only immediately available solution. An alternative source would 
have required another special session, another 90 day waiting period, and 
the threat of another referendum. Without the tax, state agencies depend­
ing for support on revenue coming from the General Fund would face a two 
percent cut in funds for the 1972-73 fiscal year. 
It was also found in the field investigation that the cigarette tax 
had support from legislative leaders of both political parties; a ccllec­
tion of large permanent interest groups; and an array of state officials 
and private citizens with pocket-book interest in passing the ballot 
measure. Persuasive appeals developed by the involved groups focused on 
the fiscal impact of a tax defeat on these and other special economic 
"'" 
groups in Oregon. 
Results of the second research method, the voter-leadership survey, 
indicated that the voters surveyed were generally accurate in assessing 
the participation of interest gruups and were influenced by those groups 
most visible and state officials most vocal. It also revealed that while 
the voters professed tiD being influenced by certain groups or individuals, 
the reasons they gave for their vote choice were not those emphasized by 
the influence sources. 
The leadership survey found that interest group leaders were some­
what more accurate than legislators in ascribing motives to the choices 
voters made, but that there was a significant discrepancy between opinions 
of voters and opinions of the state leadership relevant to the reasons 
people voted as they did. 
As to the central question of this thesis, the investigation did 
confirm the proposition that interest groups made the difference in the 
success of the 1972 cigar-ette tax measure. Interest groups were effective, 
chiefly because of the many roles they performed in each phase of the 
campaign: as initiators of campaign activity, as legitimizers, as fund 
raisers, and as channel sources for disseminating persuasive messages to 
both their own members and to the general public. The study strongly 
suggests that it was the mediating activity of state and local influentials, 
through the mechanisms of special interest pressure and cause groups which 
provided the critical margin in the vote outcome~ 
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CHAPTER I 
iNTRODUCTION 
The morning papers of January 19, 1972, served notice that the 
cigarette tax proposal, House Bill 3064, had passed by the narrow mar­
gin of two percent. Of the 36 counties in the state, only 12 had ap­
proved Oregon's newest tax increase. For the people invol~~d in the 
campaign this meant the culmination of 40 days of intense activity. If 
the "yes" vote did not indicate an overwhelming popular mandate, it was 
1 
still hailed by the proponents as a significant victory. 
From 1930, to 1971, a period of 41 years, only one other tax 
measure of any kind had been accepted by Oregon's electorate. This was 
the 1966 cigarette tax, imposing the original four Cel'.ts a package tax; 
passing only after four previous unsuccessful attempts. Moreover, a 
variety of sales tax measures had been turned down on five different 
occasions, the most recent in 1969 by an eight to one margin. Income 
tax packages had also been rejected by the people twice during the same 
41 year period; and a constitutional amendment allowing the legislature 
2 
to impose an emergency clause on tax legislation was substantially de­
3 
feated. It is not hard to see why Oregon voters are regarded as stub­
4 
bornly resistant whenever a new tax is at issue. 
The question naturally arises--why was the outcome of the cigaret­
te tax election different? What were the features unique to the cam­
paign? From the first organizational meeting through the implementation 
2 
of strategies, the campaign took place within only 40 days. Some politi­
cal observers commented that had the campaigners had more time to mob­
ilize their human resources the margin of victory would have been even 
greater. And yet, public opinion polls conducted in late December, com­
pared with those carried out three days before the election, showed a 
5 
significant downward trend: 51 percent favoring the tax in December, 
6 
and only 32 percent by mid-January. 
Reports on campaign expenditures from the Office of the Secretary of 
State provide still another element in the puzzle. Opponents of the 
7 
measure spent a total of $54,800, while those in support spent $29,363. 
It has become a truism in American politics that large "war chests" are 
8 
essential to campaign victory. The losing side outspent the victors by 
nearly two to one, suggesting that other factors were at work. 
The campaign managers attempted to explain their success by citing 
careful utilization of funds, explaining that nearly all of the money 
donated by supporters went into heavy media advertising in the metro­
politan area of Portland. Yet the voters abstract reveals that adjoin­
ing counties, where all were exposed to residual metropolitan media 
<television and radio primarily), had starkly contrasting voting patterns. 
Benton county supported the tax by two to one, while Lincoln and Linn 
counties defeated it, albeit by narrow margins. Further, four of the 
twelv~ counties registering a positive vote were northeast and eastern 
Oregon counti~s far from any measurable exposure to the Portland tele­
9 
vision and radio stations. 
Campaign success was also attributed to heavy door-to-door campaign­
ing by college yputh. But student leaders themselves have reported 
3 
practically no activity of this nature. Personal contacts were made 
but only. to other students or faculty members in higher education in­
10 
stitutions. 
One last observation central to the questions asked in this thesis 
has to do with the unusually wide support by special interest groups; 
who, on past tax measures, have been at odds. Elections Division reports 
reveal that funds came from labor, business, elementary-secondary and 
higher education sources, as well as from a wide variety of private 
11 
interests. If pocket-book commitment is any index of political in-
terest--then this measure seems to have had the attention of every major 
occupational group in the state. tt may be that the financial commit­
ment of organizations dovetailed into political activity by members which 
had some effect on the vote outcome. It may also be that monetary sup­
port indicates nothing more than leadership support and is not represen­
tative of the membership at large. 
Whatever the answers we know that too often political analysts 
have been proven wrong when they attempt to second-guess the electorate. 
This study is undertaken in an effort to obviate the problems of analysis 
by bringing together the full range of campaign activity, leadership 
opinion, and voter perceptions within the situational context of Oregon 
in the seventies. 
I. RATIONALE 
"Traditional rhetorical studies have lately come under attack 
because of their too frequent focus on public address as the "rhetoric 
12 
of political campaigns. tt With the advent of modern technology, 
4 
public speeches have become relatively unimportant as devices in mass 
persuasion; replaced by printed and electronic mediums capable of car­
ryin.g the message to far greater numbers of people. Sociologists 1ike­
wise criticize descriptive studies because they provide too little in the 
13 
way of soundly based evaluative judgments. Strengths of descriptive 
investigations are overshadowed by insufficient information regarding 
voter effect. Recent approaches to campaign communication use the tech­
niques of empirical investigation to fix on combinations of a "few 
variables without any accompanying sense of their importance or of their 
14 
ability to explain the vote-decision process." 
Attempts have been made to resolve some of the more persistent 
shortcomings of past research. Lazarsfeld pi.oneered panel studies of 
voter behavior, and sought to explain mass'communication effects in terms 
of informal social relationships. The resulting body of theory became 
increasingly well defined as the investigators focused primarily on the 
receiver in the communication continuum. To Lazarsfeld and those who con­
tinued his work, the central question was whether external factors such as 
"advertising or another person's advice" could be traced to a decision made 
. IS 
by a particular voter. The results of the personal influence studies did 
expand our understanding of the effects of mass communication on voter be­
havior, but with only a few exceptions, it provides scarcely any informa­
tion relevant to the communication process from the campaigner's point of 
16 
view. 
'The social relations research paid little attention to setting. 
Further, the studies measured only effects. of consumer, informational and 
partisan campaigns. Whether the theory can account for effects in 
5 
a campaign directed at "sell ing" the publ ic something as imper,sonal 
and complex as a new tax has been challenged. 
Local and state referendum electiGns are considered unique. 
Existing studies do not account for campaign effects in the state or 
local referendum campaign for two reasons: (1) Partisan identification 
is the same for all voters. National research on partisan campaigns 
has revealed that approximately four out of five people base their final 
17 
vote decision on partisan loyalties. Those with weak party identi­
fication depend for their choice on cues about the candidate's person­
ality, or "image." Taken together, campaigns for public office assume 
that issues, personalities and parties are the basis for voter decision. 
(2) In the referendum there is only the issue; and it has been found 
that voters pay minimal attention to anything but the most general of 
18 
issues. For instance, voters may dislike taxes but have scant under­
standing of the way in which their tax dollar is spe~t. Therefore, cam­
paign coordinators feel that the referendum campaign must be geared not 
only to persuading the public that the measure is in their best interest, 
but must attempt to educate the public as well. 
Another problem with scholarly studies of political campaigns is 
that the majority have focused on campaigns at a national level. Equi­
valent analysis of state or local elections is rare. "In these elec­
tions, far more common than presidential contests. the campaign can be 
19 
expected to have greater effect." The reason is that on a national 
level appeals are directed to a differentiated mass, predicated on the 
20 
early mass communication theory of stimulus-response conditioning. 
At the local level it becomes possible to structure appeals to discreet 
~ 
groups, or voting blocs. 
For these and other reasons, most analyses of campaign effects do 
not provide the communication scholar with answers as to why certain 
referendum campaigns succeed while others fail. Nor do institutional 
leaders who actually participate in political life provide accurate in­
formation on cause-effect. We know that too often they have been proven 
wrong when attempting to second-guess the electorate. Those closely in­
volved in a campaign frequently possess personal theories about voter 
behavior that obscure the multivariable factors entering into voter 
choice on a specific issue in a given election year. Perceptual select­
ivity dictated by special interests and past experience may trick leaders 
into thinking they know "why" an election came out the way it did. 
Group influences playa part in the "optical illusions" that de­
velop between the elites' view of what the mass believes, and what they 
really do believe. Most state officials and organizational leaders spend 
the majority of their time in informal communication about politics with 
others in the same select group. Rarely do they encounter a conversa­
tion in which their assumptions of voter ideas is challenged. Studies 
comparing leadership perceptions with the electorate repeatedly confirm 
the unreliability of election cause and effect determinations based on 
21 
leadership opinion. 
Since the subject of this investigation involves a complex cam­
paign waged and won in an equally complex social environment, it seemed 
unlikely that the questions posed could be answered by utilizing only 
one research method. A campaign is defined as the activities of an 
'J 

individual or group (the campaigner), in a particular context (the 
campaign setting), designed to manipulate the behavior of a wider 
22 
number of people (the audience) to the campaigner's advantage •. 
Using this definition it becomes important to consider the variables 
that intervene between the source and the receiver, because, as Schramm 
says, "it is dangerous to assume any simple and direct relationship 
between a message and its effect without knowing all the other elements 
23 
in the process." 
Therefore, as a preliminary step in an area where explicit in­
formation on state referendum campaigns is lacking, this study is under­
taken primarily to obtain detailed descriptive data. We need to know: 
(1) the history of tax measures in Oregon, the events that led to a 
referendum on the cigarette tax, and the implications of action taken 
by the 1971 special legislative assembly in view of the successful re-
feral of the tax; (2) tae mobilization of public and private individuals 
and groups, the techniques they used to influence the electorate; end 
(3) the voters reaction to issues, appeals, and general campaign strategy. 
In order to gather information that focuses on each of the elements 
ill the cigarette tax campaign (the setting, the campaigners, and the 
audience), it was felt that a two-part case study was required that 
utilized both the field investigation and survey research methods. 
Such an account of the events under investigation will provide infor­
mation wbet'sby: (1) reconstruction of a state-wide contemporary referen­
dum campaign can be built, (2) certain inferences regarding the nature 
of communication in such campaigns can be dr~wn, and (3) questions rele­
vant to success or failure of campaign strategies can be answered. 
8­
In summary, methods employed may provide evidence that can become 
part of a realistic analysis of the process that James Bryce referred 
to as "the mutual action and reaction of the makers or leaders of opil'­
24 
ttion upon the mass, and of the mass upon them. Campaigns that precede 
democratic elections function not only to persuade the voter of the 
value of leadership judgments on the course public policy should follow, 
but values and attitudes held by the public have an opportunity to 
surface when they would not under ordinary circumstances. In a democ­
racy it is the campaign which draws attention to the reciprocal relation­
ship between state leaders and the citizenry. 
II. PROPOSITION 
Herbert Bauss and William Ross, owne·rs of a well known California 
public relations firm, have written ·that in elections won by a close 
margin in various parts of the nation, it has often been the activity 
25 
of groups like public employees that made the difference. In observ­
ing past Oregon referendum campaigns, the writer's own observations tend 
to confirm the importance of interest group activity in the outcome of 
elections. The very nature of Oregon's initiative and referendum pro­
cedures seem to require such activity; both in initiating a ballot meas­
ure and in doing the work necessary to pass it. 
MOre often than not, such interest gr0ups work against each other. 
The 1966 Tax Limitation measure, for instance, was initiated by a group 
called the Oregon Homeowners Association. Once the measure was placed 
on the ballot, groups representing busines.s and education, among others, 
joined together in a campaign to defeat it. In the ill fated 1969 Sales 
9 
Tax measure, business interests pushed its passage in the legislature 
and upon referral to the people, attempted to organize other groups 
in support. Their attempts fai1~d as the large AFL-CIO organization 
mobilized locals around the state in a successful campaign to defeat 
the tax. 
Given the accuracy of Bauss and Ross's observation regarding the 
importance of employee groups in a close campaign, and the historical 
nature of campaign support in Oregon, this investigator wondered what 
might happen if major interest groups collaborated in their campaign 
activity. Preliminary investigation suggested that a large number of 
groups were involved in the cigarette tax campaign, groups with exist­
ing mechanisms for disseminating information to their membership; as 
well as temporary cause groups which formed for the specific purpose of 
working in behalf of the tax increase. As a result, it was decided 
that an investigation of the relationships of campaign activity that 
existed between interest groups might reveal important contributing 
factors in the outcome of the election. 
The preceding overview of the political situati9n that existed in 
Oregon in late 1971 and early 1972, suggests that the proposed tax in­
crease faced a high probability of defeat. The introductory comments 
also stated that causal relationships are not readily forthcoming. In 
an effort to establish such relationships, therefore, it is the hypoth­
esis of this thesis that the critical variable in the success of the 
1972 cigarette tax campaign was the involvement of major socio-economic 
interest groups. The specific purpose of the thesis then, is to test 
the hypothesis so that certain generalizations can be made regarding 
10 
the nature of participant involvement in a state referendum campaign. 
Interest group as it is used here denotes either a permanent 
pressure group composed of individuals who join together beca:..:se of a 
specific social or economic long-range interest, or temporary cause 
groups whose members are attracted because of a common interest in a 
short-term issue. Pressure groups are characterized by their formal 
organizational structure and permanence while temporary cause or pro­
motional groups may disband once they perceive the objective has been 
achieved or have determined that it has no chance of attainment. 
The thesis argues that all social action can be evaluated in 
terms·of the flow, structure and content of communication. In order to 
assess the communicative processes of interest groups and the nature of 
their involvement, the inquiry will exmine their activity in each of 
the three phases of communication. 
Pirst, we will contend that interest groups can be viewed as 
channel sources for the dissemination of information (communication 
flow) to their members. Channel source is defined as the means by which 
messages flow from the advocate source to the intended receiver, in this 
case, the source is the state campaign coordinator who utilizes existing 
organizations as vehicles to relay the arguments to the public. In 
general terms, a channel may be of two classes: (a) secondary channels 
in which messages move indirectly to the receiving source with no pos­
sibility of immediate feedback, as in televized propaganda or public 
speeches; and (b) primary channels utilizing the interpersonal medium 
with its attendant source-receiver interaction. Membership refers to 
the uninvolved and initially uninformed individuals belonging to an 
11 

interest group, who depend on the group leadership for their "defini­
tion of the situation." Leadership identifies for these members group 
goals, provides information relevant to the issue, and attempts to 
influence group opinion. 
Second, we will examine how interest groups structure their ap­
peals in their attempts to define the relevance of the measure to member­
ship needs (communication content). Interest group leaders may attempt 
to inform, educate, or indoctrinate members by using either factual or 
emotionally loaded words in designing the message. The way in which 
messages are ultimately composed will reflect such deliberate efforts • 
.Pinally, we will argUe that endorsements made by interest groups 
provide a means by which specific arguments gain voter attention. Among 
the many possible issues that can be used persuasively, only one or two 
will be chosen. The argument that is used, finally, in announcing sup­
port not only provides information of a general nature, but functions 
to legitimize the campaign by drawing a connection between membership 
goals and the effects on them of the ballot measure proposal (communica­
tion structure). Endorsements may take the form of public press releases 
that can reach the total public; but they may also be known only to 
members through organizational bulletins or newsletters. 
In testing the proposition the following general questions will 
be asked regarding the campaign itself: 
1. 	 Which individuals and groups were involved in 
the campaign, how did they become involved, and 
why? 
2. 	 What was the nature of individual and group in­
volvement: the roles they performed and the resources 
"they utilized? 
I 
· 12 

3. 	 What was the perceived effectiveness of 
interest group activity from the frame of 
reference held by representative leader­
ship? 
4. 	 Was there any coordination between groups 
in planning campaign strategy, decision mak­
ing, and organization of resources? 
After assessing actual campaign contributions by interest groups 
we will inquire into their impact by asking: 
1. 	 Did membership in a particular group make 
it more probable that persuasive communi­
cat~on regarding the cigarette tax issue 
was received favorably? 
2. 	 To what extent did the membership of a 
.... particular group look to that group for 
verification of an election choice? 
3. 	 How accurate are the voters in assessing the 
role of special interest groups in the cam­
paign? 
4. 	 Is there congruence between what the public 
and private influentials believe and what the 
voters believe when judging the impact of a 
particular argument? 
While the study focuses on the main question of interest group 
participation and effectiveness in the cigarette tax campaign, it does 
not 	exclude other questions. Some of these questions are: 
1. 	 Were there people who voted in this campaign 
who do not typically vote in state tax elections? 
2. 	 If so, did these "seldom vote" people identify 
with either an interest group involved in the 
campaign or a particular socio-demographic member­
ship group? 
3. 	 Did the people who by their own statements 
rarely cast a ballot in a state tax measure 
election believe they would have been affected 
by passage or defeat of the tax measure, 
4 •. To what extent does the voters judgment conform 
to the fiscal impact identified by state in­
f1uentials? 
13 
s. 	 In what ways do similiar demographic 
groups conform in their awareness of 
(a) issues, (b) channels used, (c) groups 
involved? 
6. 	 And an important question for any campaign 
utilizing mass cqrnmunication techniques: 
who, finally, is 'the audience who listens 
to campaign messages? 
It is virtually impossible to isolate all the relevant variables 
that may influence the vote outcome. But it is possible to discover 
deliberate campaign strategy: decisions made by coordinators such as 
which voters are most likely to be swayed by appeals, the issues that 
should be emphasized, the best means for' raising funds, how to allocate 
personnel time, and the selection of points on which the opposition 
26 
seems most vulnerable. By identifying the product of these decisions 
and then asking a sample of voters their opinions about which appeals 
and issues were most important, how they obtained their information, 
arid what the impact of the measure would be on them, the most signifi­
cant factors in the election should become clear enough so that a real­
istic estimate can be made of the campaign impact. This in turn will 
offer arguments either in support of, or in refutation to, the thesis 
-hypothesis. 
III. PROCEDURES 
The 	Field Investigation 
Part one of the research plan includes a descriptive case study 
of the cigarette tax campaign, beginning with its inception following 
the 1971 legislative special session through the post-election week. 
The 	purpose of the field investigation was to reconstruct impor­
14 
tant aspects of the state referendum campaign. The exploration sought 
to establish who (the campaigner) said what (the message) to whom (the 
audience) by what means (the channel) and to what effect (behavior of 
27 
the receiver). In other words, the field investigation examines the 
campaign in terms of the communication flow. 
Information was gathered in three ways: (1) through open-ended 
personal interviews and correspondence with relevant information 
sources, (2) by utilizing available news reports about the campaign, 
and (3) through analysis of campaign messages directed to the electorate. 
Interviews and Correspondence. Principal campaign coordinators 
were interviewed as well as leaders within each major interest group 
which played a role ~n the campaign. Some of those contacted were the 
professionals paid to coordinate the campaign, leaders from the Oregon 
School Employes' Association, Oregon State Employes' Association, Oregon 
Education Association, Associated Oregon Industries, representatives 
from higher education, and organized labor. Representatives from govern­
ment agencies who publicly spoke out on the issues comprised another 
.c1ass of interviewees, as did legislators who endorsed the tax measure 
through personal appearances and press releases. Each time an inter­
view revealed the name of a group or individual connected with the cam­
paign. every effort was made to contact that person. In this way the 
net of communication gradually expanded to include every organization 
active in any significant way throughout the state. 
Appointments for the interviews were obtained by phone and in each 
case were conducted in the informant's office. The responses were re­
corded on tape and afterwards transcribed sequentially and without inter­
15 
pretation. They were begun shortly after the January 18th election 
and continued through June of 1972. 
When interviews were not J;.)ssible, letters were sent to orga­
nizational representatives or to legislators. The letters requested 
pertinent info~ation related to the individual or group's specific 
function in the campaign as well as any other information deemed pos­
sible from that source. 
A sample of the questions put to the formal leadership is in-
eluded in Appendix B. They were designed not only to obtain retro­
spective accounts of situations and events but also for opinion and 
perceptual content. All of the interviews conducted in person and by 
letter included such questions as: 
1. 	 The identity of individuals or social systems 
engaged in the selection and dissemination of 
messages. 
2. 	 The roles played by individuals in decision making 
strategy, issues chosen, design of the messages, 
themes and slogans, channels utilized, and timing 
of campaign strategy. 
3. 	 The coordination of campaign efforts between 
interest groups and cause groups or apparent 
lack of cooperative effort. 
4. 	 The evaluations made at any time regarding the 
effect of specific message flow or issue appeal. 
Also, the presence of any feedback provisions and 
their impact on future decisions. 
s. 	 The aspects of the campaign perceived as most 
effective: selection of appeals, activity of 
interest or ad hoc groups, or strategy decisions. 
Other questions varied, depending upon the individual being inter­
viewed. In the case of Jack Thompson, Assistant Secretary of State, 
opinion on general campaign effectiveness was solicited because he is 
16 

not only a long time observer of Oregon political events but becapse 
he was uninvolved'yet intimately aware of campaign strategies. Ted 
Hallock, on the other hand, is familiar with Oregon politics both as a 
state senator and as a professional public relations executive who was 
not only closely involved in the campaign but directed much of the 
fo~al activity. In sum, questions posed in interviews and by mail 
were both general and highly specific depending on the interviewer's 
judgment as to the best way to obtain the greatest amount of information. 
News Reports. Accounts of the campaign were collected from pub­
lished reports of the events covering the period from December 16, 197J., 
to February 11, 1972, including the student newspapers from three state 
universities: Portland State University, Oregon State University and 
the University of Oregon.. Newspapers published in each Oregon county 
were collected covering the same period and an analysis made of their 
contents: editorials, letters to the editor, regular news reports and 
feature columns. The newspaper files were a compilation of all releases 
obtained by the Governor's office, the Oregon State Employes' Associa­
tion, Oregon Education Association, and Oregon Department of Human Re­
sources through the services of a professional clipping agency. 
Campaign Messages. Press releases, radio and television copy, 
organizational bulletins and campaign "fl iers" were the third source of 
research data. Whenever possible this material was obtained directly 
from the diffusion source, i.e., the organization writing and distribut­
ing the material. Radio and television copy was provided by Ted Hallock's 
public relations firm who developed it, newsletters were collected from a 
17 
representative of the organization distributing them, and press re­
leases or speeches were collected whenever available. 
Tp.e Survey 
Strategy. Originally the research strategy called for mailed 
questionnaires to a random sample of Oregon voters in order to assess 
the effects of the campaign. That purpose was abandoned as informal 
conversations with campaign leaders and other interested citizens who 
watched the progress of the campaign revealed discrepancies in opinion 
regarding the "effect" of the referendum issue on the average voter. 
Barly interviews similarly suggested a wide divergence in opinion. 
It seemed more appropriate to the purpose of this study, therefore, to 
survey not only a segment of the voting population but also organization­
al representatives, involved individuals representing ad hoc groups, 
legislators who spoke at public meetings in defense of the measure, 
and newspaper editors in counties where the measure passed but where 
28 
there was very little direct media support. This comparison of an 
elite to a cross-section sample was done to obtain data for a comparative 
analysis of perceptions about cause-effect. 
Sample .. 
(1) Voters. Because of financial limitations it was 
decided to confine the voter survey to two counties: both, as was men­
tioned earlier, representing areas where little in the way of publicity 
via mass media was evident. Douglas and Benton counties were chosen 
because approximately the sane number of votes were cast in each. Also, 
since the chief objective of the survey was to discover which channels 
were the most effective in influencing voter behavior, the counties 
18 
represented contrasting vote patterns: Benton, passing the measure by 
over 2,000 votes; 'and Douglas, defeating it by approximately the same 
29 
margin. One out of every 50 persons who voted weta mailed survey 
questionnaires. 
(2) Formal leadership. Leadership is defined as those indi­
viduals within interest or cause groups who identify group objectives 
for members, provide them with information concerning a particular 
issue, and attempt to influence group opinion. They might also be term­
ed "general influentials," or "potential influentials," because they 
are representatives of their groups by virtue of formal designation: 
officers in professional or 'student organizations, and those who are 
employed in positions of responsibility within their professions. 
Since formal leadership as defined here is largely made up of 
individuals in positions of responsibility, it was decided to query 
both institutional leaders, heads of temporary task groups, and legis­
lators who played a role. The leaders were selected on the basis of 
their visibility in the campaign. The criteria used to identify them 
was the occurance of public statements quoted in the press and the 
testimony of others who knew from personal contact who had participated. 
(3) Newspaper editors. Information gathetad from this group 
was intended to provide only supplementary data and opinion concerning 
activity taking place in the northeast and eastern part of the state. 
Only editor~ from the small newspapers of Malheur, Umatilla, Union and 
Gilliam counties were queried, as well as editors from the two counties 
previously mentioned, Benton and Douglas. Most of the newspapers are 
30 
small, with circulation ranging from 3,000 to 10,000 readers. 
19­
Selection P~ocedure. 
(1) Voters. Names of the voters were obtained from 
county clerks in Benton and Douglas counties. Only registered voters 
who had cast their ballots in the January election were included in an 
effort to naduce the number of subjects lost because they had not voted 
or had no interest in the referendum. A common validation problem in 
mail surveys is due to the subject's low motivation in returning the 
questionnaires. This method of sample selection was an attempt to 
partially alleviate the attending bias. Since a certain amount of in­
terest is preliminary to travelling to the polls, it is reasoned that ­
the respondents obtained in this fashion might be slightly more aware 
of issues and appeals used in the campaign. 
The sampling method required the selection of every fiftieth 
name appearing next to a signature in the county poll books. 
(2) Formal leadership. A survey of newspaper clippings 
for the period under investigation revealed the names of state legisla­
tors; and a list of formal leadership was compiled by sifting through 
transcripts of early interviews. The purpose was to establish a tenta­
tive state communication network as well as provide for a larger sample 
of elite opinion. 
(3) Newspaper editors. Names of newspapers and editors 
were obtained from the Oregon Bluebook 1971-72. Questionnaires were 
mailed to every editor in the six counties representing the sample. 
31 
Questionnaire. The questions were developed to parallel in 
20 
content the questions posed in the formal interviews. Questions form­
32 
ed six general categories: 
1. 	 Validation data: pertaining to area of residence 
age, sex, political party, and other data used to 
provide a check on the sociodemographic composition 
of the sample. 
2. 	 Filter questions: designed to check the respondent's 
awareness of politics in general and this issue in 
particular, i.e., whether they had given any thought 
to the election and the issues. Also, to ascertain 
the extent to which they exposed themselves to sources 
of information. 
3. 	 Info~ation questions: used to identify the re­
spondent's membership affiliations and understanding 
of the role played by his organization; and to dis­
cover nonmembers awareness of group campaign roles. 
4. 	 Intensity questions: attempting to determine the 
strength of the respondent's identification with a 
membership group; as well as the degree of interest 
in political issues • 
.5. 	 Explanation que stions : asking "why" of an opinion 
or behavior. 
Because of the time that had elapsed between the occurance of 
the 	event and the survey, and because of computer requirements, it was 
necessary to maintain the closed-end question format. Also, forcing 
the 	respondent to make a selection from specified alternatives provided 
data necessary to establish the degree of correspondence between com­
municative intention of the political elite and the behavioral effect 
on a cross-section of Benton and Douglas county voters. Open-ended 
responses were solicited as well, but because of their rambling nature, 
these were used only incidentally in the narrative and discussion. 
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CHAPTER II 
SETTING 
MOdern Oregon is a three zone country: an always green and lush 
Pacific coast land, an often green strip of valley, and a rarely green 
eastern Oregon plateau. The state boundaries and natural geographic 
1 
divisions remain largely unchanged since statehood was granted in 1859. 
While Oregon's population has grown rapidly during the past 20 
years, the composition retains a predominantly homogeneous cultural 
mix; there has ne~r been a large ethnic community in Oregon, with 
clearly defined cultural ties. Immigrants from Germany, England, 
Ireland, Canada and Scandanavian countries merged with immigrants from 
Ohio and Mississippi during the 1850's. According to Robert Burton, 
2 
the population has traditionally been white, agrarian~ and Jeffersonian. 
For the first ninety years of statehood, blacks accounted for 
less than one half of one percent of the population and Mexican-Americans 
were so few in number as to be absent from United States census bureau 
figures. The pre-World War II Indian population numbered less than 
four tenths of one percent--an ethnic group certainly, but one which had 
3 
practically no impact on Oregon cultural or political life. Burton 
cites geographic isolation and a slow but steady rate of growth after 
4 
1850 for the cultural blend that characterized the old Oregon. 
Today, minorities account for three percent of the population: 
5 
blacks, 29,308,' Indians 13,410, and other non-whites, 19,488. The Ku 
Klux Klan, which was among the most active in the nation during the 1920's, 
25 
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is out, and minority studies are in. 
James N. Tattersall, University of Oregon Economics Professor, 
savs that "today's population is younger, better educated, more con­
7 
centrated in professional and white collar occupations, and richer." 
I 
Perhaps also more liberal. Less homogeneity may, according to Profes­
sor Tattersall, lead to even more change. The "ne't-l electorate" will, 
in his terms: 
• . • demand high quality in state and local govern­
ment services, particularly in education and recreation. It 
should, on the other hand, be more willing to levy and ac­
cept the taxes to pay for these expanded services. 8 
Historically Oregonians depended heavily on wildlife industries, 
but since the late 1930's, timber production grew to become the chief 
source of commerce and, again, the trend is changing. Measured by 
"value added" figures, manufacturing increased by 63 percent while 
during the same period, value added by the forest products industry 
9 
increased only 46.2. 
Fishing was once a major Oregon industry, second only to forestry, 
but today the game commission keeps the major rivers stocked with, not 
native, but hatchery raised fish. Hence the growth of the tongue-in­
cheek, James T. Blaine Society, whose largely fictitous membership is 
said to be busy posting signs on Oregon borders: "You're welcome to 
10 
visit, but please don't stay." 
Politically too the state is changing--from a predominantly Re­
publican one-party system during the years between 	1900-1932 to a near­
11 
lyequal party registration during the late 1940's. In 1969 Democrats 
led by over 100,000, with a total of 521,662 registered voters and 
26 
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Republicans registering 410,693. 
In practically every significant statististical way, Oregon in 
the 1970's, wears a new face. Bu:: in spite of, or perhaps even parallel 
to such changes, one very significant facet of the state profile remains 
unchanged--the political philosophy. 
The state has never had an eastern style political machine mani­
pulated by ward bosses, political hatchet men and the like. A state 
tmachine was never put together in part because of Oregon s ttpuritan" 
13 
public attitude toward politics, and in part because politicians 
seemed unable to get together--under the party banner. According to 
one political analyst, the adoption of the direct primary in 1904 broke 
14 
down what little party unity might once have existed. Others claim 
that Oregon's system of direct legislation, expressed in the primary 
l5 
law, but also in the initiative and referendum, minimizes partisanship. 
Historically each candidate waved his own flag and campaigned on his 
own merit, not on party. In 1934, the Portland Oregonian concluded: 
"Major contests are decided on the basis of personal fitness or personal 
popularity of the candidate. Practically the only party significance 
any more to an election of governor is that success enthuses the party 
16 
with which he affiliates. Democrats and Republicans alike appealed 
to the voter on the basis of popularity and issues. "An old style Demo­
erat may look 1ike a new-style Republ ican and vice versa, tt when they 
17 
present themselves to the voters. 
One only needs to observe the 1970 partisan to note that Oregon 
is still possessed of a great many candidates 'who pay only lip service 
to party. Each election year since 1960, Democrats meet for their pre­
27 

primary convention and set forth elaborate party platforms. The plat­
form makes news for one day and occasionally a bold challenger will 
remind the voters that he, unlikp. the incumbent, represents best the 
will of the party. For the most part however, political aspirants, 
especially during the primary, merely pretend to conform. Some candi­
dates have boldly discounted the party document as not being represent­
tative, and therefore not a legitimate plank from which to campaign. 
Republicans too have their official platform convention, Dut they also 
have their Dorchester Conference founded by Senator Robert Packwood in 
18 
1963. A glance at the respective results of such conclaves reveals 
certain distinctive gaps in Republican performance versus Republican 
philosophy. 
But party registration and conformity to party platform does not 
tell the whole story. Voters frequently register in one party and vote 
for candidates of the other party. For example, in the 1970 general 
election, Oregon voters elected a Republican governor and a Republican 
19 
majority to the House of Representatives. While Democrats held a 
majority in the Senate during the 1971 Legislative Assembly, the Senate 
president was elected by the fourteen Republican members joining with 
two Democrats to go dramatically counter to the Democratic caucus choice. 
A similiar coalition of Democrats and Republicans was enlisted during 
20 
each of the past six sessions of the Oregon legislature. 
The strength of a state Republican organization has been cited as 
a critical deciding factor in voter response to candidates; an organization 
21 
that will work to develop candidates and work to get them elected. 
But as to the functioning of partisanship in the legislature, ttparty 
28 
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respons ibil ity••• is strictly a euphemism in Oregon." 
Oregon voters retain a considerable amount of independence and 
the state is often ani accurately charactetized as a consistently in­
consistent two-party state. MOreover, in political climate it is a 
notably "cleanft state. One academic observer uses the phrase, "moral­
istic political culture," to describe the political atmosphere, believ­
ing that Oregon's government is predicated on the ideal of selfless 
community service. "Party, allegiance, It quotes Burton, "takes second 
23 
place to the public interest." Former Senator Wayne MOrse is a case 
in point; switching registration not once but twice auring the years 
he served in the United States Senate and justifying his change by say­
ing: 
No Republican party officials, state or national, 
ever had the right to assume that in the name of party 
regularity I would sacrifice my responsibility to the 
people of Oregon by voting party line whenever I though, 
so-called party policy was not in the public interest. 2 
The results of such a "moralistic culture" and relatively non­
partisan cl~ate finds expression in the issues selected for campaign 
rhetoric. Rather than campaigning on the party plank as in many states, 
candidates for state and national office tend to campaign on issues 
aimed at all the people whether the issue be conservation today, or 
prohibition and hydroelectric power yesterday. "Principles above 
party," "the greatest good for the greatest number," "not for the party 
spoils but for the good of the country," are phrases that gl itter from 
the pages of Oregon history books. 
All of this is not to say that Oregon is' an untarnished state 
lacking her own form of political intrigue. The peculiarity that is 
~ 29 
distinctly Oregon is that odd political culture that struggles to 
develop social and economic growth mechanisms while at the same time, 
wielding the stick of referendum and initiative, knocking out money 
for programs that will advance such growth. Voters may ignore partisan 
issues in choosing their leaders but they frequently confound those 
they've elected by utilizing their right to referendum and initiative. 
Historical View of Initiative and Referendum 
The people in Oregon can create or destroy any act. The adoption 
of a political system that entrusts all of the power in the people 
originated in a constitutional amendment passed in 1902 providing for 
2S 
the Initiative and Referendum. 
Using the initi~tive, voters can submit a petition to the Sec­
retary of State carrying a specified number of valid signatures and so 
26 
place any measure on the ballot.. By petition, also, any measure pas-
sed'by the Oregon legislature can be placed on the ballot thus enabling 
the voters to sanction or aefeat the measure by a majority vote. Any 
constitutional revision passed by the legislature likewise must be refer­
red to the voters before it can become law. The outcome of ballot 
measure elections rests in the hands of a majority of those casting 
27 
their ballots, not a majority of those registered. Furthermore, the 
Governor has no power of veto over laws passed with these methods. The 
legislature can later amend them, but the same process, the referendum, 
is at the disposal of the people and using it they can prevent any amen­
ded measure from going into effect. 
The first exercise of the power of referendum was in 1904 when 
the Direct Primary Law was submitted to the people and carried--enabling 
/ 30 
any citizen anxious to participate in the political life of the state 
28 
to run for office without looking to party for support. 
In the election of 1908 another significant measure, the Corrupt 
Practices Act, was referred and passed by the people. It provided or­
iginally for a ceiling on campaign spending, prohibited electioneering 
on election day, and generally set forth a doctrine for political be­
29 
havior. A number of amendments to the original act have occurred 
since, including the elimination of restrictions on public employee 
participation in politics and the elimination of the prohibition against 
campaigning on election day_ The Corrupt Practices Act in its present 
40 page form, is notable in that it retains the populist character of 
the original bill's intent. 
By 1910 the people had adopted the Recall Act enabling a specified 
number of registered voters in the state or voting district to petition 
for an election to determine if the official under recall threat could 
continue to serve. Also adopted were the Initiative and Referendum to 
Apply to Local Laws Act, increasing the power of the people in deciding 
local policy; the Presidential Preference Primary law, requiring party 
delegates elected by the people to cast their ballots, en toto, for the 
presidential candidate approved by the people in their primary elections. 
Among those measures initiated by the people and defeated, were the Equal 
30 
Suffrage Amendment (defeated in 1906, 1908, 1910); Amendment for Sin­
gle Tax; and State Wide Prohibition. All of these measures, approved 
and rejected, were placed on the ballot through the Initiative Law and 
31 
have shaped the political destiny 'of the state,to this day. 
Another constitutional provision that has added to the paradox of 
government is the restriction against placing the emergency clause on tax 
31 
legislation. This section of the Oregon Constitution provides that a 
measure imposing a tax on the people cannot become law for 90 days 
32 
after the session has adjourned, having the effect of providing extra 
time for resourceful citizens or special interest groups to garner the 
requirea signatures to call for an election. Even if unsuccessful in 
defeating the tax, a referendum can usually delay implementation of a 
bill for nearly two years, or until the next general election. Since 
by constitutional law, Oregon must maintain a balanced budget, the 
budget being drafted on the biennium, this clause has proved to be the 
source of a considerable amount of frustration to officials charged 
with the responsibility of maintaining a sound level of state services. 
To summarize then, given sufficient energy and organizational 
machinery, any individual or group can challenge any law enacted by the 
legislature. Allen Eaton, writing in 1912, described the system as an 
"experiment in Democracy, tt and said of Oregon: 
It is ••• a state where the people can and do enact 
laws for the common good which their legislature has failed 
to enact for them, where they can nullify any obnoxious 
measure passed by the legislature .••• 
It is ••• a state where the people can and dq amend their 
constitution in the most radical fashion by a minority vote •• , 
where special interests hire citizens to circulate petitions 
••• , where one-twentieth of the voters can and do cripple 33 
the state educational institutions by holding up their funds •.•• 
In 1971 another author wrote: 
Oregon today has its •••best tax brains proposing stop­
gap solutions and the people fire back objections. The whole 
process !akes time and the money situation continues to3worsen. 
Oregonians have rarely permitted a tax approved by the legislature 
to become law without the "second legislature,ft the people, first scru­
tinizing it by their vote. The fiscal effects of the people's power 
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is one of the situational variables that is the concern of this thesis. 
l I. RECENT TAX MEASURES 
It is unlikely that anyone finds pleasure in paying taxes. It is 
equally unlikely that anyone finds pleasure in a decline of living stan­
dards expressed through cutbacks to public agencies that service the people 
and their growing requirements. At the state level, Oregon voters expect 
the best in the way of services, but since 1930 have defeated over 82 per­
cent of the ballot measures which included in the ballot title the word 
"tax." 
During the past decade five referendum tax measures have been placed 
before the people for decision: the 1960 Personal Income Tax, 1963 Per­
sonal and Corporation Income Tax Bill, the 1966 Cigarette Tax, the 1969 
Sales Tax and the 1972 Cigarette Tax. Of the five, only the two cigarette 
tax proposals were apprGved. Those referred since 1966 are of particular 
importance here, because of their similarity to the 1972 cigarette tax 
and because of campaigning activity in connection with the measures. 
The First Cigarette Tax 
The first cigarette tax was a bill passed by the 1965 legislature 
and referred to the people. The May 24, 1966 primary Voters Pamphlet 
described the cigarette tax as a measure that would "levy a tax of 4 
35 
cents on each package of 20 cigarettes sold in the State of Oregon." 
The measure was expected to bring in a total revenue of $10,430,000 plus 
annually, of which $430,000 would be retained by cigarette distributors 
as partial, although significant, reimbursement for their expense in handling. 
33 
More important: 
The funds collected would provide direct property 
tax relief to all property taxpayers and would oe an ad­
ditional source of revenue for cities and counties in the 
state. . . • One half of the net amount collected annual­
ly, or approximately $4,925~000 would go directly for 
property tax relief ....3 
Only one argument appeared in favor of the tax in the informa­
tional booklet compiled by the secretary of state; appealing to the 
voters in the name of property tax relief, citing a concern for the 
disproportionate share property taxes contribute to total revenue 
receipts, and arguing its stability in state financing. No argu­
37 
ments appeared in opposition. No money was spent on advertisements. 
No c-ampaign was launched. And yet, for the first time in nearly forty 
years, the people of Oregon had approved a new tax, by 310,743 to 
38 
181,957. 
1968 Tax Limitation Referendum 
In 1968 the one and a half percent tax limitation proposal was 
placed on the Oregon ballot. A group of citizens calling themselves 
The Oregon Homeowners Association, successfully colle~ted 54,000 valid 
signatures in a'petition drive which began during the summer of 1967. 
The resulting Ballot Measure Number 7 appeared under the title: "Con­
stitutional Amendment Changing Property Tax Limitation." If the meas­
ure had been approved, the six percent limitation on property taxes 
would have oeen repealed and taxes would have been limited to one and 
one half percent of the market value of residential property_ The cost 
to local government was estimated to have reached $150 million in lost 
39 40 
tax revenue the first year alone. Since the source of 47.4 percent 
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of all tax moneys in the state in 1966 was derived from property 
taxes, the initiative had serious implications. 
An organization was quickly formed to fight passage of the bill 
and proved to be one of the most tightly coordinated nonpartisan cam­
paigns conducted in recent years. A paper written by the campaign di­
rector, Roy N. Vernstrom, outlines the sequence and scope of activity 
that surrounded the anti-one and one half percent tax limitation cam­
41 
paign. 
The original citizens meeting involved 25 persons representing 
interests from business, labor, government, religion and education. 
After the initial meeting, the group met biweekly throughout the cam­
paign in an advisory capacity. The S'trategy Committee, as it was ca1­
led, was charged with the responsibility of reviewing progress on decis­
ions made earlier in the campaign and acting upon new information obtain­
ed from feedback provisions: tours of the state and public opinion sur­
vey results. 
The campaign director wrote that a public opinion survey firm and 
an advertising agency together with the Strategy Comm~ttee, Finance Com­
mittee , four state co-chairmen, a Speakers Bureau and 36 county chairmen 
made up the total task force. The campaign director made personal con­
tacts to potential channel sources (editors and television commentators 
particularly), organized the "task force" phase, and generally coordin­
ated the campaign in all of its details. As a result, the campaign was 
marked by clearly delineated areas of responsibility and frequent intra­
42 
group consultation with the teams involved. 
On November 5, 1968, the voters rejected the Tax Limitation, even 
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though it meant a state budget that would continue to rely heavily on 
property taxes. The vote was 503,444 to 276,451, a ratio of nearly two 
43 
to one. 
During the course of the campaign promoters had promised the people 
I 
that if this measure were defeated', the next legislature would take some 
definite steps toward real tax reform. But leadership opinion regard­
ing the form such change should take was divided. Republicans sup­
ported a sales tax, while Democrats were, in general, opposed. Follow­
ing the defeat of the Limitation threat, Vernstrom wrote to over 500 
representatives from interest groups around the state requesting their 
opinions on the possibilities available for tax reform. A- similiar 
~artisan trend emerged. A high proportion of business leaders as well 
as Republican legislators felt that a sales tax was the most viable 
source for needed revenue, providing it included a provision for prop­
erty tax relief. The next session of the legislature put together just 
such a package. 
The 1969 Sales Tax Measure 
The 1969 Property Tax Relief and Sales Tax Measure was referred by 
the legislature and placed on the ballot in a special election called 
for ~une 3, 1969. The measure was a complicated one, involving both 
cons~itutional and statutory changes. The official ballot title sum­
mari~es the provisions: (1) the enactment of a three percent sales tax 
exempting food and prescription medicine; (2) constitutionally dedicat­
ing proceeds to reducing property taxes; (3) changing constitutional 
school property tax limitations; (4) establishing new property tax bases 
for schools which could not be exceeded without the people's vote. The 
i 
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measure also provided for (5) a restriction on the number of school 
tax elections and provided for uniform election dates; (6) increases 
to corporation taxes; (7) rebates to low income families from income 
taxes; (8) prohibited increased property taxes on homesteads of $20,000 
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or less after the owner reached age 65. 
The 1969 legislature was well aware that voters were dissatisfied 
with increasing property taxes. The 60,000 signatures obtained by the 
Tax Limitation sponsors revealed voter discontent with Oregon's heavy 
reliance on the local property tax and the legislature was determined 
to put together a plan that would meet with a minimum.of opposition. 
They knew that whatever tax reform was referred, no biennial projections 
could be made until the voter had passed judgment. It was for this 
reason that the 1969 legislature set an early date for a special election 
on the sales tax. It was also the threat of voter rejection that prom­
pted ~he many provisions that were included. Jaro1d A. Kieffer put it 
this way: "We think of government and the role it must play. The real 
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problem is that the people have terrorized the leaders." 
The Republican controlled Oregon House had originally passed a 
variation of the measure providing that all revenue would be earmarked 
for support to public schools. The Senate version incorporated an amend­
.ant so that revenue would go to the property tax relief account estab­
lished with the enactment of the 1966 cigarette tax. 
The Heuse concurred with the Senate amendments. But prior to the 
conference committee approval, debate in both houses was characterized 
by partisan conflict. Democrats were strongl~ opposed because the tax 
did not provide sufficient relief to the homeowner: all property owners, 
including corporations, receiving a proportionate share. The most serious 
31 
disagreement, and the one that ultimately led to the sales tax defeat, 
was the tax shift effect: the homeowner would pay the tax, but would 
46 
receive little of the benefits. As a result of this felt inequity, 
the battle lines were drawn before the legislature adjourned. The tax 
was referred, and the campaign began. 
Those supporting the sales tax quickly organized political groups 
calling themselves, "Committee to Clear the Air," Committee for Sensi­
ble School Budgets, It "Do Farmers Have a Future Committee, nand "Oregon­
ians for Property Tax ReI ief Committee," all naming Mrs. E.C. Schmidtt 
as secretary. Together, the pro-tax groups spent over $100,000 in sup­
port of the measure whereas opponents expended less than one fifth that 
amount. 
In spite of the relatively small expenditure level by opponents, 
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the base of support was much wider. State union organizations and 
many small locals joined with citizens and Democratic legislators who 
had been opposed to the measure when it was under debate in the Oregon 
legislature • 
Barlypartisan conflict over the tax shift effects continued 
thr~ughout the campaign. Leadership in the state was seriously divided, 
major interest groups played conflicting roles, and in spite of intense 
efforts at obtaining the cooperation of neutral groups, repeated resist­
ance was met. The voter remained unconvinced. As Kieffer said, the 
legislators were afraid the people would not "buy it," and they did not. 
Ivery county in the state opposed the measure on election day, by a 
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total vote of 65,077 in favor and 504,074 opppsed. The Fifty-Sixth 
Legislative Assembly would face their biennial budget task once again 
38 
without the benefits of tax reform. 
III. CONTEMPORARY FISCAL SITUATION 
1971 Legislative Dilemma 
The biennial balancing of the state budget reflects the general 
state economic climate. When the 1971 Legislative Assembly met, the 
state was once again facing financial crisis. Continued pressure on 
high property taxes combined with minimal increases in projected rev­
enues were complicated by the Federal Governments decision to increase 
the personal deduction on individual income tax which automatically 
reduced Oregon revenue. In an effort to simplify tax forms, the state 
50 
had patterned their program after the Internal Revenue Code in 1969. 
The chief source of revenue in the General Fund is the income tax, 
extremely susceptible to outside economic conditions such as changes in 
the Federal Income Tax law on personal deductions. Not only was this 
change a contributing factor to the prospect of a budgetary deficit, 
other characteristics of the General Fund structure created fiscal weak­
ness. The General Fund is the least flexible of stat~ financial sources, 
obtaining its revenue and prerogatives for change in accordance with 
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legislative action and constitutional limitations. Both reflect its 
capacity to meet demands. 
Required to balance the budget by constitutional law, the 1egis­
1ature's role was, ironically, like that of a woodsman with a broken 
axe. In the foreground stood the competing branches and departments of 
government urging upward adjustment in budget. appropriations, and in 
the distance stood the constituency, only recently reminding the 1egis­
39 
lature of their extreme reluctance to hand over the revenue needed 
for repair. Any tax measure that might come out of the 1971 session 
would face the possibility of another referendum. 
The 1971 legislature responded to a projected deficit in the 
General Fund by adopting a bill allowing an increase in taxes on cig­
arettes, and by freezing the level of the personal income tax exemp­
tion at its current level. Even then the fiscal situation was rela­
tively unstable as a dock strike that had started in January failed 
to be settled. By the time the regular session adjourned, the water­
front strike had shut down port activities for over 100 days, reducing 
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the work force and halting all exports of Oregon commodities. 
Without the revenue expected from the cigarette tax increase, 
the Fund faced a deficit which might have reached or even exceeded 
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$35 million in the biennium. The cigarette tax was judged to be the 
most acceptable to the people and met with the least opposition from 
opposing factions in the state legislature from tax measures proposed. 
Even so, historically the tax was not popular with the voters. 
In 1945 the legislature had approved a cigaret~e tax and referred 
it to the voters only to have it turned down. It was proposed three 
more times--1947 , 1952, and 1956--only to be rejected by increasingly 
greater margins. After waiting 10 years, the legislature had tried 
again in 1966 and finally won the voters pe~ission to impose a four 
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cents a package tax. 
The increase of five cents a package to the old tax was supposed 
to take effect on September 9, 1971, and was.expected to bring in $24.5 
million during the biennium. A portion of the additional revenue was 
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needed to finance a new low-income property tax relief package that 
would go into effect with or without the increase in the cigarette tax. 
The original cigarette tax approved by the voters in 1966 pro­
vided that a portion of revenue realized through the tax would go into 
a property tax relief account (half of the revenue went to cities and 
counties, and half to the property tax relief account). From this ac­
count, all property--business, industrial and homes--received an amount 
of relief proportionate to the assessed value of the property. The 1971 
legislature voted to change the distribution formula. The new refund 
provision established an open appropriation going to all property owners 
whose property tax exceeded four percent of their income. All of the 
cigarette tax funds, including the additional five cents in the new bill, 
was to go directly into the General Fund. "The result of this change 
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was the abolishment of the old property tax relief account. 
After the 1971 regular legislative session adjourned it was re­
quixed that 90 days pass before the revenue changes could take effect. 
It is the activity that occurred following adjournment that is the major 
focus of this study. Chapter III and IV include a de~cription of the 
referral drive placing the cigarette tax on the ballot and the special 
legislative session called by the governor to deal with revenue loss 
created by the delay caused by the tax referral. It is also a descrip­
tion of how the state succeeded within only forty days at convincing 
the public that a tax increase was in their best interest, when in fact 
certain groups stood to gain more than others. It is the story of the 
salesmanship of interest group leaders, elective and appointive state 
officials, paid campaign managers, and the people themselves. In sum, 
41 
it is a case study of the communication processes in an issue based 
campaign on a referendum measure. 
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CHAPTER III 
CHROWLOGY O~ EVENTS 
Regular legislative assembly adjourns. 

Attorney General indictes anti-tax promoters on cor­

rupt practices violations in petition circulation 

procedures. 

Accused violators arraigned. 

Secretary of State receives petitions referring the 

Cigarette Tax to a popular vote. 

Governor convenes special legislative session. 

Toba~co distributors tried and convicted of corrupt 

practices violations. 

Special session adjournes, H.B. 3064 approved. 

Interested citizens hold first campaign planning ses­

sion. 

Agencies from public sector meet in Salem for planning 

session. 

Coalition meets in governor's conference room. 

Announced formation of committee in favor of the tax: 

"Citizens Against Raising Property Taxes." 

Tobacco distributors appeal corrupt practices convict­

ion. 

Kennedy polls show pro-tax forces leading. 

News conference held announcing "Legislators Opposed 

to Cigarette Tax" formation. 

State officials protest misleading anti-tax advertising. 

First of series of OSEA-OEA public meetings in support 

of the cigarette tax. 

January 6 
January 7 
January 7 
January 8 
January 10 
January 10 
January 12 
January 12 
January 16 
January 18 
July 7 
47 
~ttorney General notifies tax opposition forces that 
television advertising is violation of law. 
Television advertisements withdrawn. 
Opposition attorney files letter with Secretary of State 
requesting prosecution of proponents for violations of 
l~. 
Attorney General rules "wild language" not violation of 
corrupt practices law. 

Secretary of State requests apologies for misleading 

Voters' Pamphlet statements. 

Committee in favor of tax apology issued. 

Senator accuses state officials of partisanship and cor­

rUpt practices law violations. 

Day and Davis respqnd to charge. 

Kennedy polls show 37 percent Oregonians "undecided." 

Special election held. 1972 Cigarette Tax passes. 

State Supreme Court affirms early 0pLnLon: tobacco dis­

tributors found guilty, fined, and placed on probation 
for illegally soliciting petition signatures. 
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CASE STUDY OF CIGARETTE TAX CAMPAIGN 
"War is political campaigning spiced with bullets," writ'as the 
author of Politics Battle Plan. "Both involve a collision of organi­
zations seeking absolute victory; both are played in defined theatres; 
both are fought by tactics of applied weaponry; and both are won by the 
grand strategy best combining factors of time plus force and the abil­
ity to win confrontations--surmounting hostile pressures while impos­
1 
ing decision upon the enemy." 
While the "war" analogy will not carry us very far, it is apt. 
In mi~itary campaigns as in initiative campaigns in Oregon, it is dif­
ficult to know with certainty which tactical maneuver succeeded and 
with whom. But upon close observation certain recurring patterns tend 
to assert themselves and certain personalities and social systems be­
come distinct. In the 1971-72 Cigarette Tax campaign both a coalition 
and collision of interest group forces seemed to have dominated the 
battlefield. 
I. FORMAL PRESSURE GROUPS 
Special interest organizations have traditionally played key 
roles in Oregon politics. "Idea" groups, like the Oregon Council of 
Churches, the League of Oregon Voters and the Federation of Women's 
Clubs, consistently take positions on measures and occasionally on 
2 
candidates. "Economic" interest groups such as the vending machine, 
race track, and public utility interests are small in terms of the number 
of persons they' represent, but have proportionately greater funds avail­
able than groups depending on membership dues for lobbying activity. 
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Accordingly, they feel no reluctance in using their financial advantage 
in attempting to irifluence both the legislature and the public in their 
behalf. 
Lumbering, labor, education and transportation interests, accord­
ing to political scientists Swarthout and Gervais, make up the "big 
3 

four" pressure groups in the state. The Grange, active in past years, 

Lhas now been replaced in influence by the larger Oregon Farm Bureau Fed­
4 

eration, made up exclusively of farm interests. 

Of the two pressure group functions--traditional lobbying (work­
ing for favorable legislation and supporting candidates friendly to 
their interests) and the less frequent function of attempting to influ­
ence the electorate at the polls on key ballot measures, the latter is 
of particular importance in Oregon, and of special interest to this 
study. 
Popular legislation, after all, represents a direct 
battle among interests, without the intervening influence 
of party or legislative structure. Interest groups often 
are the driving force behind an initiative or referendum 
petition at the outset. 5 
Such was the case in the Cigarette Tax Referendum of 1971. 
Tobacco wholesalers funded the opposition after successfully placing 
the measure on the ballot. In the following months the Oregon State 
Employees Association, Oregon Education Association, Associated Oregon 
Industries, and a ~yriad of smaller cause and interest groups met the 
opposition head on. 
II. THE REFERENDUM DRIVE 
The original offensive was launched when the tobacco interests 
combined with a professional lobby to finance and coordinate a drive to 
50 
refer for popular vote the increase to the cigarette tax passed by the 
1971 legislature •. During the summer months and especially the third 
and fourth weeks of August, workers gathered over 26,656 valid signa­
6 
tures. Unlike the large formal economic interest groups, the tobacco 
wholesalers lobby had no membership to draw from in circulating petit­
ions. Accordingly, Ron Campbell, a Portland teacher, coordinated the 
drive and hired high school and college students to circulate the 
7 
petitions in the Portland metropolitan area. 
Both Campbell and Ken Rienke, the tobacco lobbyist sponsoring the 
initiative drive and coordinator-planner of the anti-cigarette tax cam­
paign that was to follow, were awa~e that paid solicitation of signatures 
was illegal. On August 19, 1971, they told the Marion County Circuit 
Court that the petition drive would test the constitutionality of the 
law. The court ruled that the law could not be tested until it had been 
violated. Together with Ed Collins and Sylvan Campf, local tobacco dis­
S 
tributors, Rienke decided to go ahead with the plan to hire circulators. 
The petitions had been drawn and the language approved by the 
secretary of state in late July_ By August 1, the petitions were in 
circulation, first in a fair booth at the MUltnomah County fairgrounds 
9 
and later on the streets of Portland. 
The major signature collecting effort began and terminated within 
an eight day period. By the end of this time, over 300 students had 
been placed en the payroll. When the attorney general obtained a court 
injunction ordering a halt to the arive, most of the necessary signatures 
10 
had already been obtained. 
When several high school students hired by Campbell were arrested, 
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the drive caught the attention of the Oregon press. News of the student 
arrests, and charges leveled against two of the petition sponsors-­
Sylvan Campf and Edward Collins--for violations of the Corrupt Practices 
Act (Section 260.) forbidding "petition-hawking," made front page news. 
The students were fined and released, but charges against Collins and 
Campf, supported by the courts after an appeal attempt, resulted in not 
11 
only a fine, but a three year probation as well. 
Oregonians are generally opposed to ethical violations in political 
campaigns of any nature, with or without a law to direct them. Even 
though the Corrupt Practices violation attracted public attention to 
the petition drive and may have resqlted in more signatures, according 
to Campbell, public opinion polls demonstrated that any support for the 
12 
anti-tax forces had dissolved by December. 
III. McCALL CONVENES SPECIAL SESSION 
On November 16, 36 days after the cigarette tax had been referre~, 
Governor Tom McCall called the legislature into special session. The 
purpose of the special session was to reduce state expenditures by 
$32.6 million in order to accomodate shortages created as a result of 
reduced individu& and business tax collections, reduced interest earn­
ings, reduced liquor sales and potentially reduced cigarette tax reve­
nues. The legislature~ first act was to advance the election date on 
the cigarette tax increase from the November General Election, to Jan­
uary 18, 1972, in an effort to minimize losses in revenue to General 
Fund recipients (Figure 1). 
With the explicit task of revising the budget, the legislature 
passed H.B. 3064, requiring a reduction of two percent in all General 
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Figure 1. Editorial cartoon illustrating Oregon fiscal 
situation in 1971; Oregonian, December 3, 1971. 
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Fund appropriations for the 1971-73 biennium (with the exception of the 
Emergency Fund) if the cigarette tax increase were to fail. Property 
tax relief benefits were to be reduced an equivalent percentag~ but 
only in the second year of the biennium. 
Translated into dollars, H.B. 3064 provided that defeat of the 
tax increase would have these effects: from an estimated $270 million 
in aid to local governments, $5.4 million would have been cut, forcing 
city and district agencies to look to an increase in property taxes to 
maintain the status-quo. Education, which accounts for approximately 
55 percent of the General Fund budget, was to be left intact; but Basic 
School.Support, increased at the 1971 session, would lose more than 
$4 million and community colleges were scheduled to lose approximately 
13 
$735,000. For a detailed account of the adjustments made during the 
special session, see Table 1. 
Small wonder that special interest groups quickly resolved to 
take action. The two percent cuts translated from dollars to human 
costs meant new programs eliminated or severely threatened, cutbacks in 
jobs, and recent gains in ptoperty tax relief reduced. For business 
interests there loomed the possibility of an alternative revenue source, 
an increased corporate tax, being approved by the legislature in another 
special session. With only one out of a thousand persons in the state 
corporation owners, the possibility of launching a successful initiative 
or referendum to counter such a development would be dim. In this re-: 
14 
spect business interests were especially vulnerable. 
IV. MOBILIZATION ACTIVITY 
As soon as the referendum drive was known, leaders of the groups 
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TABLE I 
EFFECT OF DEFEAT OF TAX MEASURES 
ON MAJOR STATE PROGRAMS 
Cig. Tax Income Tax 
1971-73 2% Reduc. 2% Reduc. Total 
Net Approp.* (Effec.Feb.1) (Effec.Ju1y 1) Reductions 
.. 
Department of 
Education: 
Basic Support $203,490,468 $4,069,809 $4,069,809 $8,139,618 
Comm. Colleges 36,770,720 735,414 735,414 1,470,828 
Department of Higher 
Education: 
General Support 130,636,890 2,612,738 2,612,738 5,225,476 
~chng Hospitals 14,746,034 294,921 294,921 589,842 
Department of Human 
Resources: 
Public Welfare 66,555,110 1,331,102 1,331,102 2,662,204 
Mental Health 60,584,060 1,211,681 1,211,681 2,423,362 
Corrections Div. 20,230,722 404,614 404,614 809,228 
Property Tax Relief 37 z850 2OOO 757 z000 757 z000 1 z514 2OOO (Estimate) 
TOTALS $570,864,004 $11,417,279 $11,417,279 $22,834,558 
*Origina1 appropriation by Regular Session plus Emergency Fund 
allocations, less Special Session reductions. 
Source: Oregon State Employees Association, "Fact Sheet," December, 1971. 
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potentially affected became concerned. They were well aware that 
some form of fiscal impact on their membership was imminent. The 
problem was identifiable but the dimensions were not clearly outlined 
until the special session convened. 
Independent of action by other groups, the Oregon State Employees 
Association leadership decided that their members were among ~hose who 
would be seriously affected. On November 20, 1971, the OSEA Board of 
Directors, upon the recommendation of their executive secretary, Thomas 
. 15 
Bnrignt, approved $5,000 to launch a defensive campaign. 
Jacob Tanzer~ the newly appointed Director of the Department of 
Human Resources, is unclear about t~e exact date when he decided to 
move:in behalf of his agency, but noted an early belief that something 
shouLd be done and expressed these feelings to Bob Davis, the governor's 
16 
assistant, at a regular staff meeting in early November. 
Other groups in the state were also independently evaluating the 
potential impact; Ruth Shephard, a private citizen working with the 
Council on Aging, and Alton King, administrative assistant to the student 
body president at the University of Oregon, both in Eugene; John Danielson, 
legislative director of the Oregon Education Association in Portland; 
Roy Lieuellan, chancellor of the Board of Higher Education, Eugene; Ike 
Congleton and Lou Norris of the Association of Oregon Industries, Salem; 
and Donald Jones, executive secretary of the League of Oregon Cities. 
Mrs. Shephard and Alton King met infomlally in mid-November and 
agreed to cooperate in forming a coalition between youth, representing 
college students from state colleges, and senior citizens contacted 
through the State Council of Senior Citizens. In November, Mrs. Shephard 
17 
56 

presented a proposal to the State Council meeting in Salem, urging 
that they take acti"on. At the same time, Jack Nelson, president of 
the council, accepted an offer made by King suggesting the advantages 
of a student merger. The coalition officially formed; as youth joined 
with senior citizens for the first time in an Oregon political campaign. 
In the early stages, prior to and during the special session, 
activity among the formal organizations was largely confined to inform­
al conversations within the leadership structure of each group. For 
example, William Lesh, of the ADI, reports that he was unofficially as­
signed the task of working directly with the state committee before the 
18 
committee had even been designated.. John Danielson, representing 
public school teachers, said that once the referendum was assured, his 
organization realized that some form of campaign activity would be neces­
sary. During the special session legislators made it known that public 
education ~uld be expected to contribute to the campaign effort as did 
the governor's assistant. Accordingly, on November 29, 1971, the OEA 
legislative director mailed a memo to every local OEA affilliate in the 
state alerting them to prepare to "develop strategies in support of the 
19 
cigarette tax measure. It 
MOst of the groups that were to play a role in the next several 
months of active campaigning were concerned, but with the exception of 
the OSSA and the youth-aged coalition, none made visible campaign commit­
tments until the legislature had spelled out the exact form impending 
budget cuts would take. 
Activity in Phase I 
The two percent cuts provided for in H.B. 3064, seemed to be the 
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impetus that brought formal organizations and informal cause groups 
finally together in the first phase of formal activity. 
Alton King, of the student-aged coalition, reports that the week 
following the special session's adjournment, representatives from uni­
versities and high schools in the state met with representatives from 
the Council of Senior Citizens in Salem. At this meeting, the first 
inter-group gathering of the campaign, Jack Nelson, Ron Schmidt (press 
assistant to the governor), Robert Davis (executive assistant to the 
governor), former state senator, Arthur Ireland, and King discussed the 
resources available and considered who might be recruited to coordinate 
a state-wide campaign effort. The meeting was informal and only tenta­
. . tive strategies were decided upon, but' they did decide to meet the next 
20 
week when more people could be involved. 
On December 1, also in Salem, representatives from the public 
sector gathered, including: the executive secretaries from the Assoc­
iation of Oregon Cities, League of Oregon Cities, Oregon School Boards 
Association, Oregon State Employees Association, and Oregon School E~ 
ployees Association. Also in attendance was the legis~ative director 
of the Oregon Education Association; Dale Parnell, superintendant of 
public instruction; and Roy Luellan, chancellor of the State System of 
Higher Education. These men met with the purpose of deciding on the 
direction their organizations or agencies should take. They agreed to 
emphasize the internal campaign, each group utilizing its own resources 
and channeling communication to their members. Only secondarily would 
there be a focus on the external, .state-wide g~neral campaign. Each 
representative also agreed that his organization would contribute money 
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to the general campaign. 
On December 2, a third organizational meeting was held. This 
time over 25 interested citizens gathered in the governor' s conferenc~ 
room, and included among others, the original coalition members. New 
additions to the original group included Wally Lie~s, president of the 
Community College Student Association; Charles Dunn, administrative 
assistant to the Oregon State University student body president; Raymond 
Hollaway of the Martin Luther King Foundation in Portland; and at least 
. 22 
one representative from a Salem area ~igh school. 
Robert Davis, executive assistant to Oregon's governor, was also 
in att~ndance, and as the governor's closest assistant, would play an 
important role in future weeks. In an interview, Davis reported an early 
concern about the possibility of a successful referendum drive. Talking 
the issue over with Governor McCall, and obtaining his permission to 
perform. an active function in the campaign, Davis began to make prelim­
inary contacts while the special session was still meeting. It was a 
conversation with Mrs. Shephard that resulted in his presence as the 
governor's representative at the two coalition meetings. 
According to Davis, it was at this second meeting that the cam:- ' 
paign peramaters were set. With the limited time available to organize 
and implement strategy, it was decided that the large committee should 
not be involved with every strategy d,ecision. Apparently there was con­
sensus, and the decision making authority revolved to the governor's' 
assistant and subsequently, the two other members of the soon to be de­
veloped "team": Brad Davis , private campaign consul tant, and Ted 
23 
Hallock, owner of Ted Hallock Public Relations, Inc •• 
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V. STATE CAMPAIGN 
Decision making authority in the general state campaign was di­
vided. Bob Davis brought in Ted Hallock, with the coalition committee 
approval, and together with Hallock, decided on the third member of the 
team--Brad Davis, a free-lance campaign consultant. In no respect can 
anyone of them be said to comprise what is generally recognized as a 
formal campaign manager. Each had clearly defined responsibilities. 
The three consulted qlmost daily on a variety of campaign concerns, but 
24 
they might better be termed "technical specialists." 
As a communication specialist, Hallock had almost sole responsi­
bility"for implementing and planning media appeals. His public relations 
firm not only wrote and produced radio and television spots, but deter­
mined where they would be used, the audience to whom they were to be 
directed, and the timing of the appeals during the forty-day campaign. 
Working directly with Brad Davis, and conSUlting with the governorts 
assistant, the public relations firm settled on a "theme" which then 
dominated all mass communication appeals in both visual and auditory 
2S 
mediums. 
Brad Davis was selected because of his experience in past Oregon 
political campaigns. It was he who was to contact and coordinate the 
activity of various interest groups, provide speakers to civic clubs 
upon request, write specialized appeals for interest group members, and 
generally guide all features of the campaign not directed by either 
Hallock or Bob Davis. By letter and by telephone, the consultant learned 
the interest group organizations and disseminated the only printed 
26 
materials put out by the state "committee. tt 
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The governor's assistant worked with all groups and organizations 
although official coordination was the responsibility of Brad Davis. 
"The role of this office cut across the entire campaign," writes Bob 
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Davis. Aside from daily consultation with the other two members of 
what will be called the State Committee, Davis's chief responsibility 
was fund raising. Quietly and behind the scenes, Davis and John Fulton, 
also on the governor's staff, made informal contacts with government 
and organizational influentials, keeping them informed of the campaign 
progress and providing direction when requested. "1 would surface only 
if Brad had a probiem with a group. Late in the campaign 1 surfaced 
publicly, first in television appea~ances with Haas ~enator Harl Haas, 
D-Port1an~, and began to appear both against him and by myself. These 
were public affairs view-point kinds of programs. The only other time 
appeared was to respond to Cook's Vern Cook, D-Gresham criticism 
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that my position as a public employee was illegal." 
William Gilbert, a Lake Oswego realtor, was designated treasurer 
of the committee that became the cover organization for the general state 
campaign, "Cit izens Against Rais ing Property Taxes." But aside from 
keeping the records of contributions and expenditures, Gilbert had little 
to do with the actual campaign. 
The three-man team of Hallock, Davis and Davis, formulated and im­
plemented campaign strategy; and while they info~a1ly conferred with 
members of the original coalition, and a few others, it was in every 
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practical sense, a "three man team. n 
Ted Hallock and Brad Davis had decided that, in view of the com­
p1exity of the funding issues, "the thrust would be emotive rather than 
30 
physically directed." They would talk about issues vital to specific 
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groups of Oregon voters The same men decided that instead of trying 
to talk to all of the voters with the same arguments they would create 
messages directed to six or seven categories within the population: 
people in higher education; on welfare; in Oregonts private collages 
and universities; community colleges; public employees; in business; 
and the general property owner. 
Once that decision was made, a number of men, Itpaid loaned exec­
utives or paid to operate full time," were informed. After talking 
with them, and several state agency heads, Brad Davis and Hallock began 
working on the strUcture of the messages. Davis explained that the 
final decision making authority on s.tructure and content of the various 
canpaign messages evolved to three people. "In a longer campaign you 
can get away with making a series of mistakes and then adjust. With 
one like this youtd better put the ball into the hands of a few people 
who know the mechanics of political communication and rely on their 
31 
abil ities. It (Figure 2) 
Campaign Strategy 
The State Committee was concerned with three major activities: 
fund raising, mass media utilization, and special interest group co­
ordination. Of the first two, media use was contingent on sufficient 
funds, therefore a great deal of early campaign energy was directed to 
this phase. 
Fund Raising. The "Vote Yes" people had set their early campaign 
32 
fund goal at $60,000, but later revised it downward. Bob Davis assign­
ed several organizations modest quotas, principally those in the business 
sector. A large number of organizations contributed fUnds prior to being 
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Figure 2. Decision making structure of otate campaign. Source: Ted 
Hallock, interview in Portland, July, 1972. 
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asked and others, for the most part, fulfilled their assigned quotas. 
MOney had been authorized by the board of directors of the Oregon 
State Employees Association prior to the formation of any stat~ campaign 
committee and it was unlikely that they would have contributed more. 
MOreover, the mere fact of a contribution from this organization consti­
33 
tuted a "first." The Oregon Education Association's political action 
arm, a parallel organization with revenue dedicated to advancing educa­
tional interests through the political process, donated $1,000 directly 
to the State Committee, like the OSBA, prior to any direct contact from 
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the governor's assistant. 
Qther organizations also knew ,that requests for money would be 
forthcoming. One business source reports that in mid-November, Bob 
Davis had announced the governor's intention to call another special 
session if the tax proposal failed at a meeting of the Emergency Board. 
A number of business interests were represented at that me~ting. Faced 
with the possibility of an alternative source of revenue being drafted 
at a second special session, perhaps a corporate tax, the business com­
35 
munity was prepared when the request for money came. The secretary of 
state's records show 17 major contributions coming from lumber producers, 
insurance interests, produce wholesalers, and retailers. Other industries 
contributed to the State Committee indirectly, through the ad hoc com­
mittee associated with higher education. 
Many of these same organizations were asked not only for financial 
assistance, but for "loaned executives" to assist in the coordination of 
volunteers in canvassing other potential contributors, or as one such 
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executive put it', "influencing the influentials. tt 
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A great many methods of fund raising were used. Mass solicita­
tions are frequentI"y emphasized by consultant personnel in national 
political campaigns, and were used to some extent in Oregon, but in­
direct means were used more often: with interest groups and the small 
locally based cause groups. Direct personal soliciation was used by 
Davis to make the initial contacts to special interest groups: letters 
and phone calls principally, and direct face-to-face conversation. Mass 
solicitation was used in appealing to the individual citizen without 
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calling on him in person. At Portland State University, for example, 
memos appeared in the mail box of every university staff member, asking 
that a.contribution of any size be sent to the local tax committee chair­
man of Friends of Higher Education. 
In spite of the impressive figures and the number of organizations 
contributing, the secretary of state 1 s ledger sheet does not tell the 
entire story. MOney came in from isolated and unusual sources in this 
campaign. George Diel reports that the ad hoc committee for higher 
education interests received contributions from a total of 1,524 sep­
arate sources; 1,511 people donating less than $25. Many contributors 
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gave less than $5. 
In Corvallis, where the strongest on-campus activity occurred, the 
fund raising drive was kicked off at a large gathering of civic leaders, 
businessmen, and members of the academic community, called together by 
the university president, George McVictor. At Oregon State University 
the president pointedly requested contributions; Corvallis businessmen 
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were asked for $50 or more. Later, the Gazette-Times editor appealed 
for funds through an editorial reporting the status of the state cam­
paign. Numerous university affiliated organizations requested money 
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from members. At Portland State University, University of Oregon, and 
on most of the smaller college campuses in the state system, various 
fund raising activity was carried out, ranging from "low key" Pl?peals 
to faculty and staff members, to "passing the hat" in dormitories and 
40 
fraternities by student volunteers. 
Ursel Narver and Frank Brawner, chairman and treasurer respectively 
of Friends of Higher Education, mailed an Emergency Memo to all members 
of governing boards, community colleges, independent college governing 
boards and other people who were judged to have a deep interest in 
41 
higher education. The memo urged that recipients vote, influence 
their ~riends and associates to vote, and called for contributions, 
42 ~ 
"whether $10, or $1,000, or less, or more." 
Fund raising became a major communication function of the state 
campaign and it is important to note the activity of many individuals 
as well as the larger outright contributions from interest groups. The 
final $13,152 sum collected by the higher education community represen­
ted the commitment of a great many "little" people and their concern 
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that the cigarette tax pass. 
Communications related to the fund raising phase originated in 
the office of the governor and flowed throughout the state. In the .in­
stance of higher education, the network began when Bob Davis issued 
messages from his office by way of direct personal telephone contacts 
to the chancellor of the State Board of Higher Education who in turn 
issued a memo to George Diel in the Portland chancellor's office. Diel 
then set into motion the mechanisms that would further disseminate the 
plea fo~ funds to increasingly more finite groups and individuals. One 
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of these groups, the Oregon State University administration, further 
passed the message -along to staff members, faculty, and in some cases, 
students, depending on the nature of the request. 
In some instances the message channels crossed as they did in 
Corvallis, when Robert Ingalls, editor of the Corvallis Gazette-Times, 
obtained information about financial needs directly from the legislature 
where he serves as a house member, from Friends of Higher Education, and 
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from the Oregon State University administration. He in turn passed 
the information on to his readers. Unfortunately, after this point we 
have very little way of knowing to what extent the network widened. 
In any case, desp ite the seve~e 1imitations of time, a war chest 
was collected, many communication channels were opened, and it remained 
the task of the State Committee to decide how the money might best be 
spent. 
Mass Media Utilization 
In the early days of the formal campaign the coordinators had no 
equipment and no advertising program. The final sum collected by the 
fund drive was something in excess of $29,000, therefore maximizing 
effects of somewhat limited resources was the major objective of the 
State Committee and all decisions were directed at this objective. It 
had been decided that the most effective way to reach a great many 
people was to utilize existing organizations and pitch appeals to the 
specialized economic interests in the state. This was Brad Davis's 
function. 
The d4cision that led to this maneuver is of sufficient importan­
ce in a consideration of campaign strategy that the text of Brad Davis's 
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comments deserves to be quoted extensive11: 
Previous methods of describing campaigns in this 
state has been to describe the impact in terms of dollars. 
We felt that people were surfeited with this. They were 
numbed by three hundred million dollar figures, so we 
decided early that rather than talk about simply the effect 
of the increase, the 17.6 million dollars that would be 
generated by the tax, we would talk in human terms about 
the impact. 
So we transformed the measure from dollar impact to 
human impact. Even more, we knew that we couldn't talk 
to the entire body-politic, so we picked out five cate­
gories of people that could have lost severely should 
there have been a selective tax cut. The groups we looked 
at were: the stucents; public employees, broken down into 
highway crews, public employees like OSEA and OEA members, 
state policeman; labor; business; and a fifth group, "other," 
which represented major associations that didn't fall into 
the other classifications. 
While the opposition was trying to lay charges at 
our feet Which were irrelevant and mostly false--they were 
general arguments so they dilluted their campaign dollar. 
We maximized ou~s by saying that we could not talk to all 
of the people of Oregon at one time with one story. We 
will talk in human terms to all of the interest groups 
who will lose if the measure goes down. 45 
Within these dimensions, the campaign progressed, from an early 
and in the overall picture, minor attention to public meetings, to 
later communication including radio, television and brief "fact sheets.1t 
Davis put out 15 different fliers, each with the same theme but each de­
signed to appeal to a specific group of Oregon voters. 
Two of the fliers were generalized: one, a five page informational 
photocopied brochure described the selective cut argument, and the other, 
a single page table describing cigarette tax rates nationally with 
Oregon l s tax percentage set in bold type. The thrust of arguments in 
the several fact sheets was the creation of a hypothetical situation: 
t1IF the governor called a special session, cuts MIGHT be directed at 
one particular program." Then followed the argument that the two percent 
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across-the-board cuts would not be implemented until the following 
year, doubling the percentage. Compounded by an additional two per­
cent cut if the federal and state income tax laws were not divorced, 
a cumulative eight percent COULD be slashed from existing programs. 
I 
Further, the fliers said that it would be possible that a special ses­
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sion would be called by the governor to deal with the problem. 
(Several fliers directed to special interest groups are included in 
Appendix E.) 
Other fliers followed the same general line of reasoning, but the 
language was structured to appeal only to the group to which each was 
directed. The following structure was used in a message intended for 
the low income voter: 
Without your "yes" vote, the following state assistance 
to the poor may be stopped: 1. PROPERTY TAX RELIEF for low 
income homeowners. 2. 5,362 PATIENT DAYS in the Multnomah 
County Hospital and University of Oregon Medical schoois." 
3. $180 'ANNUAL for a family of four receiving public assis­
tance. 4. NEEDED MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT for one out of 47 
eight persons with drug, alcohol and other emotional problems. 
"A doubling of tuition, reduction of teaching faculty, and halt­
ing of general fund expenditures for OSU Cooperative Extension, Exper­
ime.ntal Station, teaching hospital and clinics, etc.," was directed to 
higher education. Fliers going to community colleges warned of "a re­
duction of 84.3 percent of state support"; to the property owner, "loss 
of $97"; to public elementary and secondary schools, "loss of $34 per 
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child"--all IF the cuts were made selectively. 

'These pointedly exaggerated fact sheets were disseminated to the 
leadership of each of the interest groups with a footnote saying that 
further information would be provided upon request. In many cases the 
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leadership of the organization receiving the advertising decided not to 
use them. Enright, of the OSEA, expressed dissatisfaction with the 
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"scare approach" accentuated by "loaded language. f~ Using the same 
basic information, the OSEA designed and distributed its own version. 
Friends of Higher Education did the'same, as did the staff of the ORA. 
Of the many interviews conducted in preparation for this study, only 
two informants reported that the materials were appropriate for use in 
their organization. We can conclude from this that the flow of influ­
ence provided by this communication medium ended at the institutional 
level, reaching few people beyond the leadership in each organization. 
The target audience for the electronic media appeals was the 
"uninformed, uninterested, and independent voter" who, according to 
Nimmo, is the audience most influenced by television and, to a slightly 
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lesser extent, radio. Hallock's public relations firm was well aware 
of the nature of the audience and had clearly formulated theories about 
how to reach them. According to Hallock, the goal was to reach people 
who were not members of formal interest group organizations and who 
would be unlikely to be influenced by "objective, colorless advertis­
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ing." 
Media support was altogether planned for the Portland area; a 
decision made necessary by the shortage of campaign funds. Television 
was the top priority, but spot advertisements on radio stations accounted 
for 20 percent of the budget. Approximately 200, 10, 30, and 60 second 
time slots were purchased on the three Portland stations with the largest 
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audience. 
In addition to the arguments used in the printed literature, the 
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radio advertisements adopted several more: smoking is a luxury; if the 
tobacco lobby wins, Oregonians loose; and smoking is bad for the health. 
Eleven seperate messages were designed for the radio audience and of 
these, three used the property t~~ relief argument; one each referred 
to public health, the tobacco lobby, cuts in environmental quality con­
trol, cuts to school s and kids, and smoking as a luxury. ; . The three 60 
second slots used all of the arguments in staged spontaneous dialogue. 
The following is an example: 
(A friendly male voice) Yeah, I'm going to vote 
for the cigarette tax. I mean •.. those guys in the tobacco 
industry, you know •.. they can. defeat the cigarette tax 
'an pick up their profits and run home. But me ••• I gotta 
live here •... I'm the guy who, if the cigarette tax fails, 
doesn't get property tax relief. Either that, or they 
could take more money from the school budgets. Some guys 
say, you know, cut the budgets some more .. " Cut-out the 
spending an' throw out the bums. And I say, OK, which 
bums? You mean •..bums like the kids in mental health? 
You know... there's this little girl ...Desiree. She couldn't 
feed herself, couldn't walk. They said she'd never walk 
but she's walking. You want to throw those bums out? I 
don't. Oh, I smoke, Man, do I smoke. But--am I gonna 
vote for a cigarette tax? Yeah. Yeah, you bet I am. (DR~ 
Vote yes January 18th. Tax cigarettes, not property. 
(Disclaimer) 53 
Another ad explained the benefits of the Boy Scout program to 
the mentally retarded boys in Fairview who had "convicts for den fathers,tt 
so "they both learn, and it lets two institutionalized groups help each 
other ••• it doesn't cost much." The third 60 second slot also pleaded 
the benefits that the Human Resources Department provides to Oregonians. 
The remaining 80 percent of the media budget went into television 
advertising, far more expensive, and consequently fewer advertisements 
were purchased. Like radio, the video mess~ge argued the human impact 
of dollars cut, the dangers of smoking, potential increases to property 
taxes, and out-of-st'ate tobacco "carpetbagging." Also like radio, the 
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longer advertisements strived for spontaneity and emotional impact. 
The same advertisement that on radio talked about mentally retarded 
boys, used a pan shot focused on the boys working on their badge's, 
followed by the expressive voice of a man saying, "This is just ONE of 
S4 
the programs that can die without the cigarette tax. It 
It is impossible to know how many people attended to the radio 
and television advertising, and more important, how many were actually 
influenced to vote yes. The state campaign coordinators felt that media 
support on the four Portland area television stations was vital to the 
election success. We do know that some of the television advertisements 
were viewed as far away as Ashland, on the southern Oregon border, but 
only those homes serviced by cable television. The only potentially 
measurable effect of the media campaign was in the Portland viewing area. 
Newspaper advertisements were not used Only one ad was purchased 
in Corvallis, and this only because the laison chairman in that city in­
sisted that local contributors needed a visible demonstration that their 
SS 
money was being used to help them in their county campaign. 
In considering priorities in the media, we had a 
television budget to hit. Once that was hit, we 'had two 
options: In the metropolitan area there are four tele­
vision stations. In Eugene cable television reaches 20,000 
and in Corvallis 5,000. So we get a spinoff by using 
Portland television. Once we surpassed the goal of tele­
vision advertising in this area we had to decide whether 
we would complement the television advertising by radio 
here or extend the television to the valley. We decided 
on radio here. Newspapers were never considered, because 
of the drama of television and radio We wanted to present 
the message emotionally which is not possible to the same 
extent in print. 56 
Timing of the advertising campaign was p~anned to achieve maximum 
media saturation the last 20 days before the election. Increasingly 
longer advertisements were used as the election neared but the number 
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remained fairly constant over the entire period. A few taped public 
information programs appeared on television in other parts of the state, 
but these were debates or information panels not funded or controlled 
by the State Committee. 
Other State Committee Activity 
Two other tasks were performed by the campaign consultants in the 
early stage of the campaign: (1) hiring a public opinion research firm 
and (2) arranging for speakers to explain the issues when requested by 
local civic groups. 
Public speeches in political campaigns attract notoriously small 
audiences in Oregon, as in other parts of the nation.· Campaign coordi­
nators knew that the chief advantage to be gained through speeches was 
press coverage and free column inches in regular newspaper reports. In 
the beginning the only means of obtaining this kind of exposure was 
through appearances before civic clubs, public forums, and at "knife and 
fork" clubs. For this reason, Brad Davis spent a high proportion of his 
time in the first week or two of the campaign writing speeches. Another 
reason attention was given to public meetings was that in the early days 
of the committee's formation, meetings provided the only form of public 
legitimization. "The only way we had to communicate a message was to 
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write a speech and run out and give it ."u 
According to Brad Davis, his office was very selective in filling 
speaking requests. "We tried to go one for one; to pit equals against 
equals. When Harl Haas stepped in we'd get a Betty Roberts or a Vic, 
Atiyeh. People were paying our salaries for a win. Our credentials 
would not have been enough. We never accepted a speaking spot unless we 
7~ 
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knew in advance who the opposition speaker would be." 
No formal press releases were issued from the Committee Against 
Raising Property Taxes for two reasons: no money was available to 
hire a professional press man and the committee was getting what they 
considered was sufficient coverage through statements issues by state 
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influent ia1 s • For example, Jacob Tanzer, director of the Department 
of Human Resources, gave only two or three speeches during the 40 day 
campaign, to groups ranging in size from 15 to 35 persons; yet his com­
ments were picked up and carried in newspapers in every part of the 
state and a 1 arge port ion of the speech was reproduced in the OSEA 
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newsletter which went to over 17 thousand state employees. 
The firm of Richard Kennedy and Associates, in Eugene, Oregon, was 
61 
selected to conduct the opinion surveys. A total of four polls were 
taken, but only the first was compiled and tabulated according to the 
usual categories (age, sex, occupation, probable voter). The purpose 
of the survey was to determine voter awareness of the tax election, 
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and the reasons they might favor or oppose such a tax increase. 
The December poll showed 61 percent favoring the cigarette tax, 
34.2 percent opposed, and 4.8 percent undecided. The mQst·frequently 
mentioned reason for voting yes, was "property taxes will increase if 
the measure is defeated" (25.3 percent); the next most frequently men­
tioned reason was "smoking is dangerous and an increase in the cig­
arette tax will discourage smoking" (22.8 percent). Those opposed 
named Ita cigarette tax is aimed at a small group of people" as the best 
reason for voting no (29.3 percent), "cigarettes cost too much already" 
(16 percent), and Itthe cigarette tax is a sales tax" (14.7 percent). 
(Table II) The poll also determined that 72.7 percent of the general 
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TABLE II 
KENNEDY POLL RESULTS ON ISSUES 
COMBINED BEST REASONS FOR VOTING FOR THE CIGARETTE TAX 
ielson Percentage 
Property taxes will increase if the measure is defeated. 18.8% 
Local schools will get less state money. 18.8 
Smoking is dangerous and an increase in the cigarette 
tax will discourage smoking. 17.9 
Out-of-staters help to pay our cigarette tax. 9.2 
Local police and fire protection will be impaired. 8.3 
College tuition will increase. 7.9 
Out-of-state tobacco interests are trying to control 
Oregonians 4.8 
Not sure. 14.3 
100.0% 
COMBINED BEST REASONS FOR OPPOSING THE CIGARETTE TAX INCREASE 
Reason Percentagze 
A cigarette tax is a sales tax. 62.710 
A cigarette tax is aimed at a small group of people. 50.6 
Cigarettes cost too much already. 37.3 
Defeat of the cigarette tax will force economy in 
government. 24.1 
Defeat of the cigarette tax will force economy in 
educational budgets. 22.7 
Not sure. 69.0 
10'0:0% 
Source: Richard Kennedy and Associates, UAttitudes Toward the January 
18, 1972 Special Election" (Eugene, Oregon, December, 1971), p. 14-21. 
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population was aware of the special election and 27.5 percent was 
63 
not. 
Brad Davis said that the poll did not alter the decisions made 
by the coordinating team. Unlike the Bardsley-Haslacher poll taken 
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prior to the Tax Limitation campaign, the information was not seen 
by anyone during the campaign except the men making up the decision 
making triad. Davis explained the reason: "People need to think that 
work is vital to success. It Had the early resul ts been known to others 
involved, the committee feared that activity would have slowed and time 
would have worked against them. Also, the committee was never certain 
that the poll was accurate. "The best poll can be off by five percent 
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either way." Poll results obtained near the end of the campaign were 
phoned in: showing a 32 percent "yes" vote; 31 percent "no"; 47 percent 
66 
"undecided. " 
The large increase in "undecided" voters was credited to confus­
ion resulting from opposition claims about the property tax relief 
issue and the attorney general's warning of potential corrupt practices 
violations in television advertising and the Voters' Pamphlet. But Davis 
67 
also felt that the later polls were more accurate. The director of 
the poll reported that if the "undecided" voters were eliminated, the 
"yes_no" percentage fell within one tenth of one percent of the actual 
vote cast. In a follow-up survey conducted by phone, the public opinion 
firm. found that, in gemral, the "not sure" category reacted to their 
68 
indecision by not voting. 
Summary 
The cigarette tax issue was known to Oregonians prior to any 
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formal campaign activity; the petition drive gained wide publicity as 
the sponsors gained notoriety through Corrupt Practices Act violations-­
hiring students to obtain voter signatures. 
Tobacco wholesalers had initiated the petition drive and were suc­
cessful. As a result, the governor called the legislature into special 
session. The 1971 Special Legislative Assembly likewise drew attention 
to the cigarette tax measure, especially when they passed a bill calling 
for two percent cuts to agencies funded out of the general state budget. 
Once the effect of cuts was known, both permanent and temporary 
interest groups began to initiate activity that resulted in the selec­
tion of three men to coordinate the campaign: one responsible for plan­
ning the media advertising, another attempting to organize and coordin­
ate interest groups, and the third directing the fund raising drive from 
the governor's office. 
Responsibilities of the State Committee was at once structured 
and fragmented: the shortage of time prevented decision checks with 
other groups. Major strategy decisions were made by only three men. 
But this same shortage of time prevented genuine coordination between 
workers in various parts of the state. As a result, a variety of in­
dependent coalitions formed and campaign strategy carried out by each 
group. 
Chapter IV describes the strategies implemented by interest 
groups from the public and private sector, state officials, and elected 
leaders. It also is concerned with the manner by which the communica­
tion network expanded--including only a few interested individuals who 
talked with others of sUniliar concerns in the early phase. Finally, 
the chapter includes a description of the opponents and their campaign 
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methods, an account of charges and counter-charges leveled by those 
on both sides of the measure, the ensuing confusion and outrage of 
uninvolved observers, and a reflection of all that had gone before-­
the final vote on January 18, 1972. 
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CHAPTER IV 
According to Erwin Bettinghaus, formal legit~izers often clear 
the way for persuasive activity carried out by campaign promoters: by 
lending their influence, or the weight of their positions, to proposals 
20 
they have publicly endorsed. In the cigarette tax campaign state of­
ficials seem to have performed just such a role. One important phase 
of the campaign was successfully secured when influentials endorsed the 
tax. Each official represented the top leadership of agencies associa­
ted in the public mind as apolitical, reputable, and performing services 
important to the general welfare. Elected officials carried out a sim­
iliar function. Public statements issued by the governor and by state 
legislators attempted to establi~h the integrity of the proposal by 
creating a positive link in the mind of the voter between agencies of 
value and the state tax measure. In this sense the most important role 
officials and elected leaders performed was legitimization, clearly one 
of the most important functions of the persuasive process in politics. 
I. PUBLIC SECIDR M:>BILIZES 
Activity by Influentials 
The names of state officials and well known legislators provided 
the pro-tax forces with an aura of respectability and marked the cam­
paign with a "prestige" stamp of approval. Of the officials in state 
agencies publicly endorsing the measure, Directors of the Department of 
Environmental Control and the Department of Human Resources were the 
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most visible. L.B. Day, heading the newly formed state environment 
division, spoke to the Salem Rotary Club in early December on the topic 
of todayfs environment. In a response to questions posed by the press, 
Day outlined the expected effects on the environmental fight. The loss 
of revenue to a budget he considered already meagre might be permanently 
crippling. Day made no public appearances for the specific purpose of 
.supporting the tax, but issued three press releases (December 6, 13, and 
January 12), the substance of which found its way into major newspapers 
2 
around the state. 
According to Day, the DEQ became involved in the campaign on its 
own volition, not as a result of requests by campaign coordinators or 
others interested in passing the cigarette tax increase. His agency 
stood to loose a considerable sum if the tax went down to defeat and 
this was both the reason for his participation and the thrust of his 
3 
arguments. 
Comments made by Day were not only picked up by the press in 
nearly every Oregon county, but excerpts from the releases were quoted 
in the newsletters sent out by the Environmental Council and the Oregon 
Shores Conservation Council. He thus created a communication linkage 
between public and private organizations drawing people together through 
4 
their common interest in natural resources. Day appealed to these 
people by saying: 
Our budget is tight. If voters defeat the cigarette 
tax increase January 18, the department won't ha~ enough 
money to carry out the clean air plan adequately. 
But he did not confine his remarks to the impact of a tax defeat 
on his own department. "Defeat of the cigaret tax would mean less 
money available for 'basic school support, with still further drain on 
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6 
property taxes." 
Aside from issuing press releases, Day was in contact with the 
governor's office during much of the campaign, as was Jacob Tanzer, 
7 
the Director of the Human Resources Department. Neither state offic­
ial was directly associated with planning by the State Committee, how­
ever decisions made at the state level were definitely punctuated with 
issues and themes that had been recommended by the two men. Tanzer 
suggested to Brad Davis, tt certain types of scenes, ideas from our in­
stitutions" which were adopted and used in the filming of campaign ad­
a 
vert ising. 
The early thrust of the formal state campaign was not popular 
with Tanzer. It was his feeling that rather than discuss the fiscal 
impact of a tax loss by saying that money could be taken away from "XU 
group, it should be stated in terms of loss to "XU program, "and by 
program we mean programs for children and programs to assist people in 
their efforts to get themselves off the tax rolls. Dollars are not 
abstract. Dollars have real gut meaning in the ability of the state to 
heal broken lives and when you're talking about tax dollars, it is real­
9 
ly those lives you're talking about." 
Tanzer commented in an interview that there is a fine line betwe­
en ttscare tactics" and "facts put in human terms." He did not approve 
the early "sloganeering," used by both camps, the "simple little con­
cepts" emphasized over the significance of cuts to programs important 
in human lives. ttl am perfectly confident in the electorate that if 
10 
the facts ever sink through, people will vo~e the right way." In 
private conversations with some legislators who were going to oppose 
the measure, Tanzer"obtained an agreement that they would remain silent. 
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"Some were hung up on it being a sales tax and that this would hurt the 
poor. It was pointed out that failure of the cigarette tax would hurt 
11 
the poor and they shut Up.1f 
Radio and television advertisments did reflect the Tanzer philo­
sophy and there is no doubt about 'the importance of his role in the ca~ 
paign: as an advisor behind the scenes, and as an influential in the 
public eye 
Other agency directors within the Department of Human Resources 
perfo~ed different roles. Clarence Jones, Director of the State Eco­
nomic Opportunities Office said that while his office did not solicit 
votes or action, his field people did. "We couldn't have staff paid 
12 
by federal funds involved in this," but through non-federal staff 
members, fliers went out to over 30,000 people in the Community Action 
13 
program. Jones said his office pulled in representatives from local 
CAA volunteer boards for an informational briefing on what happens to 
a tax dollar in Oregon. IfWe made no pretense of knowing where the tax 
cuts would come--we told them where they could come. Health and welfare 
14 
stood to take the brunt of the cutS.1f After the briefing, the CAA 
volunteers were to stimulate voters to go to the polls, appealing to 
-welfare recipients, the disabled, and minority groups--sections of the 
population other interest groups would not reach. 
Mrs. Edward Hughes, coordinator of the State Program on Aging, 
gave "technical assistance to the State Council for Senior Citizens 
15 
who had endorsed passage of the cigarette tax." She cooperated with 
Mrs. Shephard and Jack Nelson in distributi~g literature to senior 
citizens assisted by her department. 
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Labor Commissioner, Norman O. Nilsen recommended passage too, 
but "with mixed emotions." Beyond a grudging public endorsement, he 
16 
did little. 
In eastern Oregon, Thomas Young, chairman of the Oregon Liquor 
I 
Control Commission and former state representative from Baker and Grant 
counties, made at least one public speech that was covered by the press. 
His appeal for "yes" votes was based on the measure's "freedom of choice" 
character, but otherwise his speech was, in general, directed toward 
17 
educating the 'audience about the provisions in H.B. 3064. 
Roy Lieuallen, chancellor of the St~te System of Higher Education, 
spoke to the Portland City Club on December 17, and like Young, was 
quoted in newspapers the next day According to the coverage of the 
Grants Pass Daily Courier and the Portland Oregonian, the text of his 
speech argued the state's severe financial crisis: 
Some of my colleagues have tried to persuade me that 
it is not politically wise to be so candid as to say a vote 
for the cigarette tax is a vote for education. However, 
passage of the cigarette tax is at least a partial solution 
to our financial emergency. Should the cigarette tax proposal 
be defeated in January, and if current legislation is imple­
mented, it will become necessary to cut back an additional 2 
percent of our general fund appropriation, or about $2.7 mil­
lion. Added to our $4 million reduction for next year, the 
full cut thus totaling $6.7 million or nearly 7 percent of our 
total operating budget . • . and, of course the primary vote 
in May on the income tax could add another $2.7 million to 
that figure. 18 
The chancellor'S office also participated in the campaign, as noted 
earlier, by alerting administrators in each of Oregon's colleges and uni­
versities of the state of financial contingency threatening the state 
system and requesting their assistance in p~ssing the cigarette tax. 
He too was in contact with the State Committee triad, although less 
19 
frequently. 
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Officials Day, Tanzer, Young and Lieue11en appeared in the early 
weeks of the campaign, but there was almost a total absence of press 
20 
statements or public speeches in the closing days. As early 1egitimiz­
ers their function was chiefly to endorse. Only secondarily did they 
fulfill an informational role, one which was attempted by other inf1uen­
tials in the state. 
Elected Officials 
Numerous state legislators were involved in making public speeches 
and in initiating activity on a state and local level. In a letter to the 
editor appearing in the Oregonian, Senator Hoyt (R-Benton, Polk) summar­
ized the reasons for legislators involvement: 
Remember, the Legislature has gone over the governor's 
austerity budget twice making substantial reductions, once in 
the regular session and again in the special session. 
Some legislators voted against referring the cigarette 
tax at an early special election because they preferred income 
tax reform, a state lotterY, or the temporary expedient of ac­
celerating the withholding tax on incomes. Some admittedly 
voted against it for political reasons. 21 
No legislator questioned the need for additional revenue. 
Senator Jason Boe (D-Reedsport), spoke on every major campus in 
Oregon, explaining the financial need argument. "My analysis of the pre­
election needs was to mobilize the campus and the new voters; I believe 
22 
that this was the swing vote." He also addressed groups in Roseburg, 
Coos Bay, Florence and Portland. With Representative Mary Rieke (R-
Portland), Boe conducted a long information session before the Legislative 
23 
Affairs Committee of the Portland Chamber of Commerce. To the Florence 
Rotary Club, Boe cited the ftsteep price in human suffering and hardship,ft 
24 
that would follow the tax defeat. 
In southern Oregon, Senator L.W. Newbry (R-Jackson) gave numerous 
88 
talks favori~g the measure and in addition wrote the explanation appear­
ing in the Voters' Pamphlet, commended by secretary of state Clay Myers 
as being one of the rare "responsible" statements appearing in the much 
maligned special election pamphlet. In the pamphlet Newbry stated that 
options open to the legislature were severely limited, explaining the 
"two plus four" plan which called for a two percent cut in all budgets 
for the first year of the biennium and a four percent cut in the second 
26 
year. 
In Klamath Falls, Representative Fred Heard (D-Klamath Falls), 
spoke to an audience at Oregon Technical Institute, pointing out that 
while he voted against an increase in cigarette taxes at the regular 
and special sessions, "the fiscal picture has changed" partly as a re­
suIt of actions by Congress on income tax exemptions and deductions, 
27 
and partly as a result of the wage-price freeze. 
In the most populated area of the state, the valley region, a 
great many legislators were expousing the issues. In Portland, Represen­
tative Frank Roberts (D-Multnomah), spoke to the North Democratic Forum 
and the Gresham Chamber of Commerce upon the request of the State Commit­
28 
tee coordinator, Brad Davis, and the O~OSEA leaders respectively. 
Senator Edward Fadeley (D-Lane), cooperated with the governor's 
office and the Joint Ways and Means Committee in their request for sup­
port. He appeared six times in Lane County in behalf of the "yes" 
29 
forces, including a half-hour televised debate. Fadeley shared the 
platform with Bob Davis in behalf of the proponents, against Senator 
Harl Haas (D-Portland) and Representative Keith" Burns (D-Portland)~ In 
the debate, broadcast over KEZI-TV, Fadeley said: 
89' 
If the tax' is approved, Oregon will still be 14th 
from the bottom among all states in the amount of taxes 
on cigarettes. Forty percent of the current Oregon cig­
arette tax is paid by out~of-state residents who boot­
leg cigarettes home. 30 
The debate was reported in a three column spread in the January 
8, Sunday edition of the Eugene Register-Guard, reaching a potential 
audience of 53,541. 
Representative Jack Ripper (D-Coos), gave at least four speeches 
on the Oregon coast: to teachers groups, public employees, the Interna­
tional Woodworkers of America locals, and the Central Labor Council of 
Coos County. ,; He characterized his role as both a legitimizer and as an 
31 
information source to the general public. Like the speeches made by 
other legislators, Ripper's appearance's were covered and reported in 
~he press. 
In eastern Oregon, House Speaker Bob Smith (R-Burns), told an 
audience that "people will suffer property tax reI ief loss" if the tax 
32 
is defeated. Stafford Hansell (R-Umatilla) spoke to the Hermiston 
Rotary Club saying the tax increase "will be necessary to maintain many 
33 
state government services." 
The chairman of the Legislative Interim Committee on Education, 
Senator Victor Atiyeh (R-Washington), told voters that "earlier budget 
cuts were painful and drastic, but if the cigarette tax fails, the situ­
34 
ation in my opinion will be grave." 
Representative William Gwinn (R-Albany), a member of the Joint 
Ways and Means Committee which oversees budget needs, and a member of 
the Oregon Emergency Board, reassured Oregon State University engineers 
who were concerned about fund reduction on research then under way on a 
99 
field burner, but did say that the cigarette tax money was important 
35 
for related research at the development center. In a "speakers cir­
cuit" swing later in the campaign, Gwinn provided a modicum of measured 
reason, saying that "campaign claims on both sides of Oregon's cigarette 
tax issue are exaggerated. There's been a lot of illogical hypothes­
izing." His argument in favor of the tax was based on temporary relief 
36 
in a crisis situation. 
Many of Oregon's legislators participated in public debates. One 
such appearance was in Albany under the sponsorship of the Committee for 
Progress Through Law, an ad hoc arm of the Benton-Linn Economic Oppor­
tunity Council. Senator Hector MacPherson (R-Oakville), argued the pro 
side against Alice Toland, president of the Linn County Taxpayers Pro­
tection Association and Ron Campbell, the Portland teacher who had re­
37 
cruited students to circulate petitions in the referendum drive. 
Legislators who opted to publicly support the cigarette tax were 
about equally divided between the two political parties: Newbry, Smith, 
Eivers, Gwinn, Atiyeh, Carson, Johnson, Rieke, and Howe from the Repub­
lican camp; Fadeley, Lang, Boe, Ripper, Roberts, Cole, Heard, and Byers 
from the Democratic. Arguments ranged from "band-aid" solution for long-
run fiscal needs, to appeals designed to reason the impact of special 
budget cuts to special programs. Party partisanship seemed forgotten 
as leaders in the two parties appeared on the same platform in behalf of 
the measure. 
Governor Tom McCall 
Members of the Oregon legislature were joined in their public en­
dorsements by their independent Republican governor, Tom McCall. The 
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governor issued a press release immediately following the adjournment 
39 
of the special session urging that the cigarette tax be approved. At 
every available opportunity he spoke in behalf of the measure. 
In eastern Oregon, at the annual Milton-Freewater Chambe~ of Com­
merce awards banquet, McCall spoke to over two hundred, structuring his 
remarks around two upcoming ballot measures. First he appealed for 
support of a bill important to eastern Oregon farmers which would permit 
the state to issue bonds for the purpose of making loans to farmers 
for irrigation. His other appeal seemed at that time important to few-­
an "all-out" plea for passage of the five cent a pack cigarette tax 
increase: 
The cigarette tax is more" than dollars and cents. It 
is a symbol--of what kind of situation we face, What small 
moves we must make--what kind of concern we must now evince. 
If we lose the cigarette tax, it will be more than 
revenue that goes with the wind. lie will have lost the mom­
entum to achieve. The people of this state must stop retreat­
ing. 
This is the edge of the pr!8ipice. Our heels are hang­
ing over. There is no backstep. 
Using an analogy likening public voting patterns with the "group 
will to survive," McCall spoke earlier in the day to ~tanfield High 
School students. To this group as well, the governor spoke in favor of 
the tax and went on to express the opinion that "the people of Oregon 
have a phobia against a sales tax, but it is a bona fide, necessary 
41 
form of public finance." 
As the elected official charged with the responsibility of propo­
sing a state budget that meets the needs of all agencies of state govern­
ment, McCall had seen $36 million deleted fro~ his original budget pro­
42 
posal by the Ways and Means Committee at the regular session. The 
additional cuts made necessary by the successful referal of the 
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cigarette tax eroded a budget he already had deemed inadequate. In a 
state where the legislature and the people are co-equal legislative 
organs, each able to make, repeal, or modify law on its own, the 
governor is no more powerful than the support he can win for his pro­
grams MOreover, the governor has no power of veto over legislation 
passed by the people; once the tax was referred the only course avai1­
able to McCall lay in using the influence and prestige of his office 
in a persuasive attempt directed at the voters. 
Fearing partisan identification in the public mind, McCall did 
not make extensive persuasive efforts, but did issue an early press 
release threatening another special session if the January 18th e1ec­
tion negated the cigarette tax. And he exerted the influence of his 
office in personal contacts to legislators, 'lobby groups, and in some 
cases, newspaper editorial staff; encouraging support both by monetary 
43 
means and public endorsements. 
The governor's participation took various forms not the least of 
which was the tt1oaned" activity of his assistant, Bob Davis, and the 
tacit approval of his office for participation by other agency personnel. 
Public appearances and press statements by the governor extended the 
communication chain. When the governor appears in Wheeler, population 
261, he makes news. When he issues a press release, the media attends. 
Bconomic Interest Groups 
The discussion thus far has considered the involvement of inf1u­
entia1s from agencies perceived by their directors as most seriously 
affected by a negative election outcome. Their appeals were directed 
at a general audience that was expected to support the notion that 
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human and environmental resources were a necessary and desirable func­
tion of government. Elected officials likewise struck at constituent 
interests. In contrast, the activity of large public and private organi­
zations appealed to clearly definable and relatively more narrow economic 
group interests--ttpocket-book" interest of the people from whom they 
drew their membership. 
Changes in the Oregon constitution providing for legalized politi­
cal activity by state employees was an important factor in both the 
visibility of influentials from state agencies and the utilization of 
state employee organizations to promote the cigarette tax measure. 
Prior to 1967, public employees were not permitted to contribute any­
thing of value--time or money--to any .sort of political campaign. In 
a bill titled the Corrupt Practices Amendment, the Legislative Assembly 
repealed all sections of the constitution inhibiting political action 
44 
by state employees except. those relating to coersion. In the 1971-72 
cigarette tax campaign, public employee organizations not only partici­
pated but used their organizations in an overt attempt to influence 
voters. In other parts of the nation, activity by public employee groups 
has resulted in the winning margin in a close election and certain de­
velopments suggest that this was also true in Oregon. 
Of the economic interest groups in the public sector, the Oregon 
State Employees Association was the most active. Beginning their formal 
activity while the 1971 special session was still in progress, the OSBA 
was involved in nearly every phase of the campaign: as legitimizers, as 
initiators of the campaign on a state and local level, as information 
source to OSEA members, and as consul~ants in some aspects of general 
decision making on the state level. 
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According to Thomas Enright, instigator of OSEA participation, 
the primary objective was to sell state employees and only incidentally 
to convince the general public. After obtaining the approval of the 
OSIA board of directors, Enright sought the cooperation of other state 
employee organizations including the Oregon Education Association, 
Oregon School Employees Association, Chancellor's office of Higher Ed­
ucation, Oregon School Boards Association, State Department of Educa­
tion, Oregon Community Colleges and the American Federation of Teachers. 
Of these groups, two (the ORA and OSEA) maintained close contact and 
co-sponsored 14 public meetings in every region of the state where there 
was a large concentration of association members. The meetings were 
directed to the membership of the aKA .and OSEA but were also held open 
45 
to the public. 
The meetings were poorly attended according to Enright. Those who 
did attend were either strongly for the measure or strongly against it. 
46 
"Not many came who were uncommitted." Although the audiences were small, 
press and television coverage extended the visibility of the state em­
ployee organization and their participation in the campaign. The pres­
ence of either a state senator or representative on the same platform 
with nonpartisan organizational leaders made news. In Klamath Falls, 
an isolated city in southern Oregon, television cameras recorded and 
carried over five minutes of Representative Fred Heard's speech in the 
47 
evening news broadcast. 
An overriding "survival" issue dominated the OSEA arguments--paral­
lei to the arguments originating in the State Committee headquarters but 
with a lesser degree of emotional loading. Enrig~t was deeply concerned 
a~ut the inaccuracies and emotionalism that characterized the early 
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materials disseminated by the State Committee and decided that the 
OSBA should develop their own. "Our people wouldn't stand for exag­
geration. They were not pleased that we had decided to promote the 
issue, but after awhile they became educated to the reality of the 
situation. The results show at the polls. Where we had a large por­
48 
tion of state employees, the margin was significantly greater." 
The 1971-72 campaign was the first that the OSEA had been finan­
cially and editorially involved with. They had decided to sell their 
members early in the campaign so that opposition publicity would have 
a minimum influence. With this objective, newsletters were sent to 
members in 80 chapters. Seven thousand copies went to other non-member 
state employees. Communication carried out by the OSEA central staff 
also included individual mailings explaining the tax measure and announ­
cing the meeting dates, and information in the form of a one page bul­
letin which organizational district representatives were requested to 
post on staff room bulletin boards. Even though Bnright considered the 
'activity of his organization "reaction strategy," poorly structured and 
weakly implemented because of the Shortage of time, various printed 
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material did reach the households of at least 17,000 state employees. 
A special section of the OSEA News, January edition, carried four 
pages of information devoted to the cigarette tax election. A detailed 
description of the background on the tax election, written by Enright, 
included an eight-point evaluation of the potential effects of a defeat 
and the reasons the legislature elected to draft H.B. 3064. Summarizing, 
Bnright said: 
OSEA legislative representatives believe that the 
present fiscal crisis is real; that the automatic cuts in 
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B.B. 3064 are no mere threat. As Governor McCall has 

said, defeat of the cigarette tax would be a disaster. 

The disaster can be averted if the 17,000 non-federal 

employees i~oOregon and their families vote "yes" on 

January 18. 

The second and third pages included (1) the complete text of 
Jacob Tanzer's speech delivered to the Washington County Forum, (2) 
detailed figures on revenue loss to each of the 13 community colleges; 
(3) anticipated job reductions at state institutions, and (4) costs to 
Oregon schoo1s--quoting Dale Parnell, Superintendent of Public Instru­
ction, and Roy Lieual1en of the State Board of Higher Education. The 
final page provided a list of agencies and the cuts each could reason­
ably expect to loose expressed in dollars. 
Participation in local OSEA chapters was spearheaded by the state 
organization. Enright said that approximately 50 local chairmen were 
named. In Benton county, an area where many groups were working together t 
th$ Oregon State University campus chapter named Professor Myron Cropsey 
as chairman. In cooperation with the sister chapter of OSEA, composed 
of classified personnel, and faculty members belonging to the American 
Association of University Professors, Dr. Cropsey organized and directed 
"approximately 92 personsu whose task was to inform friends and neigh­
bords in a person-to-person telephone campaign. Each delegate was to 
contact at least 10 people and ask them in turn to relay the message to 
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at least five more. 
Unlike OSEA membership, people represented by the Oregon Educa­
tion Association did not have as much to loose. Whereas the OSEA inter­
ests depend chiefly on support from the Ge~ra1 Fund, Oregon teachers 
and administrators obtain 70 percent of their district revenue from local 
property taxes. In spite of this lesser pocket-book impact, the OEA 
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recognized that Basic School Support decreases would make impending 
salary negotiations more difficult. Further, the increasing number 
of school budget elections being defeated over the preceeding five 
52 
years reflected a state and national property tax rebellion. "The 
taxpayer revolt" made the OBA legislative staff sensitive to the need 
for long-run tax reform and, as an intermediate and temporary solution, 
53 
the 1972 cigarette tax increase. 
Members of the OEA staff worked jointly with the OSBA in publici­
zing and organizing the public employee meetings (Figure 3). Press 
releases were mailed to newspapers in the, area where a meeting was to 
be held, cooperation of legislators' in the area was obtained, and staff 
members made available to supplement the explanation of the issues by 
1egi81~tors and the OSEA staff representatives. Cecil Posey, executive 
secretary, and John Danielson, government relations director, divided 
spe~king responsibilities, generally appearing on the platform with 
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either Enright, or his assistant, Everett Stiles. 
Legislative chairmen in local school districts were notified by 
the ORA central office of campaign needs and were used to inform teachers 
and encourage local participation. Direct mailings to the membership 
were not used but a list of ORA workers was provided to Brad Davis who 
in turn disseminated the State Committee's printed literature to Oregon 
teachers. Again like the OSEA, ORA directors were not satisfied with 
the emotive appeals used by the State Committee and developed their own 
"fact Sheets," which included information sent in bulletin form. to 
legislative chairmen, and a comprehensive edition of the aKA tabloid. 
Danielson estimated that "over 19,000 teachers received the news through 
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one or more of the organizational channels." 
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Activity by the state organization paved the way for other 
educators favoring the tax. Officials attending the twenty-second 
winter conference of the Oregon Association of Secondary School Admin­
istrators, an ORA affiliate, voted 90-55 to maintain their stand in 
favor of the cigarette tax after several members objected on the basis 
that a resolution urging stronger smoking laws for minors was inconsis­
56 
tent with public endorsement of the tax. 
~tivity of Other State Organizations 
The Oregon School Board Association and Oregon AFL-CIO endorsed 
the measure but played a relatively minor role in the total campaign. 
They did provide members with information through their regular house 
organ$, but according to Thomas Scanlon, public information officer of 
57 
the AFL-CIO, "We did no more than asked to do." Thomas Rigby, execu­
58 
tive secretary of the OSBA, reco~nded endorsement to his state board. 
Robert Ridgley, OSBA president, said on January 8, "We cannot stand any 
59 
cuts in an already meager state school aid budget, n and on January 10, 
the Hilhi School Board in Washington County, and the Enterprise School 
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Board in Wallowa County, passed endorsement resolutions. Many other 
local school boards came out in favor of the tax, perhaps as a result 
of the example set by the state organization. 
The League of Oregon Cities and Associatiori of Oregon Counties 
mailed informational memos to city and county government administrators 
notifying them of the dollar cuts to their agencies. No attempt was 
made to influence public voting behavior by either of these groups. "The 
cigarette tax had no direct effect on city government activities or c~ty 
government revenues, and therefore was not deemed an appropriate subject 
lOP 
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for activity by the league." A letter from P. Jerry Orrick, exec­
utive secretary of the Association of Oregon Counties provides sub­
stantially the same information, only substituting "county government" 
62 
for "city government. 1t 
Oregon Community College Association Executive Director, Dr. 
Donald Sheldon, cooperated with the State Committee by requesting do­
nations to the campaign effort through letters mailed to administrators 
63 
at each of the Oregon campuses. The only publication compiled by the 
OCCA is distributed only five or six times a year and includes primarily 
information of general interest to community college personnel. The tax 
measure was mentioned briefly in one such bulletin, but according to 
Dr. Sheldon, the circulation is limited and therefore not an appropriate 
medium for persuasive communication. Further, the organization is sup­
ported by state funds, unlike most of the membership organizations in 
the public sector, is relatively new on the Oregon scene, and has a 
small, apolitical staff. Its attempts to influence was accordingly 
limited. 
The efforts of higher education, on the other hand, were not re.. 
stricted. The ad hoc committee, Friends of Higher Education, has already 
been mentioned in connection with fund raising activity. They not only 
raised proportionately more money, they did so by drawing in businessmen 
and others around the state who were interested in preserving qual ity 
in higher education at the state schools. "Get a man to give dollars, 
and you have his vote," reasoned Wil Post, laison campaign chairman on 
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the Corvallis campus. In Eugene, the Lane ~ounty Referendum Committee 
obtained community support and donated over $2,000 to the campaign effort. 
65 
.10.J. 
This was the first Oregon election" to be held under the new law 
requiring that campaign expenditures be made known 10 days prior to the 
election. With the contributions made by higher education generally 
known, still another source of influence emerged in the growing chorus 
of campaign voices. The citizens of Oregon were made aware of the ed­
ucational community's committment to passage of the cigarette tax. 
Summary 
An answer to the question of who, in the public sector, generated 
the most in the way of visible campaign activity would clearly be the 
three major emplo~nt groups: the Oregon State Employees Association, 
the Oregon Education Association, and higher education through its ad 
hoc interest group, Friends of Higher Education. In sum, the groups 
'provided leadership by utilizing personal and mass communication chan­
nels: public meetings, printed literature, personal influence through 
direct personal contacts, and printed and electronic mass media indirec­
tly through news coverage of organization sponsored public meetings and 
financial contributions. 
II. ENOORSEMENTS 
Public endorsements constitute important campaign activity and 
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sometimes provide the important difference in success or failure. 
During the short cigarette tax campaign, newspaper morgues filled with 
endorsements from each side of the political continuum and from orga­
nizations representative of nearly every phase of Oregon life. The 
following section deals primarily with general endorsements made at the 
local level, support by private state organizations, and the important 
102 
activity performed by the Youth-Aged Coalition. 
General Endorsements 
In Klamath Falls, one of the few areas in the state where the 
local paper took an editorial stand against the tax increase, the 
Klamath Falls Chamber of Commerce voted unanimously to endorse the 
measure Officials from that organization said the endorsement was 
based on the "critical condition" of the state's finances due to fis­
68 
cal imbalance. The Hillsboro Chamber, North Clackamas County Chamber 
of Commerce, and Eugene Area Chamber all reported endorsement, as did 
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other city groups scattered across the state. 
As the campaign moved forward, reports began coming in about an 
increasingly greater variety of groups making public their approval •. 
Wallace McCrae, president of Blue Mountain Community College in eastern 
Oregon, emphatically stated his support, fearing a decline in educational 
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quality_if the two percent cuts went into effect. George Analla, of 
the Orelon Tax Research publication, and Herman Kehrli, director emeritus 
of the Bureau of Government Research and Service at the University of 
Oregon, distributed studies clarifying the fiscal impact on the state 
budget that, while not direct endorsements, had strong positive influ­
71 
ence. Kehrli's remarks were reprinted in their complete form in the 
strongly pro, Oregon State University paper. 
Senator Robert Packwood responded to a question on the tax posed 
by newsmen, saying, "I'll support it, but not with the feeling that we 
72 
must have it or civilization will come to an end." 
Senior citizens from Columbia county adopted a resolution called 
a "Prepaid Health Plan for the Smoker," widely quoted in the Oregon press: 
103 , 

Whereas a good share of these victims will need 
tax support to. pay all or part of their medical expenses 
and living costs, whereas, cigarette smokers have ninety­
five percent of all lung cancer and emphysema, be it re­
solved that Citizens of Oregon pass the cigarette tax 
bill. 
By doing so--sick smokers who end up on welfare, re­
habilitation, and unemployment or other tax supported state 
services will have had the opportunity to help prepay
73these expenses. 
In Lane county, six of the seven members of the Lane legislative 
delegation, both Democrats and Republicans, approved a resolution urg­
ing passage of the tax increase: 
Raving·watched and participated in the many millions 
of dollars of cuts in the state budget, and the inadequate " 
funding of local units of government, we believe further 
cuts cannot be made in these areas. 
We believe further cuts in state support of local 
government will inevitably result in increased property 
taxes. Based on existing laws, the loss of local property 
tax relief in Lane county could be over $1 million next 
year. 
Intentional inaccuracies used in this election, in­
cluding statements in the Voters' Pamphlet, must be counter­
ed. A "no" vote will reduce property tax relief. It is a 
falsehood to suggest otherwise. 
A "no" vote will increase property taxes. 74 
In contrast to the Oregon Farm Bureau, one of the few interest 
groups who opposed the tax in a public statement, the Oregon State Home 
Builders Association voted to support it. The association president, 
B.D. Greene, said, nit was very clear that defeat of the tax would place 
75 
an increasing burden on property taxes. tt 
The State Housing Council, an appointive committee selected by 
Governor McCall, also urged voters to approve the cigarette tax incre­
ase, again, because of the property tax linkage to the ballot measure. 
77 
An extremely conservative journal, the Oregon Voters Digest, 
wrote "we oppose'discriminatory special sales taxes on principle, but 
this particular cigarette tax increase should get a "yes" vote," 
76 
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because of the severe time limitations involved in obtaining any other 

78 

form of state revenue. Their support and the unanimous support of 

college and university alumnus papers provided more evidence of bi­
partisan, conservative-liberal approval. 
Summary 
Even where endorsements were not forthcoming, little opposition 

surfaced. Only three major newspapers (subscription 10,000 or more) 

came out opposed: the Medford Mail-Tribune, Klamath Falls Herald and 
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!!!!, and Ashland Daily Tidings. The endorsements, whether they were 
in response to membership pressure or the result of speeches by presti­
gious citizens, added to the general network for delivering the campaign 
message, and to some extent may have created a bandwagon rationale ~or 
ever more groups to privately support the cigarette tax. In a political 
campaign to win public office, endorsements are used to convert highly 
h impersonal propositions into personal issues. In a campaign where there 
is no candidate, no popular appeal, no personalities; speeches to Rotary 
and Chamber of Commerce groups are doubly crucial for campaign organizers. 
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If "many voters judge a candidate by the people who endorse him," 
then perhaps it is also true that when no personality or popular appeal 
exists, a group which endorses the abstraction of a ballot measure, pro­
vides voters with an even greater measure of direction. 
At any rate, on an impersonal measure like the tax referendum, the 
proponents need to create a situation that would attract public atten­
tion. The wide variety of endorsements, along with other developments 
to be described in another section, served th'is purpose. Even when 
voters remained unaware of the approval of anyone group, the group 
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itself, if consensus was genuine, served to extend the influence of 
the campaign. 
Business Interests 
In 1969, Oregon business interests had presented a united front 
in support of the sales tax, but in 1971-72 their enthusiasm for reve­
nue measures was limited to somewhat grudging financial contributions 
and the loan of a few "executives" to the campaign committee. There 
is good evidence to ~uggest that what little support did materalize 
from this group reflected the implicit threat of increased corporate 
taxes. One informant, whose organization contributed $1,000 to the 
canpaign, expressed the opinion that' any future dole would be subject 
to considerably closer scrutiny by his board of directors, in part 
because of the bad publicity resulting from inaccuracies emerging from 
both camps, and in part because of a negative corporate reaction to 
f) 81 
"blackmail tt by the governor f s office. 
Whereas many corporations were asked for manpower, only a few pro­
vided it. These were the "invisible men," working behind the scenes 
with other volunteers, with civic clubs, and in whatever way the State 
Committee decided to use them. 
An Associated Oregon Industries employee, Bill Lesh, "on loan as 
a volunteer, tf urged students, college professors and other state and 
local employees to volunteer their time going door-to-door as well as 
making whatever financial contributions they could. "Oregon's 100,000 
public employees and their families can have a major impact on the vote 
if they go to the polls, tt said Lesh to a Portland Chamber of Commerce 
82 
meeting in December. This public statement was strong, but the sole 
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visible evidence that business employees had any part in the campaign. 
Apparently the State Committee had divided responsibilities among 
~three volunteers. Don Arvidson of Northwest Bell Telephone Company, 
made a limited number of contacts in Clackamas county; Les AuCoin, state 
representative and public information officer at Pacific University, 
worked Washington county. Bill Lesh, loaned from ADI, was responsible 
83 
until the first of January, for MUltnomah county. Scott MOntgomery, 
paid assistant to Brad Davis, was assigned the southern part of the state 
and worked with Al King and other students in establishing contacts 
84 
there. 
The @Pal of these volunteers was to contact as many opinion makers 
as possible, obtain from them names of workers, potential contributors, 
and gain their public or private endorsement. Lesh described the acti­
vity as a "communication task": trying to convince leaders to "get 
85 
involved. tt 
Brad Davis had hoped to appeal to business interests more strong­
ly. The State Committee felt that the business community would carry 
arguments to their own employees--specifically the argument of property 
tax relief. There is no evidence that they did. They had little finan­
cial stake in the outcome of the election and very little to say about 
the manner in which the campaign was run. It can be assumed that the 
transmission processes available through private enterprise were not 
used. 
Youth-Aged Coalition 
The woman origin~ting the youth-aged merger, Ruth Shephard, was 
guided by two motives: (1) public visibility for senior citizens, and 
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(2) creating a situation whereby the elderly could actually work to 
good purpose for a "positive "cause." 
On November 10, 1971, prior to the special legislative session, 
the Oregon Council of Senior Citizens had issued a press release ob­
jecting to the budget balancing strategy proposed by the Joint Ways 
and Means Committee. The Legislative Committee of the State Council, 
as well as representatives of several other organizations with state­
wide senior citizen membership, sought to "maintain tax relief" by 
encouraging the Ways and Means Committee to "keep faith with the prin­
ciple of Itability to pay" as reflected in the present tax relief law, 
87 
and not to cut any part of the assi~tance that was promised last spring.tf 
It was on the basis of this senior citizen sentiment that Mrs. 
Shephard approached Alton King, then executive secretary of the University 
of Oregon student body president, a 27 year old student who had worked 
with Mrs. Shephard on a variety of senior citizen projl"\cts" It was upon 
her recommendation that King drafted the letter to Jack Nelson. In the 
letter, the student leader suggested a coalition of students and senior 
citizens, the possibility of media visibility based on the unusual image 
such a diverse and frequently opposing cooperation of interest represen­
ted, and promised student cooperation from existing campus organizations 
throughout the state. He closed the letter to Nelson by saying, "Let 
88 
us make senior citizen power a fact." 
On November 22, Nelson mailed a reply to King's offer, saying: 
Senior citizens are much interested in today's youth 
and the "new" voters--we salute your fine effort to be in­
volved in such a responsible way, and look forward, very 
much, to working with you,,89 
"" 
From this point on, cooperation between the two age groups 'made 
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news. But the coalition was more ~myththan a reality~ ~tuated 
by a wish on the part of both King ~the State Committee £Oordinators 
to maintain the appearance of a popular :f.ront organization.. .A .somewhat 
90 
limited mailing was accomplished by the ~enior citizens., ':but :for the 
t 
IIOSt part the participation by the Btate Council was li.1llited,. With the 
sanction of officers of the council., ~:ss releases and ,~spondence 
written and distributed by the yout_h.,we.nt out under the "Dale of the 
coalition. Throughout the campaign, the "united" front 1ilia:S maintai.ned: 
Senior citizens have found 'wry good helpers with 
these young people, in our mutual fight to passth.e cig­
arette tax and hang on to the property tax relie£ that 
was promised us by legislators last spring. Seniors 
have banded together in this effort because we know that 
the state can f t run, just 1 ike we haven f t been .able to 
run, on inadequate incomes .91 
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Campaign leg work was done ~ the stUdents. Under -tbedirect ion 
of King, a state-wide communication network between student leaders at 
each state and community college was establ ished. Prior to the second 
coalition meeting in November, King had written representatives from 
Portland State University, Oregon State University, Portland, Chemeketa, 
8114 Lane Coumnmity Colleges, and South Salem High School.. Someone from 
each of these canpuses was present at tbe meeting in the governor t s 
conference room in Salem. Following the meeting these same student 
le.aders provided the'" momentum for activity on their own campuses; dis­
tributing leaflets sent them by King and Mike Park (also a student at 
the University of Oregon), and providing speakers to explain the measure 
to any local group requesting information. 
As part of the responsibil ity of stu4ent coordinator. King wrote 
a two page informational essay, several s anple "letters to the editor, tf 
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and a speech text--distributed to the "prime movers" at each of the 
state colleges and universities. In both the essay and the speech, 
King cited (1) the two percent cuts to state programs provided for in 
H.B. 3064, (2) the compounding four percent cuts threatened by failure 
of the federal and state income tax separation measure, and (3) the 
cigarette tax as a "user tax." He pointed out to the students the costs 
to the state created by cigarette smokers in increased state building 
costs because of higher insurance rates, and the reforestation of burn­
93 
ed timber land as the result of smoker carelessness. 
In addition to the materials sent to over 50 student leaders, 
King distributed the State Committee's printed literature di~ectly from 
his office in Lane county and by providing a list of students to Brad 
Davis who delivered additional packets of material. The student leader, 
like the leaders of the large state interest groups, expressed dis­
pleasure with the contents of the leaflets. "It really hurt us' when we 
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used them. People are not fools." 
On January 13, King addressed the delegates of the Inter-institu­
tional Union of Students of the State System of Highe~ Education (IUSOSSHE) 
meeting on the OSU campus. Delegates decided to distribute the ttfact 
sheet" on the negative impact of a "no" vote, but stopped short of formal 
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endorsement. King said that the agreement to disseminate the State 
Committee literature was reluctantly given. 
According to King, the most significant contribution his commit­
tee made in the campaign was the personal contacts: to people new to 
a state campaign, to editors and electronic media personnel in behalf of 
the coalition, and to community and civic leaders. In a three day swing 
110 
through southern and western Oregon, King and his assistant, Mike Park, 
contacted people in Medford, Grants Pass, Roseburg, Coos Bay, North 
Bend, Coquille, Reedsport, Newport, Florence, Tillamook, Wheeler, Sea­
side and Astoria. Mrs. Shephard had written to senior citizens in 
these areas alerting them to the student visit, and Brad Davis made 
available names of media contacts. As a result of the tour, many news­
papers and civic clubs publicly endorsed the ballot measure and applaud­
ed the coalition effort. Student and faculty members in Ashland, " 
Reedsport, and Astoria began to make public speaking appearances, and 
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a "great many students got busy handing out 1iterature by the gross." 
On many of Oregon's state campuses student leaders were busy. In 
Corvallis, Oregon State University student body president Ron Wilkinson 
voiced his support of the tax measure and organized students in a large 
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registration drive on campus. Forty or more students were involved 
soliciting votes, distributing infoDnation materials, providing tran­
sportation to the polls and speaking to Corvallis, Lebanon and Albany 
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civic organizations as well as housing groups on the OSU campus. 
Reflecting the OSU student and faculty interest, the campus newspaper, 
The Barometer, published a special election edition giving a full range 
of coverage to the special election. 
The student council at Blue MOuntain Community College went on 
record January 11, favoring passage, by a 12-1 vote. Tim Mabry, BMCC 
student body president said that the "student council is a representative 
sounding board of the opinions of the campus, tt and that students were 
busy distributing materials on campus in a demonstration of earnest· sap­
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port. 
Wally Lien, president of the Oregon Community College Student 
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Association and current president of Chemeketa Community College, had 
made the materials available to Mabry. Additionally he circulated a 
special bulletin to students on his campus in which he stated· 
Recent past tax defeats cause legislators to be ex­
tremely conservative about proposing future tax increases 
to provide necessary funds for programs. When state funds 
••. are cut, it places additional demand for local property 
taxes. This demand, on top of regular demands usually 
causes hardening of the arteries toward the alternative 
source of revenue. The only remaining alternative is our 
tuition. If you are eventually planning on transferring to 
a four year college be advised that they rely even more on 
state general 'funds. 
Even if you smoke, you cantt afford the luxury of a 
negative vote on a fund source that pays half the cost of 
you r educa tion. . . . Make sure that all the voters you 
can get P8 the polls understand why a YES vote is of such 
.urgency. 1 . 
At Southern Oregon College in Ashland, student leaders were work­
ing with faculty. Also in Ashland, Pat Overhand, Ashland High School 
student body president, attempted to involve those under 18 in distri­
buting literature on the tax. King said that parental sup~ort was 
sought through the high school students but that tUne worked against 
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them and this effort failed. 
Summary 
Under the cover of the youth-aged coalition, Kingts committee 
was successful in distributing literature, obtaining press cover­
age of the coalitionts activity, and in working with other student 
leaders in mobilizing activity on campuses around the state. 
Following the election, the Eugene Register-Guard wrote in an 
editorial: 
The youth vote is widely credited for the narrow 
passage of the cigarette tax increase Tuesday. That 
credit is due. But the young voters didn't do it alone. 
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Bvidence is strong that older people teamed up with the 
young in a fortunate dual effort to keep Oregon from 
bankruptcy.103 
Mrs. Shephard commented after the election that while the elderly 
citizens of Oregon "dropped the ball" in actual campaigning, the objec­
tive had been met. As a group they ttfelt" involved, the Oregon publ ic 
was made aware that elders could be a positive influence in events af­
fecting all Oregonians, and the tax measure did pass. In this respect, 
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the coalition was a success. 
III. THE OPPOSITION 
Campaigning originated by the ,anti-cigarette tax people is not 
of primary concern to this thesis. However it would be an error to 
suppose that there was no such activity. In one sense the referral 
drive can be considered the first phase of the opponents campaign to 
defeat the tax. Once the measure was placed on the ballot an aggressive 
campaign was launched, punctuated by hyperbole and inaccuracies. 
In one of the few efforts to obtain legitimacy on the "nott side, 
Senators Vernon Cook (D-Gresham) and Harl Haas (D-Portland) formed 
"Legislators Opposed to the Cigarette Tax Increase." The press coverage 
obtained by the announcement of a legislator's committee was extensive. 
Many papers quoted Cook as saying, "It's pure baloneytt to say that state 
services would be irreparably crippled. "A special session could solve 
the financial problems of the state by qu~rterly state income tax re­
porting, and state tax reforms: increasing corporate income taxes, 
forcing out-of-state businessmen to pay their full share; taxing capital 
gains as ordinary income; instituting a policy of estimated tax pay­
105 
ments by corporations and self employed. 1t 
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On December 28, Haas, Cook and Representative Howard Willits 
(D-Gresham) , issued another press statement identifying their chief 
arguments: (1) defeat of the cigarette tax increase would force Repub­
licans to adopt tax reform measures, (2) a special session was needed 
for reform, (3) the cigarette tax was a sales tax in disguise, and 
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(4) it was a selective tax hitting middle and lower income families. 
Other news reports picked up an extemporaneous statement by Willits in 
which he said that u a higher cigarette tax would make the state more de­
pendent on this type of tax and thus less inclined to discourage smok­
107 
ing." 
The majority of the legislators opposing the tax remained silent. 
Only a highly vocal minority made news. In a speech to a southern 
Oregon civic group, Representative Sidney Bazett (R-Josephine), said 
that weak spots in the state budget could be connected to absorb ,the 
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loss. Another state senator, Thomas Mahoney (D-Portland), publicly 
opposed the measure, and in an editorial reply, the Corvallis Gazette-
Times, chided him and attempted to reduce his credibility by naming him 
as attorney for the tobacco distributors who sponsored the referendum 
109 
and funded the opposition campaign. 
Clyde Brummell, president of the Oregon Homeowner's Association, 
the only visible private membership ,organization coming out in opposi­
tion to the measure, said that his organization opposed the tax because 
110 
of its "selectivity.tt It was the homeowners association that had 
sponsored the initiative placing the Tax Limitation measure on the 1967 
ballot. 
Still another source of opposition emerged in what was a move to 
counter the popular pro-tax youth-aged coalition. Two committees 
114" 
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surfaced. The Coos Bay World called it a "raft of opposition, tt but 
their activity began and ended in two $50 page arguments appearing in 
the Voters' Pamphlet. "Students for Sensible Tax Reform" argued the 
discriminatory nature of the tax: u a miserab~e excuse for true tax re­
form and property tax reI ief," and "Senior Citizens Against Property 
Tax Increase" called the proposed tax "excessive, restrictive, and dis­
112 
criminatory." The man named treasurer of the student committee was 
a young law student friend of Ron Campbell, organizer of the summer 
petition drive; the treasurer of the senior citizen committee was the 
113 
law student's grandmother. Campbell wrote both ads. 
Kenneth Rinke, the man who initiated the referendum drive and a 
lobbyist for the tobacco distributors, surfaced only once--as a con­
tributor of $1500 to the "vote no" war chest, representing 10 days of 
time donated at $150 a day. He did far more but all of the activity 
was behind the scenes. He planned the media campaign, hired the public 
114 
relations advertising firm, and supervised all strategy decisions. 
Summary 
The enemy forces included then, five state legislators: one 
(Mahoney) employed by the tobacco interests, and four private citizens, 
two of whom were employed by the same people (Rinke and the attorney 
for "Oregonians Against Any Sales Tax" committee). And 80 the war was 
fought on both sides of the battle line by people with similiar motives: 
economic self-preservation. 
IV. CAMPAIGN HEATS UP 
By early January, the campaign became heated. Both those in 
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favor and those against the tax began making increasingly stronger 
charges and counter-charges. Arguments were deliberately and system­
atically selected to influence opinion by methods calculated to call 
forth emotional reactions in the voter's mind. It would be a euphem­
ism to call what became daily campaign exaggeration anything but pro­
115 
paganda. 
MOst of the charges revolved around a statement made by the anti­
cigarette tax campaigners that a "yes" vote on the increase would mean 
, 116 
a cut in property tax relief--an argument that was in no way accurate. 
Statements to this'effect appeared both on television and in radio ad­
vertisements and in the anti-cigare~te tax argument s found in the . 
Voters' Pamphlet and campaign brochures. Newspaper ads carrying the 
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slogan, "Beware of Tricks," alluded to the same issue (Figure 4). 
When the "Vote No" advertisements appeared, L.B. Day reacted. In 
a press release issued on January 4, Day called the television ads "one 
of the most misleading pieces of sloganeering and scare tactics I've 
ever heard. ft He went on to say that "such outrageous propaganda might 
118 
wry well deprive Oregonians of clear air and water." 
Day was quoted on Tuesday. Wednesday, Cook responded by calling 
state Officials, "prostitutes of the governor who are being paid to tell 
119 
lies about the governor's sales tax." The gove rnor' sassistant t Bob 
Davis, shot back "The truth is that property tax relief will be cut only 
if the cigarette tax is defeated. The statement made by Cook, that my 
120 
part in this campaign is illegal, is absolutely outrageous and untrue. U 
On the same day, Attorney General Lee Johnson said that he had 
seen one of the ads about which Davis and Day were complaining and felt 
121 
it was tlnot a total misstatement of fact." Sylvan Campf, a Portland 
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tobacco distributor who was among the leaders of the campaign to refer 
the tax hike to the voters, and one of the two men who were charged 
with corrupt practices violations in soliciting methods, said that the 
sponsors of the ad, "Oregonians Against Any Sales Tax Committee," were 
122 
not misleading anybody. ttl think it s the other way around."t 
~n Thursday, January 6, upon the request of Secretary of State 
Clay Myers, a letter was written to Ron Collins, chairman of Oregonians 
Against Any Sales Tax, and Alan Campf, treasurer, warning them that the 
advertisements did make misrepresentations and were in violation of 
Oregon law. The attorney general said that if the ads were not with- .. 
drawn by 5:00 p.m. Thursday, his office would take action, perhaps by 
placing the matter before a state grand jury. Another letter went to 
Clyde Brummell, president of the homeowner's association, concerning 
statements made by his organization in the Voters' Pamphlet. The 
atto~y gemral' s letter stated that: "Both Q:wo disputed television 
ad!l contain statements ... that Ballot Measure 1 ..• would abolish 
the local Property Tax ReI ief Fund and that cigarette tax revenues are 
presently appropriated to that fund, rather than the State General Fund. 
It is ~lS~ a misstatement of fact to say that Ballot Measure 1 abol­
ishes the Property Tax Relief Account since that account had already 
been abolished and cigarette tax revenues are presently earmarked only 
123 
for the State General Fund and the cities and the counties." 
On Friday the television advertisements were cancelled. The ad­
vertising firm of Clenaghen and Associates, Inc., declared that the ads 
were "an honest mistake." Brummel wrote a le1;ter to Johnson, admitting 
some. degree of error. "We regret our structure in the Voters' Pam.Phlet 
was in error as you see it. However, laymen do not structure sentences 
118 
124 
in the best of the King's English.tt 
Also on Friday, those apologizing for error went on the offense. 
Having appeased the attorney general, the anti-cigarette tax people 
charged that the Voter's Pamphlet contained erroneous statements--this 
time, by the proponents. Maurice Sussman, attorney for the anti-tax 
committee, filed a letter with the secretary of state asking that he 
prosecute those responsible. He objected to statements in the Voters' 
Pamphlet because of the prediction about "possible" total cuts to only 
one or two state agencies, declaring that there is no evidence that can 
predict what the legislature might do in a special se~sion. He also ob­
jected to the statement which said, "How about the state police. They'd 
be fair game. Eliminate them and you've found your $17.2 million in 
125 
one fell Hselective cut"." Sussman also objected to a statement that 
conveyed the idea that the tobacco companies would pay the tax. He 
said the tax is a consumer tax and would be paid by the purchaser of 
126 
cigarettes, not the manufacturer. Another objection the attorney had 
to the pro-tax pamphlet argument was the statement that the legislature 
127 
would cut property tax relief if the ballot measure failed. 
Saturday, January 8, the attorney general's office issued an infor­
mal opinion that statements made by the tax proponents were not in vio­
lation of Oregon law. George Bell, assistant to the secretary of state, 
said his office received an assistant attorney general's informal opinion 
that the Voters' Pamphlet statements in question were speculation and 
could not be regarded as facts. "While the author may have used "wild 
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language,tt it does not constitute-falsehood." . 
Newspapers carried nothing more on the matter and it began to 
1..19 

appear that the proliferation of corrupt practices violation charges 
had ended. Myers asked for apologies from persons who made false or 
misleading statements in the Voters' Pamphlet, statements he termed 
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"extravagant and designed to frighten and intimidate the voters." 
MOnday, an apology was received in the secretary of state's office from 
William Gilbert, treasurer of the Citizens Against Raising Property 
Taxes Committee, the State Committee cover organization, in reference 
to a statement that all of the $17.2 million deficit could be taken 
from the state police budget. He ackno~ledged in the letter that the 
General Fund doesn't contribute that much to the state police, so the 
deficit couldn't be met in that way, and informed the secretary of state 
that committee volunteers throughout ·the state had been instructed to 
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stop distributing any information containing the error. 
Then, on January 12, only six days before the election, Senator 
Cook brought a charge in another form, perhaps as a reaction to:: Myers 
request for an apology. He accused Oregon's secretary of state and 
attorney general of "violent partisanship" in handling of cigarette 
tax measure matters, and demanded a special investigation to see whether 
there had been election law violations. 
Since the referral by the people, both the secretary 
of state and the attorney general have worked hand in glove 
with supporters of the cigarette tax. I demand that the 
attorney general request either the Oregon State Bar or the 
chief justice of the Supreme Court to suggest to him an im­
partial lawyer to be appointed as a special assistant attor­
ney general to investigate and bring charges for the viola­
tion of t~e Corrupt Practices Act during the course of this 
election. 31 
MYers had replied to a public outcry o~r exaggerations in the 
state publication by saying that state law denied him authority to 
120 
screen false or misleading statements. Cook challenged this. He said 
Myers had deleted, without consent, a reference in the Voters' Pamphlet 
material submitted by Haas and Cook, which described Cook as chairman 
of the Senate Tax Committee and Haas as the 1971 Democratic House 
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leader. 
In the same release, Cook also charged McCall's staff and some 
appointees of violations of the Corrupt Practices Act: Tanzer, director 
of the Department of Human Resources, and L.B. Day, director of the 
Department of Environmental Quality. He accused them of soliciting 
funds in support of the five-cent increase, illegal under the Corrupt 
Practices Act permitting state employees to support partisan candidates 
and state political issues except during working hours. 
On the same day Cook made the charges Day replied by saying that 
he had not violated the corrupt practices provision. At a news confer­
ence January 12, he handed out copies of a resolution adopted by the En­
vironmental Quality Commission: 
The Environmental Quality Commission, as part of its 
responsibility to the citizens of Oregon, hereby declares 
its unqualified support of both the cigarette tax and income 
tax programs adopted by the 1971 legislature and'instructs 
the staff to disseminate full information to Oregon citizens 
on the effeci of loss of revenues from these sources on Oregon 
environment. 33 
Day called Cook f s accusation "sheer nonsense. Ifm do ing exactly 
what the commission asked me to do.,,134 
On the same day Cook and Day were having their public debate, the 
governor made a last public plea for passage. At a special press con­
ference January 12, McCall termed ,the tax boost 'the "most important tax 
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issue ever presented to the people. It 
At the. same time the Oregon Journal criticized all parties in the 
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dispute: 
While there are reasoned arguments coming from both 
sides, there is also this campaign of distortion and deceit, 
of trying to outscare each other. 
How nice it would be if we could back up and start 
over, leaving out the terror tactics and just leveling with 
people honestly. Both sides can make strong cases without 
getting into the gutter. 
" It's tempting to call for a plague on both their 
houses. 136 
A few closing shots were fired, but after the week-long series 
of minor scrimages, it was all anti-climax. Brad Davis recapitulated 
arguments used by the State Committee and then said: 
MOst of the money to finance the anticigaret tax 
program came from a Richmond, Virginia tobacco lobby. Do 
you really believe that a tobacco lobby from Virginia 
really gives a damn about your property tax relief, or 
your public schools, or mental 'inst~tutions or any other 
program in Oregon for Oregonians~13 
Last minute voter opinion surveys were conducted by newspaper 
columnists in Portland, Corvallis, Salem, Pendleton, and Bend, query­
ing the man on the street and resulting in the usual balanced cross-
section of opinion characterizing such surveys. The public relations 
firm employed by the State Committee, reported a pre-election survey 
showing 32 percent in favor; 31 percent against; and 37 percent unde­
138 
cided'. In an election even column, Doug Baker quoted a radio poll 
139 
conducted by radio station KPOK, "nearly 2 to 1 against. " 
On January 18, 1972, Oregon voters passed the 1972 cigarette tax, 
Ballot Measure Number 1, by 245,717 to 236,937--roughly a 51 to 49 
140 
percent majority. Clay Myers had predicted slightly less than a 50 
percent voter turnout--5l4,000 ballots. On election day, 482,654 were 
141 
cast. The voters of Oregon had determined to accept the "band-aid" 
142 
tax. By a small majority, voters chose to believe it was necessary. 
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V. POST-ELECTION REACTIONS 
On the Sunday preceding the election, the Sunday Oregonian 
"Forum" section carried an article with the following warning: 
If Oregon history means anything" backers of the 
cigarette tax increase are facing heavy odds in trying 
to get it passed at a special election January 18. 
Oregon has had 10 special elections in its history 
and 12 measures referred by the voters, as was the cig­
arette tax increase, have been won over the years. 
Only five of the 12 measures were approved by the 
people and fO~~30f them were in the first special election 
held in 1913. 
While not altogether accurate in reporting Oregon's historic 
voting record, the writer was correct in one respect: the proponents 
did have sizable odds working against them. 
But the voters said "yes" in the clos'est tax election in Oregon t s 
history, a majority by only nine tenths of one percent. 	(Figure 5) 
None of the advocates felt the public would vote against their 
own best interests. Tanzer bel ieved that if the "facts" were made 
144 
known, the voter would vote the "right way." Governor McCall felt 
that the public's independence and clear-thinking would 	save what was 
145 	 . 
left 	of his budget. Al King said that "cigarettes are basically very 
146 
tfunpopul ar, and even sD10kers didn t t worry about the tax. KGW-TV 
news analyst, Floyd McKay, felt the "opponents strained their credibil­
147 
ity," and Jack Thompson, chief state elections officer and assis­
tant secretary of state for more than ten years, said that "the people 
148 
could not be duped." 
In Oregon, as in national and internatipnal politics, leadership 
opinions varied and those closest to the campaign expressed markedly 
different views about why the measure passed. Only the voters them­
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Figure 5. Editorial cartoon; Oregonian, January 20, 1972. 
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selves, in the privacy of the polling booth, knew for certain why the 
tiniest majority passed the cigarette tax increase. 
Summary 
The campaign had been waged on many fronts, appealing to special 
groups as well as Oregonians in general. In summary, the proponents of 
the 	tax increase said: 
1. 	 'lhe state government is in a fiscal jam. It needs 

the money the tax hike would raise to pay the bill 

for services rendered the public. 

2. 	 An expanded property tax relief program aiding persons 
on low incomes will suffer if the tax hike is turned 
down. 
3. 	 Oregon's present cigarette tax (four cents a pack) is 
fourth from the bottom among the 50 states. Even with 
the increase Oregon can still expect to sell cigarettes 
to Californians who pay a 10-cents-a-pack tax and 
particularly to Washingtonians who pay a 16 cents tax. 
4. 	 While alternatives to the cigarette tax can be found, 
getting the legislature and the voters to approve an­
other type of tax increase during the current fiscal 
period are minimal at best. 
The 	opponents argued: 
1. 	 A cigarette tax per se is bad. It is a sales tax and 
hits the poor man hardest. It is not based on the 
ability to pay principle. 
2. 	 If the voters okay the tax hike they may be actually 
delaying a meaningful overhaul of Oregpn's tax structure 
based on ability to pay. 
3. 	 State government wen' t collapse if the tax hike is 
vetoed. It can survive the estimated $17.5 million 
drop in revenue if the voters turn down the tax. 
There is, of course, .no way to know for certain how many people 
were influenced by the issues~ and the structure of t1:e arguments. The 
previous commentary demonstrates how muddy the issues became as the cam­
paign progressed. 
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We do know, however, that nearl y every available channel was 
used in an effort to influence the voter. Specialized campaign 
literature was directed to group members in the form of memos, fact 
sheets, letters, and organizational publications. Personal appearances 
by an extensive army of speakers further disseminated the message to 
specific audiences with similiar interests. The electronic media was 
utilized to channel messages to more generalized audiences using 
television advertising, public debates, editorial commentaries. Radio 
advertisements, talk 'shows and news broadcasts reached a smaller audi~ 
ence--one confined 'to only the Portland metropolitan area. 
Newspaper reporters picked up ~nformation from press releases and 
public statements and relayed that information to a wider audience " 
across the state. Editorial writers and feature columnists commented 
extensively on both the substantive issues and the campaign methods em­
ployed by the cover committees on both sides. 
Campaign strategy did not attempt to change attitudes toward tax­
ation. The media campaign did not dwell on the functioning of state 
government or the dollars needed for general governmental needs per se; 
not did the speeches made by state officials, legislators, and special 
interest group representatives. Instead, the appeals attempted to re­
inforce existing positive attitud~s toward: (1). job security (in the 
case of specialized appeals to state employees), (2) aid to the handi­
capped and emotionally disturbed (appeals through radio and television 
advertising as well as fact sheets and public speeches), (3) preserva­
tion of Oregon's quality of life (chiefly through appeals by L.B. Day 
calling attention. to environmental needs), and (4) self~interest of 
homeowners (the issue of property tax relief). 
126' 

According to researchers in persuasion effects, long term at­
titudes and voter predispositions toward issues cannot be changed to 
149 
any measurable degree by a short term campaign. But persuasion can 
affect short term perceptual change by creating a linkage between past 
positively valued attitudes and neutral or inactive attitudes. The 
campaign strategy used this theory in planning the content of persuasive 
messages. Ecology, property tax relief and job security were connected 
ISO 
to an extension of a tax already approved by the electorate. Voters 
were asked to vote, not on a tax increase, but for their own special 
Utterests. 
Underlying the substantive re~lity of Oregon's fiscal dilemma, 
were the innuendos, threats, and charges of ethical and legal violations 
made by opposing sides. Publicity that was obtained by the charges drew 
attention to the issues even if they did not clarify them. And the 
charges were merely an outgrowth of the fear appeals themselves. 
A seasoned veteran of political campaigning, Herbert Baus, of the 
California public relations firm of Baus and Ross, says that it is the 
task of a successful campaign to "tastefully frighten voters into believ­
l~ 
ing that failure of the issue would be disasterous .. It Although 
to differing degrees, both the supporters and the opponents must have 
believed this. The state committees on both sides couched their cam­
paign rhetoric in fear provoking language. Even the directed appeals 
of interest groups focused on loss of jobs or programs. 
Chapter V. considers the effect on the voters of campaign stra~: 
tegies in the 1971-72 referendum campaign, asking whether or not they 
believed arguments presented in support of the cigarette tax increase. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE SURVEY 
Large national campaign management firms recognize that a popu­
lar referendum differs considerably from the election of a candidate 
because there is no major personality demanding voter attention. In­
stead the election "involves complex debates about . . . technical ities 
1 
of funding. tt The principal problem in a referendum or initiative cam­
paign then, is to convince the public that passage of the ballot measure 
would be of public benefit; and motivate them to travel to the polls to 
cast a favorable ballot. 
Taken together, the facts of Oregon's fiscal situation, the acti­
vities of interest groups on both sides of the question, and tradition­
al Oregon voter behavior on tax measures, suggest that a great many 
variables were at work on the vote outcome. Without a comprehens ive 
survey of the entire state we cannot state with certainty that the mea­
sure passed because of, or in spite of, the formal campaign However 
an analysis of voter opinions taken from two highly divergent counties 
may provide evidence supporting the thesis hypothesis. That is, that 
the united efforts of special interest groups was the deciding factor 
in the narrow margin of victory. 
The voter survey, reported in this chapter, was an effort to an­
swer three major questions: (1) Who voted in this election? (2) How 
did they vote? and (3) Why did they cast their ballots as they did? The 
poll attempted to discover which issues were most important to the voters, ­
13a 
how they obtained their information on the tax, which influence source 
was primary in their vote decision, and how they viewed the activity of 
interest groups in the campaign. 
The leadership survey attempted to find out what influentials 
thought were the reactions of the voters. The questions paralleled the 
voter questionnaire. 
I. BENTON AND OOUGLAS COUNTIES 
Benton and Douglas counties are dissimilar by practically every 
measure. Benton is smaller geographically, has a smaller population 
(53,77.6 to Douglas at 71,743), and .fewer registered voters. Yet ap­
proximately the same.number of persons in each county voted in the Jan­
uary special election (56 percent of the .tota1 registered voters in Benton; 
2 
49 percent in Douglas). It may be that the campaign generated more 
interest in Benton, but it may also be that a comparatively higher socio­
economic level provides for a generally higher vote turnout in special 
elections. 
The 1970 census figures show that the median grade of school com­
pleted by residents of Douglas county is 11.8, while in Benton the median 
grade completed is 12.9. Educational level and income are generally 
recognized to be directly related, and so they are in the sample counties. 
Benton's mean family income is $11,412; while Douglas is lower at $9,470. 
Nearly twice as many persons in Benton are employed in the professional 
or technical fields. Douglas has a larger proportion of residents employed 
3 
as laborers. 
The higher education and per capita income in Benton is a reflection 
of the chief employment industry. Oregon State University is now sit­
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uated in Corvallis, the county seat (population 24,795). The heavi­
est concentration of Benton's population resides in or around the col­
lege town and Corvallis businesses depend heavily on income from the 
4 
OSU academic complex. 
Douglas, on the other hand, is chiefly a logging, mining and fish­
ing area extending from the coast town of Reedsport, to the Cascade 
Mountains. Many small towns within Douglas county boundaries have pop­
ulations of less than 1,000. The largest city is Roseburg, the county 
seat (population 13,902). No large state facilities are located in 
Douglas, and the only institution of higher education is Umpqua (enrol­
S 
lment, 1,507) 
Benton county receives a significantly larger volume of electron­
ic aedia information through Portl and stations. The actual market share 
that Portland stations receive in Benton is 57 percent of totaltele­
vision households (13,400 T.V. households). Douglas ~ceives only lim­
ited Portland television, five percent of the total possible market 
share, through a franchised cable firm (21,700 T.V. households); and 
6 
has practically no radio reception. 
Benton is also more affected by newspapers than is Douglas. Forty-
percent of households receive either the Portland Oregonian or Journal, 
7 
as opposed to only 21 percent in Douglas. 
In sum, both geographically and culturally, Douglas county is 
more isolated from the influence of large metropolitan newspapers, and 
8 
television and radio stations. 
In Benton county the cigarette tax measure was approved by over 
9 
2,000 votes; Douglas defeated it by the same margin. 
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II. mE VOTER SURVEY 
Survey Procedure 
In Chapter I, the survey methodology was described as having 
been composed of a random sample selected from a population of indivi­
duals who had actually cast their ballots in the January 18, 1972 
Special Election. Approximately 250 questionnaires were mailed to 
voters through the random procedure. Of total questionnaires mailed, 
28 percent were returned (Benton, 71; Dougl as t 69). 
Validation of Survey Sample 
A comparison of the sample to the population in each county 
demonstrates that the response is representative by two measures: 
party registration t i.e., number of Democrat and Republ ican ballots 
issued by election officials; and total "yes" and "no" votes cast. 
The number of Democrats and Republicans issued ballots in each county 
was obtained from the "Official Voter Abstract of the 1972 Special Elec­
tion," as was the vote tally. Based on these figures, the number of 
expected returns in each category was computed using a~ test for a bi­
nomial experiment (~~~~). 
This procedure demonstrates that the party preference and the 
"yes-no" distribution of those responding in the sample population was 
not signific~ntly different (at the 10 percent level) than the entire 
population (Table III) '. 
It would have been desirable to compare other factors such as the 
percentage of those 18 to 21 years old casting their vote and the per­
centage of this age group who responded to the questionnaire. Since 
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TABLE III 
VALIDATION SCORES BASED ON ACTUAL BALLOTS ISSUED 
AND QUESTIONNAIRES RETURNED 
FRACTION OF 
VOTES CAST 
SAMPLE DIFFERENCE 
# E:.eected(a) 
B Cnty D Cnty 
# # 
# Received 
B Cnty D Cnty 
# # 
Z Value 
B Cnty D Cnty 
% % 
Democrat 29.67 36 .. 39 23. 34. -1.62 -.59* 
Republican 35.08 28.66 38. 29. .70 .08* 
Yes vote 49.75 26.90 .49. 32. 
- .19 1.26* 
*No 	 significant difference at the 10% level. 
(8) 	Fraction of number returnes expected in each category based on 
actual votes cast. 
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there is no way to discover such variables as age, sex, income and 
education within the limitations of the survey design, there is no 
apparent way to validate the resulting data further. However, based 
on the above measures of variability, the survey is judged to be a 
valid representation of the voter population in each of the two Oregon 
counties. 
III. SURVEY FINDINGS 
The Voters 
With respect to demographic factors, it appears that the largest 
voter turnout in both counties was ~ong persons between the ages of 30 
to 60; those who reside in urban areas; and persons employed in white 
collar occupations. It would also seem that a definite majority of 
those who voted in the 1972 special election also vote in every, or 
almost every election (Benton, 97 percent; Douglas 98 percent). 
A large number of females, persons over sixty and housewives 
voted. There is no way to determine whether the high percentage is 
bias due to the fact that certain groups are predisposed to return mail 
questionnaires, or whether a proportionately larger number of females, 
housewives and persons over sixty actually voted in this election. Re­
suIts of other 'voter surveys conducted on a national level in presiden­
tial elections, demonstrate that a slightly larger percentage of women 
10 
than men do in fact vote; and more persons over 45. 
In Benton, more Republicans voted than did Democrats (54 percent); 
in Douglas sl ightly more Democrats (49 percent). This data reflects the 
11 
party registratiQn in each county_ (Table IV) 
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TABLE IV 
POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN SAMPLE 
Benton Douglas Benton Douglas 
!i! N % N % Union Membership ~ % N % 
18-21 
22-29 
30-39 
40-49 
SO-59 
60­
§.!! 
Male 
Female 
3 
9 
20 
15 
12 
11 
70 
24 
46 
70 
4 
13 
28 
21 
17 
15 
9a 
34 
65 
99 
1 
9 
10 
17 
13 
16 
-66 
26 
40 
66 
1 
13 
14 
25 
19 
23 
9s 
38 
58 
96 
Member 
Non-member 
Occupation 
Farm Operator 
Housewife 
Profes-Tchnc1 
Bss-Mngr1 
Retired 
Unemployed 
Clerk-sales 
20 28 
50 70 
70­ 9a 
0 0 
28 39 
22 31 
7 10 
7 10 
1 1 
1 1
-66 92 
21 
46 
67 
2 
20 
23 
8 
7 
0 
2 
62 
30 
67 
97 
3 
29 
33 
12 
10 
0 
3 
90' 
Residence Income 
City 
Suburb 
Rural 
Bducation 
54 
5 
10 
69 
- 76 
7 
!! 
97 
45 
6 
14 
65 
65 
9 
20 
94 
Under $5,000 
$5,000-9,999 
$10,000-14,999 
$15,000-25,000 
$26,000 plus 
17 
12 
21 
15 
3 
68 
23 
17 
30 
21 
4 
96 
9 
21 
21 
13 
2 
66 
13 
30 
30 
19 
3 
9s 
Sm. H.S. 
B.S. 
Sm. C1g 
Clg 
Post C1g 
4 
17 
11 
13 
18 
69 
6 
24 
24 
18 
25 
9a 
5 
23 
18 
11 
6 
63 
7 
33 
26 
16 
9 
91 
Total Returns 71 69 
Part~istration 
Democrat 
Republican 
Independent 
23 
38 
8 
69 
32 
54 
11 
97 
35 
29 
3 
67 
49 
42 
4 
95 
*Difference indicates no 
quastionnaires. 
response from some informants who returned 
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Population Group Vote 
According to the survey findings, over 50 percent of all age 
groups voted "yes" in Benton county_ In Douglas county only those 
under 29 years of age and between, 50 and 59 voted in favor of the cig­
arette tax increase. The largest "no" vote appeared to be in th 30 to 
39 age group in both counties .. 
Unfortunately the sample of persons affiliated with a profes­
sional association or union was small, and for other reasons not use­
ful in ascribing group affiliations to voting behaviors. Also, most 
of those answering "yes" to the question'of union membership, were mem­
bers of organizations inactive in this campaign. Therefore, certain 
questions posed in the introduction must remain unanswered: (1) "Did 
membership in a particular group make it more probable that persuasive 
communication regarding the iss~es emanating from their group would be 
received favorably?" and (2) "To what extent did they look to that group 
for verification of an election choice?" 
In regard to other population groupings there is a substantial 
representation in the sample. In Benton county 71 percent of males 
surveyed voted "yes," and 63 percent of females; in Douglas county an 
equal proportion of men voted for and against the measure (50 percent), 
while more females voted "no" (53 percent). 
More people living in open country fz:-om both counties voted "no." 
In Benton those who lived in suburbs or cities voted "yes," more, where­
as in Douglas the "yes-no" vote was divided between rural and urban resi­
dents with slightly more voting "no" who lived in cities or suburbs. 
Based on level of education, the only group in Benton with fewer 
than 50 percent voting "no" were those with less than a high school 
1" 

degree. In Douglas county, the only groups tallying a higher percen­
tage of "yes" votes, were those with college or post-college educa­
tions, suggesting that in this election at least, the more highly ed­
ucated voter favored the tax. 
Occupational groups with the largest number of responses to the 
survey-housewives--voted 71 percent "yes" in Benton, while in Douglas 
only 40 percent voted in favor. The only occupational group register­
ing over 50 percent "yes" votes in Dougl as were those employed in pro­
fessional technical fields. 
In answer to the question of what is the relationship between 
population groups and the "yes-no"· vote, we can say that in both count­
ies it was the urban voter with a moderate to high income, a college 
education and a white collar job who supported the cigarette tax. While 
a high percentage of women in Benton voted "yes"--in both counties more 
me~ favored the tax (Appendix F). 
Attention to Political Messages 
Respondents were asked how often they listen to political messages 
thIOUgh (l) attendance at public meetings or debates, (2) attention to 
political advertising over radio or television, and (3) conversations 
with friends or relatives (Table V). 
Few from either county said they attended meetings or political 
rallies on a regular or frequent basis. They survey found that among 
Benton voters, 62 percent rarely attend and 24 percent never attend 
such meetings; 57 percent of Douglas county respondents said they 
rarely attend, and 36 percent said they never did. Those who said they 
did attend meetings frequently (eight percent in Benton; three per­
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TABLE V 
TOTAL RESPONSES TO QUESTION RELATING TO GENERAL AT1ENTION TO 

BOLlTICAL MESSAGES FROM BOTH COUNTIES 

l3enton Douglas 

Nt PeNT ~ PCNT 

I. POLITICAL MEETINGS 
Regularly 0 0% 1 1% 
Frequently 6 8 2 3 
Rarely 44 62 39 57 
Never 17 24 25 36 
No response 
...! 6 2 3 
Total 71 100% 69 100% 
II. POLITICAL ADVERTIS ING 
Regularly 17 24% 13 19% 
Frequently 31 44 39 57 
Rarely 20 28 14 20 
Never 1 1 1 1 
No response 2 3 2 3 
Total 71 100% 69 100% 
III. CONVERSATIONS ABOOT POLITICS 
Regularly 36 51% 31 45% 
Frequently 31 44 28 41 
Rarely 3 4 6 9 
Never 0 0 2 3 
No Response 1 1 2 2 
Total 71 100% 69 100% 
1,47 

cent in Douglas) are persons between the ages of 30 to 39, with high 
school or some college. But again the sample is too small to form any 
conclusions relating age or education to attendance at political meet­
ings. 
MOst people apparently receive the largest proportion of their 
political information either from conversations with friends or by 
listening to political advertising over radio or television. In Benton, 
44 percent named frequent attention to electronic media sources; 57 
percent in Douglas. The highest percentage in both counties said they 
either always or on a frequent basis talk with friends about politics 
(51 percent always, 44 percent frequently in Benton; 45 percent always, 
41 percent frequently in Douglas). These are people between the ages of 
30 to 49, of both sexes, and with at least 'some college education. 
Those who listen to political advertising most have high school 
or some college educatiun and fall into every age group, with slightly 
more in the age bracket of 30 to 49. These voters are equally represen­
ted by both sexes. The only population groups in Benton with a notable 
number of responses indicating rare attention to poli~ical advertising 
were those between the ages of 30 to 39, with college or post college 
educations. This group named personal conversations on political matters 
as a regular occurrance. 
We can reason from the survey findings that persons with high in­
terest in politics among the better educated engage in a proportionately 
higher percentage of their time talking politics with friends. Those 
with less than college educations also have a. high incidence of politi­
cal conversations with friends, but also attend to electronic media ad­
vertising with more frequency. It is not surprising that persons in 
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the age range of 30 to 49 engage in more active political attention. 
These are the child rearing, working years, when expenses are high­
est and income is reaching its peak. Hence these people can be ex­
pected to be more alert to changes in public policy that may have an 
affect on them. 
Reasons for the Vote 
Fiscal Impact. The question was asked: "Would you have been affec­
ted if the cigarette .tax measure had failed?" The purpose of the ques­
tion was to discover if a high proportion of voters cast their votes 
because of a belief that they would be adversely affected by a defeat 
of the 'tax increase. In general the answer was "no," they did not 
vote because of potential economic affect. 
(1) Age. Persons over 40 and between the ages of 22 to 29 from 
Benton county believed that the tax increase would have had no affect 
on them (Table VI). In Douglas county the only group responding by a 
"}Jes" to the question of economic affect, were persons in the 40 to 49 
age group (53 percent). The only group registering a high "no" respon­
se were those over 60 (56 percent). 
(2) Sex. In both counties mpre women than men felt that the tax 
defeat would not affect them (54 percent in Benton; 50 percent in Doug­
las). Also, more women than men were uncertain about possible affects 
of a tax defeat. 
(3) Residence. Interestingly, rural dwellers in Benton believed 
that they would not be affected (80 percent), while in Douglas people 
living in stimiliar areas believ~d they would (50 percent). In general, 
persons living in cities or urban areas in Benton county believed that 
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TABLE VI 
TOTAL TALLY AND PERCENT OF RESPONDENTS 

NAMING FISCAL IMPACT 

Would there have been a fiscal impact on you had the cigarette tax 
measure been defeated? * 
YES NO UNCERTAIN 
N PCNT N PCNT N PCNT 
Benton county 29 48% 28 48% 11 4% 

Doug1 as county 24 35 26 37 14 28 

* Reasons for yes-no response to this question varied. Few 
naned ttcost of smoking" as a reason for their opinion of 
fiscal. impact. 
lSP 
they would not be affected, whereas Douglas county urban dwellers did 
not. 
(4) Education. The largest percentage of respondents in Benton 
who believed there would be a fi~cal impact on them were people with 
post-college educations These persons believed that they would exper­
ience some affect (67 percent) probably as a result of cuts to higher 
education. In Douglas county the same percentage of those with post­
college educations, principally persons in medical or legal professions, 
believed that defeat 'of the tax would have no fiscal Unpact on them 
(67 percent), while those with college educations felt, more than any 
other group, that there would be an.affect (45 percent). Those who 
thought that the tax would have no impact on them were respondents with 
less than a high school education in both counties (50 percent in Benton; 
60 percent in Douglas). 
(5) Occupation. The only occupational group believing that they 
would be adversely affected by defeat of the tax were persons employed 
in professional or technical fields in both counties (64 percent in 
Benton; 48 percent in Douglas). All other groups felt themselves to be 
unaffected. Retired persons (71 percent in both counties) were the 
largest occupational group in this category. Housewives were about 
equally divided between "yes-no-undecided" responses, particularly in 
Douglas county; suggesting that confusion was present in relation to 
the implications of the tax on property tax relief, school costs, and 
cuts to state agencies. 
(6) Income. Persons with incomes over $15,000 in Douglas county 
answered "yes,"·there would be a fiscal impact, for a variety of reasons 
ranging from "hate others who smoke," to "if not this one, then an 
151 
increase in some other tax." In Benton county the highest "yes" 
response was in the $5,000 to $9,000 range (SO percent). Again, the 
data reveals a surprising fact: oersons from both counties with in­
comes less than $5,000 felt defeat of the tax would not affect them. 
These are the people who might have lost the most through cuts to pro­
perty tax relief providing for increased relief to low income families 
12 
and retired persons. 
(7) Professional or Union Membership. Only in Benton county is 
there a large concentration of state and public employees. In only 
this county did a high proportion of organization members believe they 
would have been affected by a defeat of the tax increase (55 percent). 
In Douglas it was largely non-members who saw personal cost in a negative 
vote (41 percent). 
(8) Voting Patterns. Those persons in each county who by their 
own statements vote in every election registered the least number of un­
decided responses in answer to the question of "Will you be affected?" 
Among those Who vote most of the time, there was slightly more indecis­
ion (27 percent in Douglas; 32 percent in Benton) sugg~sting again that 
among the less informed, less frequent voters, confusion regarding 
critical implications of the tax increase was present. 
Important Issues 
Voters were asked the two reasons most important to them in their 
decision on how to vote in the cigarette tax increase. The reason for 
asking the question was two-fold: (1) to determine in general terms why 
they voted as they did, and (2) to discover to what extent voters were 
influenced by the issues selected as arguments on both sides of the 
152. 

campaign. 
A significantly large group in both counties naned "continued 
property tax relief" as the most important reason they favored the 
tax (53 percent in Benton; 60 percent in Douglas). Those voting "no" 
did so largely because they felt the cigarette tax was a fonn of re­
gressive taxation with those least able to pay carrying a disproportion­
ate share of the cost (63 percent in Benton; 62 percent in Douglas) • 
The second most important reason named for voting "no" was the 
opposition claim that there was "no guarantee of property tax reI ief ft 
(54 percent in Benton; 54 percent in Douglas). Campaign coordinators 
supporting the ballot measure had argued that property tax relief would 
be cut if the tax failed. Opponents misrepm sented the effect by sar­
ing that if the tax passed, the entire property tax relief fund would 
be completely abolished. Based on voter response to the survey query 
on this issue, people in both counties remained confused about the ac­
curacy of campaign claims. 
The second most important reason for voting u yes" was the "threat 
to Basic School Support lt argument (35 percent in Benton; 28 percent in 
Douglas), although. the ..argument that "smoking is dangerous" was nearly 
as.important to Benton county voters (30 percent) and more important 
to those from Douglas county (37 percent). 
Apparently the argument that tobacco interests from outside the 
state would benefit mODe than Oregonians by a def~at of the tax was of 
less relative interest in both counties. It was the least often reason 
mentioned for voting "yes t It which -conforms to the earl y findings by the 
, 13 
professional polling agency which queried voters on the same issue. 
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The relatively least important reason for voting "no" was the argument 
that "taxes were already too high on cigarettes, tt which again is gen­
erally consistent with Oregon's ranking as one of the lowest in the 
nation for taxes on cigarettes. 
Important Sources of Political Information 
General Attention to Information Sources. Television viewing be­
havior in both counties appears to be similiar: 62 percent watch tele­
vision in the evening only; 14 percent rarely watch; 11 and 13 percent 
respectively (Benton and Douglas county) watch television most of the 
time (Table VII). This includes persons in each of the population 
categories. In Benton, all ages, persons of both sexes, and at each 
educational le\el prefer to watch television only in the evening. MOre 
people under 39 say they rarely view television and then only for the 
news. Douglas county respondents follow the same general pattern. 
In Benton, 92 percent of regular voters read the newspapers daily 
whi~e in Douglas county respondents indicate an 83 percent incidence of 
daily newspaper readership. Not surprising is the finding that those 
who regularly vote also regularly attend to newspaper coverage of current 
events. Again this holds true for persons of both sexes, each age and 
occupational group. 
Attention to Campaign Messages. Both county sample populations 
report that most of their information on this ballot measure was obtain­
ed from, first, regular news reports, and second, radio and television 
advertising. The Voters' Pamphlet and conversations with friends or 
relatives were third and fourth in importance, with conversations named 
as slightly more important to Douglas county voters. 
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TABLE VII 
GENERAL A'ITENTION 'It) TELEVISION AND NEWSPAPERS 
RELATED TO EACH COUNTY 
Benton Douglas 

'N PeNT N PCNT 

I. TELEVISION 
MOst of the time 8 , 11% 9 13% 
Daytime 0 0 0 0 
Evenings 44 62 43 62 
News only 5 7 3 4 
.Rarely 10 14 10 14 
Never 1 1 0 0 
No Response 3 5 ~ 7 
Total 71 100% 69 100% 
II. NEWSPAPERS 
Daily 65 92% 57 83% 
Most days 3 4 6 9 
Once a week 1 1 1 1 
Several days a week 1 1 3 4 
Less than once a week 0 0 0 0 
Never 0 0 0 0 
No response 1
-
2
-
2 3 
Total 71 100% 69 100% 
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Regular voters said the least important channels for obtaining 
information was public debates or speeches. The limited attendance 
at the state wide series of meetings attested to by meeting sponsors 
bears this out However, Douglas county respondents, when asked which 
graup they viewed as most influential in campaigning, replied that it 
was legislators. Since the majority of public endorsements by member's 
of the Oregon legislature came from press reports of speeches made at 
public meetings, it appears that public debates'were important~ but only 
as a means for relaying information through the more frequently used 
medium of the press. 
Channe 1 s of InfllE nce 
Voters were asked, nWhat information sou rces were the most impo,r­
tant in their decision on how to vote?" Two sets of responses were pro­
viced. The first included typical channels for disseminating campaign 
information, television or radio advertising, public speeches, regular 
news reports, organizational newsletters, or conversation. The second 
set listed personal influence sources such as the husband or wife, par­
ents, neighbors or friends, community leaders. 
The purpose of this question was to discover which channels of 
influence in both categories were most important in election choices. 
General Channels. Only 16 persons in the Benton sample and nine in 
Douglas said that they attended public meetings or debates on this issue. 
Of these approximately the same number voted for or against the measure, 
indicating little in the way of positive or negative influence from such 
meetings. 
The largest number of respondents in the sample said that they 
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were influenced by reading regular news reports (58 percent in Benton; 
50 in Douglas); and of these, 76 percent in Benton and 48 percent in 
Douglas voted "yes" (Table VIII). In other words, the newspaper re­
ports were first in importance as information channels for those voting 
"yes" in both counties. As influence sources, newspapers were only 
third in importance to residents of Douglas. 
The chief influence source named in Douglas county was the Voters' 
Pamphlet (61 percent). For those voting against the tax in Douglas, 
conversations with friends ranked first (58 percent); in Benton county, 
the Voters' Pamphlet (41 percent). 
Compared to Benton county, Douglas is a media isolated area. Ap­
parently information sources critical to the "yes" vote in Benton, were 
unavailable to Douglas voters. Regular news reports were more limited 
in Douglas because of the smaller circulation of the large Portland 
da,i1ies. Radio and television advertising supporting the tax were al­
most totally absent. This may account for the greater dependence of 
Douglas county voters on the Voters' Pamphlet (61 percent named it first 
in influence) and conversation with friends (ranked second in importan­
ce at 52 percent). 
Other Influence Sources 
Questions designed to discover the most important influence source 
in vote decisions were those asking about the typical campaign channels 
a1teady mentioned, and those asking about influence sources from persons 
both public and private: family members, friends, community leaders, 
and public officials on a state level (the' governor, secretary of state, 
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TABLE VIII 
INFLUENCE CHANNELS FOR CIGARETTE TAX MEASURE 
RELATED TO YES-NO VO'lE IN EACH COUNTY* 
BENTON DOOOLAS 
YES NO YES ;NO 
N PCNT N PCNT N PeNT N PCNT 
Advert is ing 
Voters Pamphlet 
Speeches or Debates 
Newspaper Reports 
Organizational Nsl trs-; 
Talking with Friends 
Other 
33 
23 
3 
44 
12 
27 
3 
67% 
59 
60 
76 
75 
71 
75 
16 
16 
2 
14 
4 
11 
1 
33% 
41 
40 
24 
25 
29 
25 
24 
19 
1 
24 
5 
14 
0 
48% 
61 
50 
48 
56 
42 
0 
26 52% 
12 39 
1 50 
26 52 
4 44 
19 58 
1 100 
* Includes total responses in each category of influence channel 
and for the yes-no vote 
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agency heads, etc.). In Both counties the spouse, friends and public 
officials ~re rank'ed highest in importance. 
More people in both counties ranked infl uence from a husband or 
wife as first in importance, public officials and friends second and 
third respectively. But for people voting "yes" in Benton, leaders 
were the most important influence (93 percent). In Douglas county, 
"yes" voters looked chiefly to a spouse for direction (50 percent), 
with community officials and leaders also important, although fewer 
people named this group (Table IX). 
The large number of public endorsements and private canpaigning 
performed by officials and leaders during this campaign may account for 
the surprisingl y higher ranking of officials over pensonal influence 
through social contacts--particularly in Benton. Local leaders were 
relatively inactive in Douglas, which may explain the high rank order 
14 
of state officials specified as influential .in that county. Apparen­
tly the activity of local and state influentials communicated to the 
voters their concern that the measure pass • 
. Group Roles 
It was deemed important to know how the public viewed the activity 
performed by special interest groups in the campaign. The field inves­
tigation revealed that college youth were active, particularly within 
the institutions they attended; that legislators publicly endorsed the 
ballot measure; and that employees in higher education and leaders of 
state and local ORA and OSEA units worked in a variety of ways to assure 
passage. Senior citizens organizations did little beyond lend their 
endorsement and name to a coalition cause group. 
159 
TABLE IX 

VOTER RANKING OF PERSONAL INFLUENCE SOURCES 

A. Number of total influenced by various classes rank ordered. 
Benton Countz 	 Douglas County 
N (R) 	 N (R) 
Spouse 37 1 Spouse 32 1 

State Official 22 2 Friends 16 2 

Friends 31. 3 State Official 13 3 

Community Leader 14 4 Community Ldr 8 4 

Conmunity Ofcl 12 5 Parents 7 5 

Parents 11 6 Church Ldr 7 6 

Church Ldr 9 7 Community Ofcl 6 7 

B. 	 Rank order listed in Table IX-A is contrasted with the % of Yes 

votes as influenced by various classes 

Benton Count.l 	 DouSl as Countx: 
Community Ldr 93% 4 Spouse 50% 1 

Parents 91 6 Community Ldr 50 4 

Community Ofcl 83 5 CODlllunity Ofcl 50 6 

Church Ldr 77 7 State Ofcl 46 3 

State Ofcl 73 2 Parents 43 5 

Friends 71 3 Church Ldr 43 5 

. Spouse 70 1 Friends 37 2 
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Voters were asked which of these groups were most influential in 
the election outcome of the election in their areas: senior citizens, 
college students, teachers, state employees, state legislators r busines­
ses, higher education, the governor. It was this question that revealed 
the greatest difference between the two sample counties. 
Benton respondents named higher education as the most important 
and influential group, college students as second in importance, and 
members of the state legislature third. Douglas county felt state leg­
islators were first, the governor second, and higher education third. 
In view of actual campaign activity performed by rep~esentatives of these 
groups,. the voters appear to have been cognizant of group efforts. 
State employees were ranked fourth in Benton county where they 
actually performed a number of campaign functions, but since many members 
of the OSIA are also on the Corvallis campus, the categories of higher 
education and state employees may be said to overlap. A distinction 
between the two interest groups is narrow and cannot be expected to be 
ci~ar to survey respondents. (See Table X for ranking of influence) 
Summary of Infl uence Sources 
Based on the survey findings, influence sources important to the 
voters in this election were (1) relatives, (2) friends, and (3) local 
and state leaders. From this we can say that direct personal influen­
ce within social groups remained critical in persuasive effect, but the 
greatest percentage of persons who voted "yes" in Benton county said 
they did so because of influence outside of the primary group_ 
Impersonal information sources chiefly used were (1) newspaper 
15 
reports of events or pseudo events, (2) radio and television advertising, 
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TABLE X 

RANKING OF GROUP INaUENCE 

UWhich groups were most important 
in your area?tt 
Groups 
Higher ec:hcation 

Co11e,ge Studen ts 

State Legislature 

State Employees 

Teachers 

Governor 

Businesses 

Senior Citizens 

Other' 

* Responses include total named. 
to the outcome of the election 
Benton
.,--­
Douglas 
# 
23* 17 
19 10 
18 24 
16 7 
14 9 
11 20 
9 6 
9 7 
1 6 
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and (3) editorial information. The only groups relying heavily on the 
Voters' Pamphlet 'Were the "yes" voter in Dougl as, and the "no" voter in 
Benton. 
Group influences were thought to be (1) higher education, 42) 
students. and (3) state legislators in Benton county; (1) legislators, 
(2) the governor, and (3) higher education in Douglas. 
In both counties most of the people who voted "yes" did so because 
they believed that defeat of the tax would mean (1) less property tax 
relief t and (2) cuts to state agencies t not because they fel t there·...· OJ;. 
would be a personal impact on them from a tax defeat. Persons voting 
"'no" did so largely because they believed that (1) the tax was regres­
8i~, and (2) that it was too much like a sales tax. 
"Yesn voters cited as the second most important reasons (1) the 
possibility of cuts to public schools, and (2) the fact that smoking is 
dangerous therefore an an appropriate commodity for ta.:x:ation. The uno" 
voters used the opponent argument that there was no guarantee of proper­
ty tax: relief as their second most important reason for opposing the 
tu. 
A high proportion of persons in both counties felt that the issues 
ware muddy and that fiscal impact of a tax defeat on them was unclear. 
Baturally those voting affirmatively believed p..ponent arguments were 
~ll presented and free of confusion w~ile the opponent cause was un­
clear; those registering dissenting votes believed the opposite. 
III. LEADERSHIP SURVEY 
Hearly every known participating legislator and interest group 
leader was mailed a questionnaire requesting information similar to that 
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asked the voters plus specific questions directed at obtaining tes­
timony on their role in the campaign. Only those legislators who 
were active through coordinating work or public speaking appearances in 
favor of the tax were queried: seven responded. Sixteen organizational 
leaders were sent questionnaires and of these, fifteen replied. There9 
fore it is felt that the responses from all leadership sources represent 
accurately those persons involved in or close to the supporting side of 
the campaign. 
Leadership Involvement 
Both legislators and interest and cause group leaders were asked 
how they viewed their role in the campaign, the tasks they performed, 
and the manner by which they became involved in the effort to pass the 
state ballot measure (Table XI). 
Legislators responded to the question of, "What was your role in 
the campaign?" by naming legitimizing of the campaign effort as most 
important. Of secondary importance was their role as information sources, 
according to the majority of responses. Cause group leaders asked the 
same question said their primary role was legitimizing the campaign on . 
.the state level and initiating activity on both a state and local level. 
The answers were consistent with roles uncovered in the field investi­
gation. They saw themselves as information sources to the general 
public as only moderately important. 
In response to "What tasks did you or your group perform in the 
campaign?" four legislators replied that their primary job was the 
making of public statements that were quoted in the press. The other 
three felt that the chief task they performed was fund raising. 
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TABLE n 
LBADERSHIP ROLES AND TASKS PERFORMED 
ROLl
-
Leg1t imizer: 
State Level 
Local Level 
Initiator: 
State Level 
Local Level 
Information source: 
To General Public 
To Members 
TASKS PERFOro.BD 
Fund Rais ing 
Mailings to constituents 
Public Statements Quoted 
Public Speaking appearances 
Inter-organizational coordination 
Recruiting or organizing workers 
Legislators 
# 
5 
0 
0 
1 
1 
3 
o 
4 
7 
o 
o 
Leaders8
--, 
S 
.5 
7 

6 

.5 
6 
3 
ab 

11 

7 

6 

Arncludes primary and secondary functions named by interest group 
leaders. 
b"to members" 
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Organizational leaders felt that their primary tasks were issuing 
public statements to be quoted in the press, mailing information re­
garding the tax measure to their members or other interested citizens, 
and the third most important function was public speaking appearances 
or inter-organizational coordination of the campaign. 
Only organizational leaders were asked the question, "How did you 
become involved in the cigarette tax campaign?" (Appendix G) Six re­
sponded that it was ,an independent decision made by their organization's 
board of director~; four replied involvement occurred as a result of 
personal contacts by individuals or group leaders outside their organi­
zation who were already involved; and 'four said that involvement was a 
decision made independently by themselves or their organization's leader­
ship. 
Interest group leaders were also asked whether or not they would 
have been involved if the tax defeat meant fiscal impact on their mem­
bers. Only slightly over half said they would not have been active. 
Information Channels and Influence Sources 
Questions parallel to those asked the voters of Benton and Douglas 
counties were posed to legislators: (1) informational channels important 
to the voters, and (2) groups most influential on the outcome of the 
election (Table XII). 
Legislators were asked which in a series of channels were impor­
tant in the election outcome: television, radio, newspaper advertising, 
regular newspaper reports, public speeches, etc. Slightly over half of 
the legislators, queried felt that television was extremely important in 
the vote outcome. Also slightly more than half believed that newspaper 
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TABLE XII 
LEADERSHIP OPINION ON INFLUENTIAL INFORMATION 
CHANNELS AND GROUPS 
Legislators Leaders 
Impt N Impt Impt N Impt 
INFORMATION CHANNELS:, 
Television 
Radio 
Newspaper ads 
Newspaper reports 
Publ ic Speeches 
Door-to-door contact 
Mailings to voters 
Personal contact 
5 
3 
3 
3 
2 
1 
1 
3 
2 
0 
0 
4 
3 
1 
1 
2 
5 
4 
3 
8 
3 
3 
3 
4 
1 
0 
5 
4 
4 
3 
GROUPS 1*
-
2 3 1 2 3 
Higher Ec:h cation 
Public Employees 
Public education 
Businesses 
Senior citizens 
Youth 
Organized Labor 
Other 
1 
0 
0 
3 
3 
1, 
4 
0 
2 
1 
4 
3 
2 
2 
1 
0 
4 
6 
2 
0 
0 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
6 
6 
2 
5 
1 
1 
2 
4 
4 
5 
4 
7 
0 
12 
10 
7 
2 
3 
8 
1 
1 
* l=L6ast important 
2=Mbderate1y important 
3=Extreme1y important 
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advertisements were moderately important; and the same proportion felt 
that news reporting and editorial support was least important. 
Interest group leaders were asked the same questions regarding 
important information channels. They believed that television was most 
~portant, followed by regular news reports. These same leaders felt 
that of all channels available to the voters, radio and door-to-door 
campaigning were least important. 
As to the influence of special interest groups on voter choice, 
legislators felt almost unanimously that public employees and higher 
education were extremely important. Public school educators and organ­
ized labor were felt to be moderately important, and senior citizens 
and business interests least important. Organizational leaders felt 
that higher education, public employees, and young people were most im­
portant. Only moderately important were senior citizens, organized 
labor, and public educators. Business was considered unimportant. 
With respect to questions of interest group influence the responses 
of interest group leaders were only somewhat closer in assessing influ­
ence than were state legislators. The voters too viewed higher educa­
tion as critical in the vote outcome, however all classes of state em­
ployees were rated higher. 
Both legislators and leaders were asked to rate the proponents 
on clarity of the issues. A definite majority of both legislators and 
interest gro'lp leaders fel t that the issues were only somewhat clear 
(all legislators; four out of seven replies of leaders). The same ques­
tion was asked regarding clarity of the issues presented by the oppon­
ents of the tax increase. Again, a majority from both groups felt that 
the opponents were not at all clear in explaining the issues; a finding 
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consistent with what we might expect from leadership supporting the 
ballot measure, but not altogether supporting the methods used in the 
campaign. 
Importance of Issue s 
The response to the question, "Which issues were important in the 
voters decision on how to vote?" offers the most striking contrast be­
tween the voters and leaders active in the campaign (Table XIII). 
Legislators named cuts to state agencies, property tax relief, and in­
creased tuition at state colleges and universities as extremely impor­
tant to the "yes" vote. They named as only moderately important the 
issue ·of cuts to Basic School Support and property tax relief. 
Least important to the legislators was the issue of out-of-state 
tobacco interests gaining more from a tax defeat than the Oregon elector­
ate. Few felt that the issue, "smoking is dangerous,ft was a factor in 
election choices, whereas voters from both counties named it as second 
in importance as a reason for voting "yes." 
Organizational leaders felt that property tax relief was most 
important and second only to a threatened cut to state agencies. Again, 
the survey found that organizational leaders are more accurate in asses­
sing voter reasons for supporting the tax. 
The question of which issues were important to the "nott vote was 
also asked. Legislators felt that similarity of the cigarette tax to 
a sales tax was extremely important in the "nott vote, as was a judgment 
that most voters were against all taxes. Fewer than half of the legis­
lators queried fe~t that voter resistance to all taxes was of even mod­
erate importance. Most fel t that the issue of least importance was 
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"threat to property tax relief." This was in contrast to the voters 
who believed that threats to property tax relief was a primary reason 
for opposing the tax, apparently believing the opposition claims. None 
of the legislators fel t that the i.ssue was most important and four said 
it was least important of all suggested. 
The leadership representing interest and cause groups felt that 
the issue of "regressive taxation, tf was the most important reason voters 
said "nott. This is consistent with voter survey results. The second 
most important reason named was that nall taxes are too high. It Third 
most often mentioned issue was the argument that the cigarette tax was 
too similiar to a sales tax. None of the leaders questioned felt that 
"danger to property tax relief lt was of any significance in voter deci"", 
sions 
Summary of Leadership Survey 
One of the chief reasons for conducting a leadership survey that 
paralleled one polling the voters, was to discover the extent to which 
their judgments conform to those held by the Oregon voter. The study 
asked if leaders are accurate in assessing why voters decided to vote 
for or against the tax. The data reveals that certain important dis­
crepancies do exist between the leadership el ite and regul ar voters in 
regard to (1) their opinions of political communication channels that 
are most important to the voters, and (2) the importance of specified 
issues in election choice. 
The voters were asked how they' obtained their infoDmation and 
the sample replied that the most important s'ource of information on the 
sales tax was newspaper reports and conversations With friends. Oregon'"s 
170 
political elite were at odds on this question, both with each other and 
with the voters. 
The voters were asked their reasons for voting yes or no. They 
said key issues in their decision to vote "yes" were (1) need for con­
tinuing property tax relief, (2) threats to the Basic School Support 
fund, and (3) the danger of smoking. The "no" voters answered (1) the 
cigarette tax is a regressive tax, and (2) there are no guarantees of 
property tax relief. Leaders, particularly legislators, felt that other 
issues were more important to the voters. None thought that "smoking 
is dangerous," or "threat to property tax: relief" were issues affecting 
the vote. 
Not at all surprising was the finding that the public felt the 
issues were clear only if they voted "yes" ; unclear if they voted "no." 
Leadership felt generally that the campaign on the proponent side had 
made the issues clear to the voter, but all of those polled favored the 
tax. 
Voters believed that the most influential groups active in the 
campaign were (1) higher education, (2) students, and (3) state employe­
es. In this, leaders were agreed, although there was a variety of opinion 
difference between interest group leaders. 
IV. 	SURVEY OONCLUSIONS 
While the data cannot fully answer each question posed in the 
statement of thesis objectives, the following general conclusions have 
been drawn regarding the voters surveyed: 
1. 	 Regular voters use in general the same channels 
for obtaining politically relevant information: 
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regular newspaper reports, radio and tele­
vision advertising, and the Voters' Pamphlet. 
2. 	Voters of higher education and income depend more 
on newspaper coverage of campaigns; lower socio­
economic groups rely more on "low effort" radio 
and television advertising.16 
3. 	The chief audience for political campaign messages 
in general and this campaign in particular, seems 
to be those between the ages of 30-49, in the middle 
income levels, and who are socially active in their 
communities. 
4. 	Attention to campaign communication is not directly 
related to voting frequency. Regul ar ~loters over 
60 years of age rarely attend to the usual cam~ 
paign channels. 17 
s. 	Regular voters are accurate in assessing the cam­
paign participation of special interest groups. 
6. 	It is more difficult to convince lower income pop­
ulation groups (of all ages) of complex facts in 
fiscal legislation, and this tax measure in particular. 
7. 	 Fear appeals can have a "boomerang" effect. The 
inaccuracies of campaign messages on both sides in 
this campaign resulted in voter confusion, espec­
ially t~, real impact of the ballot measure defeat 
on the 'General Fund. 
8. 	Voters are more likely to go to the polls if the 
issues are accurately presented. Where there was 
less confusion there was a greater turnout and a 
greater percentage of ttye sft votes. While these may 
not be causally related, there is evidence to sug­18gest that uncertainty and negative votes are.
By 	 comparing the voter survey data to that derived from the leader­
ship survey these conclusions have been drawn: 
1. 	There is little congruence between what regular 
voters believe to be important issues and what 
public and private influentials believe. 
2. 	While regular voters are accurate in assessing the 
campaign participation of special interest groups, 
the leadership in these groups differ in regard to 
the same question. 
3. 	Interest group leaders are somewhat more accurate 
l7~ 
in ascribing motives to the voters than are 

legislators. 

4. 	 MOst legislators were aware of inaccuracies in 
the campaign from the political committees on 
both sides of the issue, and felt them to be a 
negative element in the campaign effort. 
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c'HAPTERVI 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this study was to bring together the full range 
of activity in the 1971-72 cigarette tax referendum campaign. The in­
vestigation included an analysis of (1) past tax elections in Oregon, 
(2) the events leading to a referendum on the cigarette tax, (3) the man­
ner by which public and private individuals and groups became involved, 
(4) the communication initiated by campaigners, and (5) the voter's reac­
tion to general campaign strategies. 
The thesis hypothesis argued that the critical variable in the suc­
cess of the 1972 cigarette tax campaign was the involvement of major socio­
economic interest groups. The proposition was tested in the field inves­
tigation by examining activities of individuals and groups which were 
designed to manipulate the behavior of the voters to the campaigners' 
1 
advantage. In other words, each major element in the campaign was 
studied: (1) the campaigners, (2) their strategies, (3) the setting, 
(4) the voters, and (5) election results. 
The purpose of the final chapter is to briefly review what was 
revealed by the investigation and draw certain generalizations in support 
of the thesis hypothesis. 
I. SUMMARY 
The manner by which the cigarette tax campaigners tried to "sell" 
the electorate was only in some respects parallel to what is described 
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by campaign researchers as the "usual method" of passing a state bal­
lot measure. There was I ittle debate regarding "technical ities of 
funding." When budgets are cut, went the reasoning, services to the 
people are cut. If this logic failed to capture the favor of the 
voters; there were others: nonsmokers would not have to pay yet would 
receive the same services gained by those who did. Attempts were made 
to shift attention away from the issue of "regressive taxation": smokers 
did not have to smoke, so it was an optional tax rather than a "select­
ive tax. It 
These and other arguments appeared in the campaign literature and 
media reports of campaign events. They were del iberately and carefully 
selected, and used by institutional leaders in many segments of Oregon's 
political life. In the referendum campaign, public appearances, person­
al contacts, and mass communication channels were utilized by state of­
fic~als, the governor and state legislators. Strategies were suggested, 
debated and implemented by the State Committee. In addition, other 
approaches were used by independent campaigners reptesenting large pres­
sure and cause groups. 
The State Committee said that the fear appeals were deliberately 
chosen and were necessary to mobilize groups that could be hurt by a 
revenue reduction. But these same fear appeals, compounded by similiar 
methods issuing from the opposition, may have created voter confusion, 
and more important, voter distrust. 
The coordinators also said that there was no effort to respond to 
opposition attacks in the implementation of the pre-established strategy; 
but certain state officials did respond and gained wide public atten­
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tion when they charged the opposition with deliberately misleading and 
and false statements, and equally wide attention when they in turn were 
charged with misconduct in the performance of their duties. 
Campaign coordinators said that the time limitations made for a 
tightly knit campaign. Only a few' people made key decisions on slogans, 
timing, and channels that would be used to disseminate the arguments. 
But again, an analysis of the campaign demonstrates a contradiction. 
While there was no time for internal organizational dissention, leader­
shi~ fragmentation did occur in the absence of any concerted efforts to 
bring them together. Each group carried out its own strategy decisions. 
The interest group leaders ~ere not permitted to see results from the 
public opinion polls, they were not consulted on the way funds should be 
spent, and they were not asked their opinions about the best structur­
ing of the arguments. As a result they felt no particular obligation 
to conform to State Committee decisions. There is a very real possibil­
ity that had the campaign lasted longer, latent dissatisfactions with 
the course taken ,by the State Committee might have become manifest and 
created serious problems for the united effort. 
The fragmentation of activity carried out by different interest 
and cause groups makes analysis difficult. Some leaders said that 
student contribution was of critical importance; others that participa­
tion by state employees was the deciding factor. MOst infonnants had 
different notions about what contributed to success: personal influence 
through. individual contacts, said some leaders; mass persuasion utiliz­
ing metropolitan Portland media, said others. But the voter disagreed 
with both and said that they obtained the buik of their information from 
regular newspaper reports. 
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Media reports generally dealt with matters peripheral to the 

issues: (1) synthetic opposition surfacing in the form of committees 

designed to counter the influence of the youth-aged coalition, (2) 

demands for apologies for corrupt practices violations coming from both 

sides of the battle line, and (3) leading supporters of the tax labeled 

"prostitutes of the governor" by the opposition, and leading opponents 
called "carpetbagging out-of-state 'ers" by the proponents. 
In the 1971-72 cigarette tax campaign only one factor remained 
constant--resistance of Oregon voters to taxes. And yet, even this 
long-time tradition was challenged. A state official said in an inter­
view inmediately following the election that "the public has finally 
accepted the fact that government is not adequately funded. They believe 
2 
something has to be done." 
It was for the purpose of resolving some of the remaining causal 
questions that the voter.-Ieadership survey was undertaken as a follow-
up to t~e field investigation. The purpose was to discover voter opin­
ions regarding the effectiveness of communication generated by special 
interest groups and their reasons for voting as they ~id. These opinions, 
described in the previous chapter, assume importance in connection with 
the following conditions which existed in Oregon at the time of the 
campaign: 
1. 	 The cigarette tax increase was the only immediately 
available solution to a serious budget deficit. An 
alternative source would have required another special 
session, another 90 day waiting period, and the 
threat of another referendum. 
2. 	 This was the first recent tax, measure with support 
from legislative leaders of both political parties: 
Democrat and Republican Senate leaders; Speaker of 
the House; and house members from both parties. 
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3. 	 The tax revolt in Oregon was not the product of 
depressed conditions, according to all economic 
indexes, but reflected a nation wide dissatisfac­
tion with property taxes. 3 
4. 	 This was the first state campaign conducted under 
the federal constitutional amendment granting the 
vote to those between the ages of 18 and 21. 
s. 	 It was the first time Oregon politics had witnes­
sed a coalition of young and old people working 
side by side with large permanent interest groups. 
6. 	 It was the first time that a concerted effort was 
made by members of Oregon's higher education com­
munity in support of a general tax. 
7. 	 Campaign strategy called for directed appeals to 
special interest groups and attempted to define 
issues in terms of fiscal impact on special groups. 
8. 	 In each of the 12 counties where the tax increase 
passed there was either a major institution of the 
state system of higher education, a community col­
lege; or an important complex of state government. 
But there were also colleges in five counties where 
the tax was defeated: Jackson, Coos, Douglas, Clatsop 
and Deschutes. 
Certain inferences should also be included as part of the analysis: 
1. 	 There was a great amount of public consternation 
over misrepresentation of the "facts," resulting in 
extensive voter confusion about the truthfulness 
of campaign lOO.ssages. 
2. 	 Public confusion was most evident in the reasons for 
the "no" vote, and in voter judgnents regarding the 
fiscal impact of the cigarette tax defeat on them. 
Taken together, facts and inferences suggest that a great many 
variables were at work in the vote outcome. Without a comprehensive 
survey of the entire state we cannot say with certainty that the measure 
passed Qecause of, or in spite of the campaign. However, comparisons 
of voter opinions in two Oregon counties provides evidence that strong­
ly suggests the campaign was a qualified success. 
l8G 
Relation of Field Investigation to Survey Results 
The survey findings reveal some serious weaknesses in the cig­
arette tax campaign. Rather than countering opposition statements that 
the property tax relief account would be eliminated if the tax passed, 
supporters of the measure on a st~te wide level continued with their in­
itial campaign strategy: suggesting that the two percent cuts "could 
be" leveled at one or several agencies rather than across-the-board to all 
services as provided for in a companion bill to H.B. 3064. As a result, 
many voters remained uncertain about the property tax relief question, 
and those who do not always vote in special elections, responded to their 
uncertainty by vot ing "no." 
This information, taken with data provided by the professional pol­
ling agency irmnediately following the election, provides evidence that 
certain strategy decisions worked to prevent a larger victory. 
Countering the voter indecision were the strong appeals made to 
and by members of both formal interest groups and temporary cause groups-­
~otably the youth-aged coalition and Friends of Higher Education. These 
organizations attempted direct personal influence by instigating activity 
on a local level, working to convince members that they would be directly 
affected, by the two percent cuts, not "selective cuts," if the tax were 
defeated. The arguments they used included: (1) budget cuts to (a) 
higher education, (b) departments of Human Resources and Environmental 
Quality, (c) State Basic School Support, (d) community college operating 
reimbursements and (e) direct property tax relief. The same arguments 
were used by each group with an emphasis placed on the one most relevant 
to the particular audience. 
Voters were influenced by these arguments, and the survey revealed 
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that those who voted "yes" did so largely because of them. Moreover, 
voters were aware of interest group activity in their respective counties 
and named higher education, students and state employees as most influential 
in the campaign. 
Voters were influenced by their elected leaders, the governor as 
well as legislators, and articulated this influence on the questionnaires 
returned. The .,survey al so demonstrated the importance of contributions 
made by state and local influentials. There is evidence to indicate that 
although leadership endorsements were influential, particularly to those 
voting "yes," their reasons for favoring the tax were not. 
II. CONCLUSIONS 
The thesis hypothesis stated that the clucial variable in the suc­
cess of the referendum campaign was the involvement of special interest 
gro~ps. Interest groups were defined as permanent pressure groups and 
temporary cause groups. The following pressure groups were most active: 
the OSEA, the OEA, and Friends of Higher Education. The most publicized 
4 
cause group was the youth-aged coalition. Business interests and organ­
ized labor did contribute to the campaign effort, but to a lesser extent; 
the former donating money and several volunteers, the latter a campaign 
contribution and public endorsement. 
While the data cannot fully answer every question posed in the 
statement of thesis objectives, the central proposition was supported.' 
The investigation revealed that interest groups were effective, chiefly 
because of the many roles they performed in each phase of the campaign: 
as initiators of campaign activity, as legitimizers, as fund raisers, 
and as channel sources for disseminating information to both their own 
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members and to the general publ ic. 
(I) Initiators. The OSEA and youth-aged coalition was instrumen­
tal in initiating a pro-tax campaign and were, with the governor's 
office, responsible for establishing an official campaign committee. 
Although they had little to say about strategies developed by the State 
Committee, without them a central campaign committee would not have been 
possible. 
As initiators they oper£d up the channels of communication by 
defining the problem and relaying this information to other potentially 
affected groups and individuals. They also performed a ,legitimizing 
function as the formal organizational leaders publicly endorsed the tax 
measure in the early stages of the campaign. Other roles they perform­
ed were perhaps more significant, but the early endorsements establish­
ed a precedent for involvement and were critical in later mobilization 
of affiliated local groups and the snow-balling endorsements by other 
influentials that followed. 
(2) Message disseminators. The most impo rtant role performed by 
all interest groups was as channel source. Each group had existing 
mechanisms for getting information to a large number of a people within 
a minimum period of tine. Since the campaign was necessarily of such 
short duration this was doubly crucial. Each group, including the student 
organization, had immediately available multiple communication channels 
over which they had substantial control. The. most important channels 
were pr.inted media (newsletters, student newspapers, and various other 
specialized publications originating within ~he organization), and per­
sonal contacts (local legislative chairmen, presidents of local chapters 
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or college student groups, affiliated organizational officers). 
Many press statements were made and public speeches given in the 
40 day campaign, many of which were facilitated by the interest groups. 
Fully half of all speeches made by state influentials were done through 
the sponsorship of the employee o'rganizations. While few of the voters 
surveyed actually attended the public meetings, they read about them in 
their daily newspapers or listened to quoted statements made by legis­
lators or officials over the regular news reports on television and 
radio. Speeches given by faculty and students on college campuses 
likewise received notice in both the pub~ic press and in university 
publications. 
(3) Fund Raisers. The availability of multiple channels, espec­
ially in higher education, made possible the third role. Permanent 
interest groups had existing funds available for just such a purpose 
an~ needed only the approval of their respective governing boards to 
release the money. Friends of Higher Education had no such ready source, 
~nd yet, because of their contacts with persons committed to quality ed­
ucation, were able to raise an amount almost equal to that contributed 
by other groups. Fund raising success went beyond support of the State 
Committee media effort in its effect. By obtaining small donations 
from many individuals, they obtained increasingly greater committment. 
"Get a man's dollar and you get his vote t" said one campaigner. There 
is good reason to believe that this is true, and the mobilization of 
human. resources was in this way advanced. 
The roles were self-starting and self-perpetuating. Because there 
was no effort on the part of the State Committee to involve anyone out­
side the immediate'working team in the decision making process, the 
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interest groups felt no obligation to be guided by them. MOst of the 
groups refused to use printed literature put out by the State Commit­
tee and instead wrote and distributed their own, using essentially the 
same arguments concerning economic impact on specified population groups, 
but structured with less exaggeration and emotionally loaded language. 
Based on the interviews conducted in this study, we do know that per­
suasive messages originating with the groups had a large audience, col­
lectively totalling in excess of 80,000. Using the mail and personal 
distribution by students at Oregon college campuses, potentially eight 
5 
percent of all registered voters in the state were reached. 
It would be inaccurate to say that the campaign would have suc­
ceeded without media support in an area with the largest population in 
the state. Our survey demonstrates that radio and television advertis­
ing are important sources of information for the Oregon voter; however, 
me~ia appeals would not have been possible without the fund raising 
activities of the interest groups. 
Nor were attempts at interest group coordination carried out by 
the State Committee completely ineffectual. But many of the other act­
ivities of the central campaign organization had a counter-productive 
effect--their overstated arguments drew fire from the opposition that 
might have been avoided, and gave the press cause to publicize the sen­
sational news of corrupt practices violation charges rather than news 
of the substantive issues. 
-Por all of the teasons named above we must conclude that the 
mediating activity of state and local infl~entials, through the mech­
anisms of special interest pressure and cause groups, provided a crit­
ical balance and made the difference in the campaign success. 
I8.? 

Recommendations for Future Research 
Timing was a significant weakness in the design of both the field 
study and the voter survey. Specifically, it would have been desirable 
to conduct the field investigation during the actual campaign rather 
than some months later. The time factor was even more crucial in re­
gard to the voter survey, although every effort was made to counter 
this problem. Although the sample was considered representative, other 
evidence suggests that many more young people voted than those repr~sen­
ted in the survey. 
An extensive voter registration drive was conducted on the Oregon 
State University campus. Because a majority of students return to their 
family homes during the summer months, it may be that many did not re­
ceive the questionnaire in time to return it by the survey deadline. 
For this reason, we do not have adequate information on the student vote-­
the issues youth felt were important, the way they teceived their info­
~ation, or the chief source of influence on their vote decision. Future 
research would do well to account for seasonal residence among college 
youth in any study of campaign effects. 
A very real need remains in local or state campaign research in 
many areas, particularly: perceptual differences between the leadership 
elite and the average voter; the long-range effects of campaign credi­
bility on voter choice; and voting trends among population groups on 
referendum issues. It would also be profitable to discover whether a 
particular combination of interest groups provides greater momentum and 
role possibilities in other state political ~ampaigns. 
This investigation revealed not only that special interest groups 
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are often active in state ballot measure efforts (both as initiators 
and as campaign sponsors), leadership from this group are more nearly 
in tune with voter attitudes in every aspect of a campaign. Therefore, 
a more narrowly focused study on differences among the el ite in their 
assessment of voter opinion ought to be conducted. Because a campaign 
is nothing more or less than the people who run it, a careful analysis 
of such leadership perceptions would be of real value to studies of 
local or state referendum campaigns. 
A longitudinal study of source credibility within similiar types 
of campaigns likewise should be attempted. By a variety of means, the 
voter seeks to remind his leaders the implications of his disbelief on 
passage of a tax proposal, but leadership too often discounts this as 
a factor in election.results. National as well as state leaders behave 
as though the voters could be won merely by deciding on the "best" 
slogans, the most efficient timing, and the most persuasive arguments. 
It would be interesting and valuable to discover how extensive distrust 
is among the various popUlation groups and the extent to which distrust 
motivates them to vote for or against tax measures. 
Many other potentially profitable avenues for investigation present 
themselves. Questions of the effect of membership affilliation on vote 
have not been adequately answered. Nor haye que stions regarding the ef­
fects of overlapping group membership on vote decisions. More careful 
analysis of the relationships of party affiliation to susceptability of 
influence from partisan leaders needs to be done. 
Summary 
Although it is clearly difficult to find conclusive answers through 
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one or several research methods because of the complexity and scope of 
state political campaigns, this investigation has thrown some light on 
the influence of interest groups in a nonpartisan, state referendum 
campaign. All of the data obtained through both the field investiga­
tion and voter-leadership survey suggest that interest group involve­
ment was important to the success of the campaign. We can also conclude 
that future successful campaigns will witness a new coalition of influ­
entials and another combination of interest groups, perhaps differing 
in composition from those active in the 1971-72 effort, but combinations 
which will most certainly perform the same roles and make use of the 
same channels. A future referendum would also do well to place credi­
bility as a top prio~ity in planning campaign strategies. To be sure, 
there are always charges to be answered originating from the opposition, 
and issues to be structured in the most persuasive fashion. But if 
Oregon is ever to obtain voter approval for any proposal that goes 
beyond a "band-aid" solution to what has become a biennial fiscal crisis, 
responsible campaigning is essential. 
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Notes 
lNimmo, p. 10. 
2post , interview. 
3"Public Opinion and Taxes," Advisory Commission; "Oregon Labor 
Force Trends, If Oregon Department of Labor (January, 1972). 
4Tbe State Committee was not defined as an interest group because 
it was made up of professionals paid to work in behalf of the measure 
and who otherwise would be unlikely to take an active part. 
~mbership mailing list: OSEA, 17,000; OEA, 19,500; potential 
university publication readership, 54,000; potential community college 
publications readership, 40,000; OSBA, 2,500. 
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APPENDIX A 
TAX PROPOSAL VOTING RECO!ID 
Date Tax Proposed Yes No 
1930 Personal Income Tax 105,189 95,207 
1933 Sales Tax 45,603 167,512 
1934 Sales Tax <'64,677 156,182 
1936 Sales Tax 32,106 187,319 
1947 Cigarette·Tax 103,794 140,876 
1952 Cigarette Tax 233,226 413,137 
1956 Cigarette Taxa 280,055 414,613 
1960 Personal Income Tax 115,610 570,025 
1963 Personal-Corporation Income Tax 103,737 362,845 
1966 Cigarette Tax 310,743 181,957 
1968 Ii Percent Tax Limitation 310,743 181,957 
1969 Sales Tax 65,077 504,274 
1972 Cigarette Tax 245,717 236,937 
aA1so in 1956, a measure providing that the Emergency Clause 
could be used on tax proposals was defeated by 487,550 to 
175,932. 
bA measure placed on the ballot by initiative. Defeat meant no 
change in tax structure. 
Source: Oregon Blue Book 1955; Oregon Blue Book 1971-72. 
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CoUntI 
Baker 
Benton 
Clackamas 
C1atsop 
Columbia 
Coos 
Crook 
Curry 
Deschutes 
Douglas 
Gilliam 
Grant 
Harney 
Hood River 
Jackson 
Jefferson 
Josephine 
Klamath 
Lake 
Lane 
Lincoln 
Linn 
Ma1heur 
Marion 
Morrow 
Mu1tnomah 
Polk 
She !'man 
Tillamook 
Umatilla 
Union 
Wallowa 
Wasco 
Washington 
Wheeler 
Yamhill 
APPENDIX C 
JANUARY 18, 1972, SPECIAL ELECTION 
SUM1ARY OF COUNTY VOTE 
Yes
-
1,393 
10,551 
21,118 
2,843 
2,952 
5,661 
1,010 
1,116 
,3,491 
5,898 
319 
681 
674 
1,558 
7~807 
887 
2,774 
3,634 
503 
24,989 
2,642 
7,033 
2,132 
20,024 
537 
68,342 
5,238 
284 
2,016 
4,690 
2,650 
785 
2,569 
21,922 
199 
4,795 
Totals 245,717 
No
-
1,680 
4,507 
19,497 
4,239 
3,852 
7,925 
1,405 
1,657 
3,749 
9,223 
311 
907 
824 
1,566 
9,807 
1,091 
5,180 
5,829 
998 
24,140 
3,422 
9,257 
1,442 
15,478 
603 
59,842 
4,105 
403 
2,602 
4,622 
2,076 
815 
2,611 
16,762 
314 
...i.z196 
236,937 
Source: Official Abstract of Votes SE!cial Election 1972. 
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~PENDIX D-l 
lPUBLIC OPINION SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRES 
VOTEk3 
SECTION I 
1. 	 How often do you vote in state-wide elections? 
(1) 	every election 
(2) 	most elections 
(3) 	some elections 
(4) 	few elections 
(5) 	 rarely 
2. 	 Would you have been affected if the cigarette tax measure had been 
defeated? 
(1) 	yes 
(2) 	no 
(3) 	uncertain 
If you answer was yes, please indicate how it would have affect­
ed you. 
3. 	 If you voted FOR the cigarette tax measure, check the two reasons 
most important to you. 
(1) 	continued property tax relief. 
(2) 	possibility of cuts to state agencies if new revenue was un­
available. 
(3) 	possibility of increased college tuition if new revenue was un­
available. 
(4) 	possibility of cuts to public schools. 
(S) 	out-of-state tobacco interests would benefit more than Oregon. 
(6) 	because smoking is dangerous anyway. 
(7) 	other. 
4. 	 If you voted AGAINST the cigarette tax measure, check the two reasons 
most important to you. 
(1) 	the tax is regressive and hurts a special group. 
(2) 	 the tax is the same as a sales tax of which I disapprove. 
(3) 	cigarettes already cost too much. 
(4) 	taxes should not be increased until government learns economy. 
(5) 	all taxes are too high. 
(6) 	property tax relief is not guaranteed by the tax measure. 
(7) 	other. 
5. 	 How did you learn about the measure? 
(1) 	television or radio advertising. 
(2) 	the Voters' Pamphlet .. 
(3) 	public speeches or debates. 
(4) 	regular news reports. 
(5) 	organization newsletters or bulletins. 
204 
(6) 	talking to friends or relatives. 
(7) 	other. 
6. 	 What information sources were the most important to you in your 
decision on how to vote? 
(1) 	public meetings in your area. 
(2) 	newsletters from organizations. 
(3) newspaper reports. 

(4). newspaper editorials. 

(5) 	television or radio advertising. 
(6) 	conversations with friends or neighbors. 
(7) 	other. 
7. 	 Other than the information sources already mentioned, what source 
was most important in your decision on how to vote? 
(1) 	husband or wife. 
(2) 	one or both parents. 
(3) 	neighbor or friend. 
(4) 	community leader. 
(5) 	church affiliated leader. 
(6) community official. 

(?) public official (on a state level) 

8. 	 Many groups worked in the cigarette tax campaign. Please indicate 
which group you think had the most influence on the outcome of the 
election. 
(1) 	senior citizens. 
(2) 	,college students. 
(3) 	teachers. 
(4) 	state employees. 
(5) 	state legislators. 
(6) 	businesses. 
(7) 	governor's office. 
(8) 	higher educat ion. 
(9) 	other. 
9. 	 Were you contacted personally by anyone from a group listed above? 
(1) 	yes. 
(2) 	no 
10. 	In your opinion, were the opponents of the cigarette tax measure in 
your area clear in explaining important issues? 
(1) 	extremely clear. (2) somewhat clear. (3) not at all clear. 
11. 	In your op1n1on, were those supporting the cigarette tax measure in 
your area clear in explaining important issues? 
(1) 	extremely clear. (2) somewhat clear. (3) not at all clear. 
12. 	Are you a member of a professional association or union? 
. (1) yes. 
(2) no. 

If yes, please name the organization: 

If no, please skip to Section II. 
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13. 	 Row often do you attend association or union meetings in comparison 
with others in the organization? 
(1) 	regularly. 
(2) 	frequently. 
(3) 	occasionally. 
(4) 	rarely. 
(5) 	never. 
14. 	 Row often do you read the organization's newsletter or bulletin? 
(1) 	regularly. 
(2) 	frequently. 
(3) 	occasionally. 
(4) 	rarely. 
(5) 	never. 
15. 	 Was your association or union involved in the cigarette tax campaign? 
(1) 	yes. 
(2) no. 

(~) uncertain. 

16. 	 If your answer to the above question was yes, please indicate the 
functions your organization performed in the campaign. 
SECTION II 
1. 	 Howl often do you view television? 
(1) 	most of the time. (4) news only. 
(2) 	daytime oUly. (5) rarely watch television. 
(3) 	evenings only. (6) never watch television. 
2. 	How often do you attend public debates or speeches of a political 
nature? . 
(1) 	regularly. (3) rarely. 
(2) 	frequently. (4) never. 
3. 	 How often do you listen to political advertising prior to an election? 
(1) 	regularly. (3) rarely. 
(2) 	frequently. (4) never. 
4. 	 How frequently do you read the newspaper? 
(1) daily. 	 (4) several times a week. 
(2) 	most days. (5) less than once a week. 
(3) 	once a week. (6) never. 
S. 	 How often do you talk with frienlls, neighbors or busine ss associates 
about political issues or state ballot measures such as the cigarette 
tax? 
(1) 	often. (3) rarely. 
(2) 	occasionally. .(4) never. 
6. 	 Please indicate your age: 8. occupation: 
7. 	 Your sex: 9. grades of school completed: 
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10. 	Your political party: 11. Type of living community: 
12. 	Your approximate income: 
LEADERS* 
1. 	 What part did your organization or group play in the recent cigaret­
te tax campaign? 
(1) 	a major role. (2) a minor role. 
2. 	 How would you characterize your organization or grbup's role in the 
total campaign? 
(1) 	as legitimizers of the measure on a state level. 
(2) 	as legitimizers of the measure on a local level. 
(3) 	ini~iating activity on a state level. 
(4) 	initiating activity on a local level. 
(S) 	 initiating activity within your organization. 
(6) 	information source to the general public. 
(7) 	information· source to your mem~ership. 
3. 	 What were some of the tasks your organization or group performed in 
the campaign? 
(1) fund raising. 

'(2) mailings to your members. 

(3) 	mailings to general public. 
(4) 	public statements quoted by the press. 
(s) 	public speaking appearances. 
(6) 	inter~organizational coordination. 
(7) 	recruiting and/or organizing manpower. 
(8) 	other. 
4. 	 How did your organization become involved in the cigarette tax campa­
ign? 
(1) personal contact by another involved individual or group. 
(2) decision made independently by your organization or group_ 
(3) decision made independently by your organization leadership. 
s. 	 If the tax measure had been defeated, what would have been the projec­
-ted fiscal impact on your organization or group? 
(1) 	considerable. (3) very little. 
(2) 	slight. (4) none at all. 
6. 	 If your answer to the last question was positive, would your organi­
zation have been involved if there had not been the possibility of 
major fiscal impact? 
(1) 	yes (2) no (3) uncertain 
7. 	 In your district or county, w~ich communication channels listed below 
was the most important in the election outcome? 
(1) 	television (5) public speeches. 
(2) 	radio. (6) door-to-door campaigning. 
(3) 	newspaper advertising. (7) mailings to voters. 
(4) 	news reports. (8) editorial comment. 
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8. 	 In your county or district, which communication channels were used 
for getting information to the voters? 
(1) 	television. (5) public speeches. 
(2) 	radio (6) door-to-door campaigning. 
(3) 	newspaper advertising. (7) mailings to voters. 
(4) 	news reports. (8) editorial comment. 
9. 	 What impact do you think the following groups had in the campaign on 
the state wide level? 
(1) 	higher education. (5) senior citizens. 
(2) 	public employees. «(0 youth. 
(3) 	public education. (7) organized labor. 
(4) 	businesses. (8) other. 
10. 	How would you rate the organization of the cigarette tax campaign on 
a state wide level as compared with other campaigns on state tax 
measures? 
(1) 	very well coordinated. 
(2) 	poorly/coordinated. 
(3) 	cannot compare. 
11. 	 How do you rate the clarity of the proponents of the measure in 
explaining important issues? 
(1) extremely clear. (2) somewhat clear. (3) not clear. 
12. 	 How do you rate the clarity of the opponents of the measure in 
explaining important issues? 
(1) extremely clear. (2) somewhat clear. (3) not clear. 
13. 	 Of the issues selected, which had the most impact in persuading the 
members of your organization or group to vote in favor of the tax? 
(1) 	property tax relief. 
(2) 	cuts to state agencies. 
(3) 	increased college tuition. 
(4) 	against out-of-state tobacco interests. 
(5) 	smoking is dangerous. 
(6) 	state support to public education cuts. 
(7) 	other. . 
14. 	 Of the issues selected, which had the most impact in persuading the 
members of your organization or group to vote against the tax? 
(1) 	regressive, tax. 
(2) 	similarit y to a sales tax. 
(3) 	all taxes too high. 
(4) 	high cost of cigarettes. 
(5) 	danger to property tax relief. 
(6) 	other. 
* 	 Questionnaires mailed to legislators substituted the wording, "your 
organization or group," for "you," or ftyour'constitutents.tt 
208 
APPENDIX D-2 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS TO 
INFLUENTJ.ALS* 
1. 	 How did you or your organization become involved in the canpaign? 
2. 	 What was the extent of your involvement? 
3. 	 In your judgment, would you say that the campaign was well planned? 
Were the most important issues used? Were appropriate campaign 
techniques utilized? 
4. 	 What was the most important factor responsible for the outcome of the 
campaign? (Campaign themes, choice of communication channels, success 
in educating the public, etc.) 
S. 	 What was the impact of the media used? 
6. 	 Which interest groups active in the campaign had the most impact on 
the final vote? Why? 
7. 	 Can you identify key influentials who made public statements support­
ing the ballot measure, and .can.you judge the impact of theit; public 
stance? . 
8. 	 How does this campaign effort compare with previous campaigns you 
have been involved in? What are the similarities? The differences? 
9. 	 Would another campaign run :in the same way succeed? Why or why not? 
10. 	What was the attitude of your membership or constitutency toward the 
issues selected? Why do you think they voted as they did? Did your 
activity in the campaign have any influence on their vote? Why? 
* Includes major questions posed to influentials but not necessarily in 
this order. Spontaneous comments were solicite~ whenever possible. 
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APPE..."ID IX E 
SAMPLE OF PRO-TAX CAMPAIGN COmITTEE FLIERS 
WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN 'IO THE POOR (MEN, IDMEN AND KIDS) ••• 
if the 5¢-a-pack Cigarette Tax doesntt pass on January l8? 
The answe r is obvious: THE POOR WILL BE HI T SO HARD, IT WILL MEAN 
A "LIVING HELL." 
If it's been touch "surviving" on only 80% of what is necessary to 
live on, I~INE LOSING ANOTHER $2z903,000~ 
AND IT COULD GET A LOT WORSE -- WITHOUT ANY PROMISE OF GETTING BETTER. 
"SUPPORT l-DNIES" -- that t s the official phrase for food and shoes and 
.clothes -- MIGHT BE CUT A LOT mRE THAN JUST $9,903,000 -- LIKE 
$17,200,OOO~!! . 
OLD AGE ASSISTANCE COULD BE WIPED OUT -- GOING FROM 

$63.69 PER MONTH 10 $2.69! 

AID 'ID DISABLED COULD BE 2!!! TO $27 82 PER MlNTH.! 

AID '10 DEPENDENT CHILDREN COULD BE SLASHED BY $92 

POR A FAM[LY OF FOUR! 
THE ABUNDANT roOD OR FOOD STAMP PROGRAMS COULD BE 
REDUCED TO 39% OF THE STAt'IDARD NECESSARY TO SIMPLY 
SURVIVE! 
And one more paint 
IF THE $17,200,000 WERE TAKEN AWAY, YOU (x)ULD .Al80 LOSE 
$21,700,000 IN FEDERAL HELP! 
We know your Christmas and New Year will be a tough, miserable and pain­

ful time as it is. 

BUT YOU CANNOT SIr ON YOUR HANDS AND LET THE CANCEROUS CIGARETTE LOBBY 

DBFBAT THE CIGARETTE TAX -- SO THAT YOU CAN STARVE A LITI'LE BIT MORE. 
TALK TO YOUR FRIENDS. MAKE THEM KNOW WHAT COULD HAPPEN. 
And. • • BE SURE THAT YOU AND YOUR FRIENDS VOTE ON TUESDAY, JANUARY 18. 
VOTE "DS" ON THE CIGARETTE TAX. 
'\ 
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WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN TO OREGON t S HIGHER EDUCATION -­
if the 5¢-a-pack Cigarette Tax fai1es to pass in the January 18 
State-wide Special Election? 
FACT: 	 Governor McCall has stated that he WILL CALL ANOTHER SPECIAL 
SESSION SHOULD mE CIGARETTE TAX FAIL. 
FACT: Governor McCall has also stated that he WILL NOT ALLOW FURTHER 
"ACROSS-THE-BOARD" CUTS ON OUR STATE BUDGET. (We've already 
cut more than $36,000,000 from the originally proposed budget.) 
FACT: "SELECTIVE PROGRAM CUTS AND/OR TAX INCREASES WILL HAVE TO BE 
MADE (shou1d.the Cigarette Tax fail) to both balance the State 
Budget (a Constitutional requirementl ) and provide the necessary 
monies to ~alvage priority State services and programs. 
FACT: 	 Either of these "SELECTIVE" programs could be DIRECTED AT 
OREGONtS HIGHER EDUCATION! 
FACT: 	 If the ENTIRE $17,200,000 expected to be raised by the Cigarette 
Tax were taken from the Higher Education instruction budget, 
THE LOSS OF MONEY COULD BE RECOVERED BY A NEARLY DOUBLED INCREASE 
IN TUITIONS FOR RESIDENT UNDERGRADUATE STUDENTS FOR THE 1972-73 
SCHOOL YEAR. 
('ruitions would have to be raised $344 over the present $378 -­
RAISING TUITIONS TO $722 PER YEAR!) 
FACT: 	 If it was determined that this loss of State revenue should be 
recover:-ed by REDUCING TEACHING FACULTY in the State System of 
Higher Education, IT WOULD REQUIRE .A REDUCTION OF 1,140 TEACHING 
FAL"1JLTt MEMBERS FOR THE 1972-73 SCHOOL YEAR. 
THIS RBllJ CTION OF STAFF WOULD BE EQUAL TO THE ENTIRE TEACHING 
STAFF OF THE UNI VERSITY OF OREGON • • • . 
lArticle XI, Section 7: The Legislative Assembly shall not lend the 
credit of the State nor in any manner create any debt or liabilities 
which shall • . • exceed the sum of $50,000. • •n 
Source: 	 Citizens Against Raising Property Taxes, 300 Jackson Tower, 
Portland, Oregon. Bill Gilbert, Treasurer. 
Note: The first page of each flier is reproduced here in its entirety. 
\ 
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.t\PPENDIX F 
TABLES REFERRED TO IN THE TEXT 
'table F-1 
I RELATION OF AGE TO YES-NO VOTE: 
;BENTON poUGLAS 
YES NO 'YES NO 
! ---peNT N peNT N---PCNT N PCNT 
18-21 3 100% 0 0% 1 100% 0 0% 
22-29 8 89 1 11 8 89 1 11 
30-39 12 60 8 40 3 30 7 70 
40-49 8 53 7 47 4 24 13 76 
50-59 9 75 3 25 8 62 5 38 
60­ 8 73 3 26 6 44 9 56 
Table F-2 
RELATION OF SEX TO YES-NO VOTE 
BENTON DOUGLAS 
YES NO YES NO 
N ---PCNT N PCNT N --peNT N PCNT 
Male 17 71% 7 29% 13 50% 13 50% 

Female 31 67 15 33 18 45 22 55 

Table F-3 
RELATION OF RESIDENCE TO YES-NO \UTE 
N 
BENTON 
YES
- PCNT N 
NO 
peNT 
OOUGLAS 
YES
-N peNT N 
NO 
-PCNT 
Metropolitan 
Suburb 
City or Town 
Open Country 
2 
4 
37 
4 
67% 
80 
73 
40 
1 
1 
14 
6 
33% 
20 
27 
60 
0 
3 
20 
6 
0% 
50 
47 
43 
2 
3 
23 
8 
100% 
SO 
S3 
S7 
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Table F-4 
RELATION OF EDUCATION TO YES-NO VOTE 
BENTON DOUGLAS 
YES NO YES NO 
N -PCNT N PCNT N-PCNT N PeNT 
Some High School 1 25% 3 75% 2 40% 3 60% 
High School 10 59 7 41 8 35 15 65 
Some College 11 65 6 35 7 39 11 61 
College 10 77 3 23 7 64 4 36 
Post College 15 83 3 17 5 8,3 1 17 
Table F-5 
RELATION OF OCCUPATION TO YES-NO VOTE 
BENTON DOUGLAS 
YES NO YES NO 
N -PCNT N PCNT N -PCNT N PCNT 
Farm Operator 0 0% 0 0% 1 50% 1 50% 
Housewife 22 79 6 21 8 40 12 60 
Professiona1-Tchn1 13 59 9 41 13 57 10 43 
Bus iness-Mngrl 3 43 4 57 3 38 5 63 
Retired 4 57 3 43 3 43 4 57 
Unemployed 1 100 0 0 0 ,0 a ~o 
Clerical-Sales 1 100 0 0 1 50 1 50 
Table F-6 
RELATION OF INCOl:1E TO YES-NO VOTE 
BENTON DOUGLAS 
YES NO YES NO 
N -PCNT N PCNT N -PCNT N -PCNT 
Under $5,000 11 65% 6 35% 5 56% 4 44% 
$5,000-9,999 9 75 3 25 11 52 10 48 
$10,000-14,999 14 67 7 33 12 57 9 43 
$15,000-25,000 12 80 3 20 3 23 10 77 
$26,OOO-PLUS 2 67 1 33 0 0 2 100 
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Table F-7 
: RELATION OF ORGANIZATION MEMBERSHIP 'TO YES-NO VOTE 
BENTON 'OOUGLAS 
YES NO :YES ' NO 
N PCNT N PCNT N-PCNT N PCNT 
Mem.ber 11 55% 9 45% 9 43% 12 57% 

Non-mem.ber 37 74 13 26 23 50 23 50 
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Table F-8 
ORGANIZATIONAL LEADER INVOLVEMBNT 
, ROW DID YOU BECOME INVOLVED IN THE CAMPAIGN? 
Res~onse Number 
Personal contact by another individual or group: 4 
Decision made by organization independently: 6 
Decision'.made by organizational leadership independently: 4 
WHAT WAS THE EXPECTED FISCAL IMPACT ON YOUR ORGANIZATION OR GROUP? 

Res20nse Number 
Considerable 11 
Slight 1 
Very little 1 
None at all 2 
WOULD YOUR ORGANIZATION HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IF 

THERE RAD NOT BEEN THE POSSIBILITY OF MAJOR FISCAL IMPACT? 

Res~onse Number 
Yes 3 
No 4 
Uncertain 4 
